

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

20 September 2018

Ms. Emma Best
MuckRock News
DEPT MR 51316
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Reference: F-2018-01190

Dear Ms. Best:

This is a final response to your 17 March 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a re-review of the document titled **History of Mobilization and Military Personnel Division 1947 – 1967**. Upon review, we have determined that this document was incorporated into the document titled **The Support Services Historical Series, Mobilization and Military Personnel Division, 1947 – 70**. We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located one document, consisting of 218 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6). A copy of the document and an explanation of exemptions are enclosed. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(l) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. As the CIA Information and Privacy Acting Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Information and Privacy Coordinator
703-613-3007 (Fax)

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Sincerely,



Allison Fong
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Explanation of Exemptions

Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
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- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
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- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.



CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

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The Support Services Historical Series

MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

1947-70

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OP-5

September 1971

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
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MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

1947-70

by(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

September 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

1947-70

I. General(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActA. Introduction

Certain functions within the Central Intelligence Agency require persons with technical skills and experience which are peculiar to the military. Others require persons in military status [redacted] From the Agency standpoint, the use of military personnel relieves it of the requirement to furnish military training and indoctrination. Also, it has been advantageous to the Agency to have personnel throughout the military services who understand the organization and operations of the Agency as well as its capabilities and limitations and who, hopefully, are sympathetic with its aims and methods. To this end, the Agency is unique among other civilian agencies in the effort it expends to insure that military personnel detailed to it are properly employed and administered. From the Department of Defense (DOD) standpoint, participation in Agency operations at appropriate levels by military personnel facilitates liaison and coordination and enhances the Agency's capability to meet DOD requirements.

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As shown in Appendix B, the Agency's requirements for military personnel fluctuated considerably in total members and by military service over the years. Although a breakout by Directorate was not available, it is known that the requirements outside the Clandestine Service, while limited, remained fairly constant. The major shift in the Agency's involvement in covert paramilitary operations. For example, the Agency's military personnel strength increased dramatically during the Korean Emergency from [redacted] in 1950 to [redacted] in 1951, then to [redacted] in 1952, peaking at [redacted] in 1953. At that time the requirements were apportioned among the military services approximately as follows:

	<u>Percent</u>	
Army	[redacted]	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
Air Force	[redacted]	
Navy	[redacted]	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
Marine Corps	[redacted]	

The total requirements gradually decreased after Korea to [redacted] in 1959 but climbed back to [redacted] in 1964 following the Cuban Crisis and Berlin Blockade era. The nature of the operations during this period shifted the apportionment between the military services to the following:

	<u>Percent</u>	
Air Force	[redacted]	
Army	[redacted]	
Navy	[redacted]	
Marine Corps	[redacted]	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

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B. Division Mission and Functions**1. Mission**

The mission of the Mobilization and Military Personnel Division (MMPD) is to maintain liaison with the DOD, obtain the assignment of necessary military personnel, provide administrative support to such persons while on detail to the Agency, monitor the reserve activities and training of Agency civilians affiliated with the reserve programs of the armed services, provide guidance and assistance in support of Agency personnel mobilization planning, and administer the Agency's military deferment program.

2. Functions**a. Military Personnel Support**

The basic and primary function of the Division was the procurement, assignment, administration, and reassignment of the military personnel required by the Agency. Initially, these responsibilities were discharged through the Military Personnel Branch of the Personnel Division of the Agency's Administrative Staff. The Branch was raised to Division level in 1952 to meet the requirements of the large number of military personnel assigned to the Agency during the Korean Emergency.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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c. Military Reserve Affairs

A Military Reserve Affairs Branch was established in the Military Personnel Division on 18 June 1954. Previously, a Reserve Affairs program had been administered by one individual (a Master Sergeant) and consisted of administrative support to Army reserve officers and, to a limited extent, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps officers. Civilian employees who held enlisted reserve status were not included. The establishment of a separate Reserve Affairs Branch under a field grade officer assigned exclusively to such duty was necessitated by a directive from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of Personnel which outlined the objectives to be achieved and the programs to be followed in the development of CIA personnel mobilization planning. This required the identification of all reserve personnel in the Agency, both officer and enlisted, and the implementation of a strong and vigorous reserve training program.

Aside from the above, the problems which surfaced following the Korean Emergency indicated a pressing need for expanding the Agency's administrative control over and support to its employee military reservists. Although there were some Agency-sponsored reserve training units in existence at the beginning of the emergency, the Agency had no control over the mobilization assignments of the individuals. Consequently, a sizable number of employees who were in Ready Reserve status were unexpectedly ordered to active duty by their parent services. Some of the

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affected employees were involved in covert operations outside the United States which made it necessary for the Agency to request cancellation of orders in the national interest. This, of course, did not enhance the Agency's image with the military authorities who were responsible for procuring the additional military manpower required for the Korean Emergency buildup. At the same time, a number of Agency employee Army reservists assumed military status in Korea without proper backstopping at the Washington level. Since they were not being credited with reserve retirement points and could not answer Department of Army inquiries, several of them were discharged for an apparent lack of participation in reserve training activities. Later, when the facts could be surfaced to the Department of the Army, all of the persons involved were reinstated but the law did not permit retroactive credit. One Army reservist, (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) lost five years of reserve service because he remained in uniform after Korea for the Agency's (b)(1) (b)(3) Operation. (b)(3) NatSecAct

In 1955 the Agency succeeded in obtaining an agreement from the DOD under which selected employee reservists could be provided suitable training by the military departments and earmarked for assignment to the Agency in military status in time of emergency. The details of the agreement and ensuing actions are discussed at length in Chapter IV (Military Reserve).

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d. Personnel Mobilization Planning

The Personnel mobilization planning functions were transferred to the Military Personnel Division from the Office of Personnel Plans Staff in 1959, at which time the Division was redesignated as the Mobilization and Military Personnel Division (MMPD).

In 1953 an agreement was established between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff which set forth basic principles governing the activities and military command relationships of the armed forces and CIA in the conduct of unconventional warfare in active theaters of war where American forces were engaged. The objective of this document, known as the Command Relationships Agreement, was to accomplish the intent of the National Security Council directives 10/2 and 10/5 in which the Council had assigned to the Agency responsibility for the development of covert assets for unconventional warfare including, wherever practicable, provision of a base upon which the military might expand in time of war.

Following finalization of the Command Relationships Agreement in 1953 and concurrent with the Agency's initiation of a concerted mobilization planning effort, a Personnel Mobilization Planning Staff was formed under the Director of Personnel. A more detailed discussion of the personnel mobilization planning program that was developed during the period is contained in Chapter III.

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e. Military Deferment

Responsibility for administration of the Agency's military deferment program was transferred from the Personnel Operations Division to MMPD in December 1963. This facilitated coordinated control over military reserve and Selective Service affairs for employees assigned overseas.

The Agency also experienced problems with the military draft early in the Korean Emergency. The Agency did not and never has sought permanent exemption from military service for its employees, but it became necessary to control the timing of military service of certain employees so as not to adversely affect the accomplishment of the Agency's assigned missions. This was successfully accomplished through agreements and procedures which were established between the Agency, the Director of Selective Service, and the Secretary of the Army.

A detailed discussion of the Agency's military deferment program is contained in Chapter VI.

C. Organization and Key Personnel1. Organization

Although the basic organization remained relatively stable during the period with the exception of functions being added or subtracted from time to time as outlined in the preceding paragraph, there were some changes which are worthy of mention:

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a. Prior to 1960, MMPD had a full-time liaison officer on duty with the DDP whose function was to assist the Division in keeping abreast of estimated requirements to support planned operations and resolve problems which arose from time to time. Also, when the number of military personnel assigned to a given Area Division became exceptionally large, such as was the case in the FE Division during and following the Korean Emergency, enlisted administrative personnel were physically located within the Area Division. As the number of military personnel decreased, however, and as the policies and procedures governing the use of military personnel were clarified and accepted, the requirements for special slots outside the Division diminished.

b. For several years MMPD had a separate branch which was responsible for the procurement of all required military personnel. In 1962, however, in the interest of more efficient use of manpower and better coordination, each branch was made responsible for its own procurement. The administration of Navy and Marine Corps details was generally handled by the Army Branch, since the numbers involved from these services did not justify separate branches.

c. The Mobilization Branch (which included the civilian reserve programs) and the Military Reserve Branch were merged in 1960. Since the operations of the two branches were keyed to mobilization planning--the procurement, processing, and administration of civilian

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and military personnel required on mobilization--the merger was effected in order to insure complete coordination between the two activities.

2. Key Personnel

The names of key personnel assigned to the Division during the period are shown in Appendix C.

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II. Military Personnel Support

A. Policies on Agency Use of Military Personnel

As shown in Chapter I, the Agency had requirements for and used active duty military personnel from its formation in 1947. For the first several years the Agency negotiated its requirements with the military services concerned. The DOD issued a directive on the subject in 1952, 1/* but it was limited in scope to statements of policy on length of tours, release by the Agency of officers selected by their service to attend professional schools, eligibility of assigned personnel for overseas service, and the handling of disciplinary problems. A new DOD directive was issued in 1957, 2/ however, which outlined the reasons for assignment of military personnel to CIA, placed restrictions on the use of military personnel in certain skills and under certain conditions, and required that annual estimates of military personnel requirements, along with justification for all new positions, be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Following review by OSD, the estimates were processed to the individual services for review and comment and OSD then made a consolidated reply to the Agency.

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.

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The 1957 directive, which remained in force at this writing (1971), stated that, for purposes of representation and liaison, certain military personnel should be assigned to CIA to provide adequate military participation and support at appropriate levels and that personnel selected for these assignments should be the best qualified and most experienced available, with a well-founded understanding of their own service policies, programs and requirements. It further stated that certain military personnel would be assigned to the Agency to fill positions requiring persons with technical skills and experience peculiar to the military services and that the personnel so assigned should be adequately trained for the function to relieve CIA of a requirement to furnish military-type training (b)(1) and indoctrination. Although the use of military personnel (b)(3) NatSecAct purposes was not mentioned in the directive, these requirements have been accepted as valid over the years. The directive did state, however, that military personnel should not be requested by the Agency to:

.... fill billets requiring persons with language, area or other unusual skills, experience and qualifications which are not intrinsic in military personnel, if such qualification is the primary basis for the request.

.... perform housekeeping functions, communication or clerical duties, to render medical support, or otherwise to be a source of labor and miscellaneous services, if such duty is the primary basis for the request.

.... staff or support CIA installations in undesirable locations or duties except where the assignment of military personnel is agreed to be the most practical solution. In

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such cases CIA should exhaust every possibility to acquire the personnel needed from the U. S. and indigenous labor pool.

With respect to labor and services, however, the directive did state that:

Overseas, where a CIA activity is located near or within a U. S. military installation, the local military commander may, when requested by CIA, and based on a specific agreement approved by the Military Service concerned, provide services of common concern, such as physical security, etc., to CIA as to other branches of the Government, provided that such services can be furnished within current local personnel allocations and subject to fiscal reimbursements where required. Such facilities, or personnel involved, should not normally be turned over to CIA administration.

B. Reimbursement Policies and Procedures

Prior to fiscal year (FY) 1961, the Agency did not reimburse for detailed military personnel who were engaged in paramilitary activities nor did it make direct reimbursement for those military personnel who, although providing services of common concern at certain overseas installations, remained under the jurisdiction of the local military commander. The Department of the Air Force, however, in a letter dated 5 February 1959, requested that CIA make reimbursement for personnel assigned to paramilitary activities, and for certain other personnel not previously detailed to CIA, in a manner which would relieve it of ceiling liability for such personnel. On 30 April 1959 the Director of Personnel submitted a study entitled "Reimbursement for Defense Department Personnel" 3/ in which he recommended that the Agency:

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Accept in reimbursable detail status those military personnel who are performing work exclusively for, and under the administrative command and control of, the Agency, including paramilitary personnel; and

Reimburse the military services under current agreements for services furnished the Agency, including those performed by personnel who are not, for reasons of efficiency, under the command of the Agency.

These recommendations were concurred in by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 15 May 1959 and the Agency's position on the subject was set forth in a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the Secretary of Defense dated 16 May 1959. ^{4/} In this memorandum the DCI pointed out that, in keeping with a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1955 by the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget and the DCI, the Agency budgeted for and reimbursed the DOD for all military personnel detailed to it for all activities other than paramilitary and that reimbursement was also made to the several military services for various other support rendered in accordance with separate support and reimbursement agreements. He stated that, after reviewing the situation, he believed it to be appropriate at that time to revise the 1955 Memorandum of Understanding to provide reimbursement for all detailed military personnel, including those assigned to paramilitary activities, but recommended that allowances be made for those crisis situations wherein substantial numbers of paramilitary personnel that might be required by CIA would be made available on a temporary non-reimbursable basis. He further

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stated that he believed it desirable to establish or reaffirm the general principles under which CIA would reimburse the services for salaries of military personnel and charge CIA personnel ceiling, or reimburse only for services rendered by military personnel utilized in support of CIA activities.

As recommended by the DCI, a new Memorandum of Understanding was developed and signed in 1960. 5/ This agreement stated that CIA would, commencing 1 July 1960, budget for and reimburse the DOD for (a) all military personnel formally assigned to the Agency and (b) the services of those military personnel who were detailed in continuing and substantially full-time support of the Agency but who remained under the command control of the military commander concerned. It specified that the amount of reimbursement for officers would be computed on the basis of an average salary by grade applied to those officers assigned to or detailed in support of the Agency and that, for enlisted personnel, the amount would be computed on the basis of an average salary applied to the total number assigned or detailed in support of the Agency. It also stipulated, as requested by the DCI, that:

In the event of a situation wherein substantial numbers of military personnel are required by the Central Intelligence Agency as a temporary expedient (less than six months), it is agreed that these personnel will be made available without reimbursement for salary.

An interesting feature of this agreement is that it enabled the Agency to obtain military personnel support under certain conditions without

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having to count such personnel against its manpower ceiling. The military services were already authorized to exempt this category of personnel from their potential ceilings by Public Law. 6/ The enabling sentence read:

The Central Intelligence Agency will include in its budget, under an appropriate heading, military personnel not under CIA command and control, who as such, are not reflected as part of its regular personnel strength.

C. Procedures for Development and Submission of Estimated Military Personnel Requirements

Commencing about 1 March each year, MMPD contacted each potential using office within the Agency to secure their estimated requirements for military personnel for the coming fiscal year. In order to reduce the likelihood of having to request piecemeal increases in ceilings during the year, considerable time was spent each year in discussion with potential users in an effort to "foresee" and provide for possible contingencies. As might be expected, there were times when the (b)(3) CIAAct "guesstimates" which were finally submitted and approved proved to be excessive. For example, the Agency was authorized [redacted] military personnel for FY 1954 but the highest "on board" strength during that year was [redacted] Commanding with FY 1955, however, requirements estimates became more realistic in that they were based on known needs plus a 10 percent cushion factor to cover unforeseen contingencies. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

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As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Agency was authorized to request military personnel support for services of common concern under certain conditions. Since the personnel concerned were not assigned to CIA but remained under the command control of the local military commander, these requirements were not included in the annual estimates submitted to the DOD until FY 1970. Prior to this time the service manpower planners were not overly concerned with the small numbers involved, because by law they were excluded from their final strength accountability. It became necessary to include this category in the annual estimates commencing with FY 1970, however, because the DOD manpower authorities decided that all uniformed personnel, regardless of their status, would be charged against the DOD manpower ceilings imposed on the military services.

There is no record of opposition to the Agency's requirements estimates by the individual military services prior to FY 1970. The estimate of requirements for that year, however, somehow reached the Chief of Staff of the Air Force who asked why the Air Force was required to furnish more personnel than all of the other services combined. That simple question sent his staff to general quarters. The simple answer was that the functions [redacted] involved dictated the allocation among the services. In this case, the majority of the Air Force requirements were in the Office of Special Activities which was involved in a joint Air Force-Agency air operation and in the Special

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Operations Division which was responsible for a special mission using Air Force planes. After numerous surveys and meetings, the actual requirements were approved but the Agency was forced to eliminate the 10 percent cushion which had been included and was committed to make every effort to shift some of the requirements away from the Air Force in the future. It had been the practice to send the annual estimates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as specified in the 1957 DOD directive. In order to avoid a repeat of the problems encountered with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in FY 1970, however, the FY 1971 estimates were sent to the attention of the Support Activities Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). That office was the Agency's liaison channel for [redacted] operational support requirements and, through its access to comparable offices in the individual services, was able to process the requirements and obtain concurrence without involving unwitting manpower authorities. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

The annual estimates of military personnel requirements submitted to the DOD reflected total requirements for officer and enlisted personnel by service. After these were approved, the details as to grades and skills were furnished the individual military services which, when approved by them, became the authorized manning documents for that fiscal year.

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D. Responsibility for Procurement and Administration of Detailed Military Personnel

MMPD's responsibilities for the procurement and administration of detailed military personnel, acting for the Director of Personnel, were clearly defined in Agency Regulation 20-51b. ^{7/} These responsibilities included procurement, administration in accordance with the applicable policies and regulations of the military services, and processing for reassignment upon completion of tour of duty. Operating officials initiated and forwarded procurement requests through the head of the appropriate career service to MMPD, using Agency Form 1152 (Personnel Action Request). Each request included a description of the duties to be performed and an explanation of the requirement for a military person, either from the standpoint of skill [redacted]. The approved request also assured MMPD that the office had a position vacancy for the person requested. Assuming that the request was within the approved DOD military personnel authorization, MMPD converted the Agency job description to military terminology and submitted a requisition to the service concerned through prescribed personnel channels. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

As a general rule, the personnel nominated for assignment to the Agency by the military services were of high caliber. Even so, those nominated were screened by MMPD, either by a records profile or by personal interview, before being put into Security and Medical processing. Preliminary screening and pre-entrance on duty processing normally took from six to nine months.

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Operating officials were responsible for the specific use and supervision of military personnel within their respective areas of jurisdiction but MMPD was responsible for all administrative support functions which would be performed by a normal military unit, to include pay, promotion, monitoring of performance reports, awards, and decorations. Particular attention was given to performance reports to ensure that an individual's military record was not harmed through a lack of understanding of the military rating system on the part of a civilian supervisor.

In summary, MMPD, acting for the Director of Personnel, had a responsibility to the Agency to ensure that the military personnel assigned were of the highest caliber, both professionally and morally. At the same time, there was a responsibility to the DOD to make certain that the personnel requested by the Agency were required and fully justified under prescribed criteria. Finally, there was a responsibility to the individuals involved to ensure that the jobs were commensurate with their grades and qualifications and that their careers were not harmed as the result of an assignment to the Agency.

E. "Non-Assigned" Military Personnel Support

The use of the "non-assigned" military personnel support authority contained in the 1957 DOD directive, discussed in A, above, was advantageous to the Agency for several reasons. First, and probably foremost,

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the personnel involved did not count against Agency ceiling. Second, the performance of such functions as physical security and aircraft maintenance, by merely extending the existing military coverage, constituted an economical use of manpower and facilities by avoiding (b)(1) duplication. It also had the potential of enhancing (b)(3) NatSecAct and relieved the Agency of the expense and time which would be required to clear, process, and administer such personnel in an "assigned" status. There were also disadvantages, however. Since the personnel involved remained under the command and control of the local military commander, the Agency had no finite control over the selection of personnel to perform the functions or over the tenure of the personnel involved. For example, since the normal military procedure was to rotate physical security personnel between shifts and posts, it could be expected that the personnel involved in guarding the Agency's facilities would also be rotated. It was therefore essential that the unwitting military personnel involved learn as little as possible about the true nature of the Agency's facilities or operations which they were supporting.

MMPD had neither authority over nor responsibility for the "non-assigned" military personnel support programs prior to 1969. In fact, there was no central Agency control over the establishment and use of these programs. Requirements for new programs were submitted to the JCS [redacted] at the request of a using office. Once established, however, there was no follow-up to determine whether the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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requirements for personnel or services for which the Agency was
(b)(1)
reimbursing remained valid. MMPD received copies of (b)(3) NatSecAct
[redacted] correspondence with the JCS on these programs but normally nothing
more was heard after they were established.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In view of the alarming number of personnel problems which were being surfaced [redacted] the Chief, MMFD, sent a memorandum to the Director of Personnel 8/ in which he expressed his concern about the lack of central control over the establishment and use of the "non-assigned" military personnel support programs and recommended that a task force chaired by the Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (OPPB) be established to study the entire program and recommend specific guidelines and control procedures. The Director of Personnel forwarded the request to BPAM for their comments and recommendations, but when OPPB was contacted several months later to determine the status of the report, it could not be found. In view of that development, Office of Personnel Memorandum 20-51-4 was issued on 10 February 1969 9/ placing responsibility for the establishment and monitoring of all "non-assigned" military personnel support programs under the Director of Personnel, in coordination with [redacted] The OPM directed that use of the program be limited to those situations where the performance of the service would be a logical extension of the function already being performed by the military command concerned and that, since the Agency had no control over the military personnel involved, the program not be used in situations where the personnel concerned would become involved in, or knowledgeable of, sensitive Agency operations. As to procedures, it required that complete justification for the establishment of a position or group of positions under the program be

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

submitted to the Director of Personnel by the Division or Staff concerned, but only after determination that the proposal had been discussed with and concurred in by the local military commander concerned. It also provided for the annual review of ongoing programs. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

As of this writing, the Agency was receiving "non-assigned" military personnel support at [redacted] involving [redacted] Air Force officers, [redacted] airmen, and [redacted] Army enlisted men. In addition, an Air Force request for reimbursement for [redacted] officer and [redacted] airmen spaces for support which they were providing to the Agency's communications facility [redacted] was under consideration. The details of the programs are shown (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Appendix D.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

F. Contingency Requirements for Military Personnel

The Agency found it necessary on several occasions to request the loan of military personnel on temporary-duty status to meet contingency requirements under the authority contained in the 1960 Memorandum of Understanding 5/ discussed in B, above. For example: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

1. In 1961, [redacted] personnel and a number of armored Forces instructor personnel were placed on temporary duty with the Agency by the Department of Army for assistance in training [redacted]

2. In 1963, [redacted] military communications personnel were loaned by the military to enable the Agency to maintain (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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24-hour communications coverage in Central and South America during the Dominican Republic crisis.

3. Also, during the period July 1963 to September 1964,

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
the Department of Navy provided the Agency [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] detachments to train [redacted] in underwater
(b)(1) demolition techniques. (b)(3) NatSecAct

As provided in the 1960 Memorandum of Understanding, reimbursement for salaries was not required for military personnel on temporary duty.

The Agency did, however, absorb all other costs such as travel, per diem, and special clothing if required.

(b)(1)

G. Special Military Detail Program for Vietnam (b)(3) CIAAct

By letter dated 3 December 1966, 10/ the DCI requested the Deputy Secretary of Defense to authorize the loan of some [redacted] volunteer military officers with previous experience in Vietnam as advisors at the sector or sub-sector level, to help the Agency carry out its responsibilities in the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) program and related activities in Vietnam. The Deputy Secretary of Defense formally concurred in the Director's request by letter dated 17 February 1967. 11/ (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

A meeting was held on 8 December 1966 between the J-1, Joint Chiefs of Staff and [redacted] Acting Chief, FE Division (along with other Agency representatives) to discuss the details of the Agency's proposal. It was agreed that, since the Agency would need officers who

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had previously served in Vietnam as advisors to indigenous elements and would want them to serve an 18-month tour rather than the normal 12-month military tour, participation in the program should be on a voluntary basis and that some form of inducement would be in order. With respect to the latter, it was agreed that the Agency would explore the feasibility of offering the pay and allowances of equivalent General Service grades in lieu of military pay, similar to a program which had been established between the Agency for International Development (AID) and the DOD under authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.*

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

* The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 621) and Executive Order 10973 of 3 November 1961 (26 F.R. 10469) authorized the Secretary of State to use military personnel outside the United States and compensate them at any of the rates provided for the Foreign Service Reserve and Staff.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A Memorandum of Understanding was developed between the Agency and each of the military services setting forth the criteria for assignment to the program, length of overseas tour, incentive pay, (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct administrative procedures. 14/ Each officer assigned to the program was also furnished the same specifics in an Agency Letter of Authorization. 15/

The [redacted] spaces authorized by the DOD were allocated as foll (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] to Army, [redacted] to the Marine Corps, [redacted] to the Air Force, and [redacted] the Navy. A total of [redacted] officers were finally selected and assigned to the program. The Air Force fell one short of their quota because they had so few officers who had experience as advisors in Vietnam. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

After assignment to the Agency and prior to movement to Vietnam, each officer received special training which included a six-week course in the Vietnam Training Center of the Foreign Service Institute and an Agency-sponsored South Vietnam Operations Course.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Since the officers were ostensibly [] employees rather than military, one of the major problems which had to be resolved was the development of procedures through which casualties could be reported through military channels. Accordingly, after a series of meetings between military, Agency, [] a Casualty (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Annex 16/ was developed under which all information regarding a casualty received through [] Agency channels would be processed to (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct the appropriate military service through MMPD. Notification of next of kin was to be handled solely by the military. The procedure had to be changed after the first fatality, however. In this case, an unwitting [] night duty officer who received the message immediately (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct notified the next of kin by telephone. In order to preclude similar incidents it was decided that, in event of casualty, [] would (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct notify Headquarters MACV which would then assume the normal notification and evacuation responsibilities. During the operation of the program, three officers were killed in action and eight were wounded in action. A listing of those involved, showing the date and type of casualty, is shown in Appendix E. The first officer to be killed was [] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) [] US Army, who was caught in ambush on 3 October 1967 shortly after his arrival in country. [] US Army, and (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) [] US Marine Corps, were killed during the 1968 Tet offensive. Also, several of the officers were wounded during that period. Although the officers were operating [] the KIA (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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and WIA percentages within this small group were higher than those suffered by other civilians in Vietnam during the same period. In fact, the only Agency employee killed in Vietnam was killed in Hue with [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

[redacted] on 29 February 1968. As to why the casualty rate among the military group was so high, one can only guess that they were inclined, because of their military training, to "take charge" in emergencies. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

[redacted] US Army, who was seriously wounded on 31 January 1968, is a good example. In an account of the action which [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

[redacted] US Navy, wrote on 17 May 1968 (Appendix F) he stated:

Because of the nature of this action, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of enemy killed by [redacted]. The battle lasted for two hours, and during that time he expended about 200 rounds of M-79 ammunition. Of the 39 VC dead left in the compound after the battle, I estimate that [redacted] killed 10 to 15.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[redacted] (an Agency employee)

stated in a recommendation for the Distinguished Service Cross which he submitted on 3 June 1968 (Appendix G):

[redacted] could have done considerably less during the day's battle and still have been properly considered to have displayed great courage. The actions he did perform were a signal service to his comrades, his allies and his country, and they were prompted only by [redacted] own dedication to his duty and his nation, rather than by specific assignment or Orders. By any definition, these actions were heroic, and deserve to be honored by his fellow countrymen.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

[redacted] (their second highest award) for the actions described above; thus he could not be recommended for the DSC.

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If the success of the program could be measured by the number of recommendations for awards for merit and bravery, then there could be no question of the program's value to the US effort in Vietnam. In the 18 months during which the program operated, 32 of the 49 officers were recommended for a total of 64 US and Vietnamese awards. Of these, 19

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were for gallantry in action. Although it was planned that all recommendations for awards would be processed to the headquarters of the military services concerned through MMPD to protect the officers' (b)(1), (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] a number of the recommendations filtered into the MACV system where the awards were approved and presented in the field. A roster of the officers concerned and the awards received or recommended is shown in Appendix H.

Judging from the performance reports rendered on the officers involved in the program and, as discussed above, the recommendations for awards, the program was well worth while. The consensus of opinion within MMPD, however, was that the program was extremely cumbersome and that the mission could have been accomplished at much less cost to the Government by using any 50 highly qualified and motivated young officers nominated and selected under normal procedures.

By restricting the program to "volunteers" who had served one or more prior tours in Vietnam and by offering a bonus to attract such volunteers, the Agency attracted to the program many "professionals" who, because they were the types who volunteered for repeated tours, came complete with all types of family and other personal problems. It was felt that many of the problems could have been avoided if the Support Offices which were to implement the program had known about it in advance. In actuality, the Chief, MMPD, was called on 8 December 1966 by the Deputy Director for Support who stated that he had just learned that there was to

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be a meeting between Agency representatives and the J-1, Joint Chiefs of Staff in approximately one hour to discuss the Director's 3 December 1966 request for the loan of 50 military officers and that he thought MMPD should be represented. The Chief, MMPD, and his Deputy went immediately to the Pentagon and just had time to scan a copy of the Director's letter in the J-1's outer office before the meeting commenced. It was at that meeting that the offer of additional pay as an incentive to get qualified officers to volunteer for the program was made. 17/

H. Special Military Officer Recruitment and Training Programs for CIA Career Potential Employees

Over the years a number of special officer procurement and training programs, which did not represent military personnel requirements per se, were negotiated with the military services through the DOD. The basic goals of these programs, which were first proposed to the Secretary of Defense in March 1951 by the then Director, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, 18/ were to provide the Agency a nucleus of career personnel who had been exposed to military discipline and training, while injecting into the Agency's top and middle strata a healthy leavening of service knowledge, views, and needs. Specifically, the Director proposed that the Agency be permitted to procure yearly through service-controlled sources not more than 150 college graduates interested in a career in intelligence who would be assigned to the Agency in military status after training by the military services. In addition, he proposed that the

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military services accept up to 50 selected college graduates with no military commitments for training in appropriate courses such as Basic Training, Officer Candidate, Intelligence, and Language Schools.

After considerable additional correspondence on the subject between the Director,* the OSD, and the JCS, 19/ the Secretary of Defense, by memorandum dated 23 June 1951, 20/ informed the Director that the services could train up to 200 personnel per year for the Agency but that due to the fact that the supply of ROTC graduates would barely meet the demands of the services during the next ten-year period, the Agency should not procure the personnel from the ROTC programs, the service academies, or the military establishments.

Following receipt of concurrence from the Secretary of Defense, agreements were established between the Agency and all of the military services under which selected individuals would be accepted for training

* When General Smith learned that the JCS planned to recommend that the Agency be denied access to "Service-controlled" sources of manpower, he asked in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense:

Can this small project, which is mutually beneficial and in the interest of national security, be accepted by the Defense agencies without such restrictive conditions? It has been pending for two and a half months already, and, after all, we are co-belligerents.

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in officer candidate schools and assignment to the Agency in military status after specified periods of service with the military service. 21/ All of the agreements were essentially the same, except for differences in annual quotas and length of active duty service required before assignment to the Agency. The Army quota was 70 per year, the Air Force 65, the Navy 55, and the Marine Corps 10.

In spite of the contention by the Joint Chiefs and the DOD in 1951 that "the supply of ROTC graduates would barely meet the demands of the Services during the next ten-year period," the Army and Air Force found in 1954 that they had more ROTC graduates than they could accommodate under their reduced manpower ceilings. Consequently, commencing with the Army ROTC students who were scheduled to graduate in 1955, the Agency was authorized to select and recruit up to 75 per year. 22/ The following year an agreement was made with the Air Force under which the Agency was authorized to select, commencing with the graduating class of 1956, up to 50 AFROTC graduates per year. 23/

According to the records of the Office of Training, entrants into the Career Training Program under the various military recruitment and training programs commencing in 1951 were as follows: (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

1. Army - OCS graduates under the 1951 agreement,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

ROTC officers under the 1954 agreement, and 1 OCS graduate

under a new OCS agreement established in 1966. Apparently the Army OCS program was not used by the Agency after the ROTC

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agreement was established in 1954 because the latter was much more attractive to the individual and, of course, to the Agency. ROTC officers were assigned to the Agency immediately upon completion of their basic branch course (usually nine weeks) where they served the balance of the required two years of active military service. The OCS route required 16 weeks of basic training followed by approximately 20-23 weeks in OCS before commission. A new Army OCS agreement was established in 1966, ^{24/} however, partly to meet anticipated increased requirements in the Agency's CT program and partly as a means of relieving the manpower problems which some of the other Agency offices were experiencing. For example, the Office of Economic Research was finding it impossible to meet its personnel requirements in the economics intelligence skills due to the pressures of the draft and competition from industry.

As it turned out, only one of the Army OCS spaces authorized under the 1966 agreement was used for the CT program but (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] spaces were used for OER, [redacted] for OSI, [redacted] for OSR, and [redacted] for the Office of Communications. There was no actual or planned input into the program after 30 June 1970 because of the Army's drastic reduction in its OCS programs necessitated by the overall military strength reduction.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

The 1954 Army ROTC agreement was amended in 1967, 25/ at the Agency's suggestion, to reduce the annual quota from to and to require that the individuals serve approximately one year with the Army after basic schooling and the balance of their two-year obligation with the Agency. The revised agreement became effective with the 1968 graduating class. The original agreement was made when the Army had more ROTC graduates than it could accommodate. Also, the draft and Vietnam were not public issues in 1954. In 1967, however, the Agency became concerned that the program was enabling individuals to avoid most of the active duty portion of their military obligations which, if publicized, could subject the Agency to criticism. Also, it was felt that under the revised agreement, the Army would realize some return on its investment and that CIA would gain by getting a more knowledgeable and better trained officer for career employment.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

2. Air Force- OCS graduates. Apparently the Agency did not use the AFROTC program which was established in 1955 because the Air Force required their ROTC officers to serve on active duty for three years at that time. The requirement was later increased to four years.

Unlike the Army OCS program, the Agency continued to use the AFOCS program after the Korean Emergency because, it must

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be presumed, the latter was more attractive to the individual. The pre-commission time for the Air Force program was much less than that required by the Army program. In fact, commencing in January 1963 when the Air Force substituted an Officer Training School (OTS) for their OCS program, the requirement for basic training was removed and the course was reduced to 13 weeks

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
in length.

Due to a major reduction in the total AFOCS capability, the Agency's annual quota under that program was reduced in (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

1957 from the original to spaces. The Air Force had

proposed that the quota be reduced to pointing out that an average of slightly less than five officers per year had been

graduated during the six-year period of the agreement. 26/ The

final number was settled at commencing with FY 1958 to meet the Agency's planned expansion in its CT program. 27/ The

quota was raised to spaces per year when the OCS program
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
was converted to the OTS program. 28/

The Agency found in 1966 that it needed more OTS spaces to meet the requirements of the CT program. The greatly increased draft calls required to meet the military personnel requirements in Vietnam had made it difficult for the Agency to procure qualified applicants who were not subject to military service.

Thus on 13 September 1966, at the request of the Office of

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Training, the Air Force was requested to increase the quota (b)(3) CIAAct from [] to [] spaces. 29/ The Air Force non-concurred in the requested increase under the terms of the existing agreement,* but did offer to consider an increase if the Agency would modify the agreement to provide for retention of the officers by the Air Force for three years to perform normal Air Force functions in consonance with Air Force requirements before being assigned to CIA for their final fourth year of active duty. 30/ The Air Force maintained that the goals of the 1951 agreement, which were to inject a healthful leavening of USAF knowledge, views, and needs into the Agency, could not be achieved within the limited time period of one year that the officers remained in the USAF environment. The Agency did not pursue the matter further. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

3. Marine Corps-- [] OCS graduates. Individuals commissioned through this program were obligated to serve on active duty for three years. Under a revised agreement concluded in 1958, [] graduates were assigned to Fleet Marine Force (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct duty for one year after completion of a 30-week basic officers' course and then detailed to CIA for the balance of their active duty obligation. The procedures were modified in 1961 to permit

* Agency-sponsored AFOCS graduates were released from active duty after two years while the normal Air Force requirement was four years.

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assignment of the individuals overseas after completion of the basic course, even though such assignment might result in a delay in reporting to CIA beyond the agreed upon one- (b)(1) year duty with the Fleet Marine Force. 32/ (b)(3) CIAAct

4. Navy- OCS graduates. There is no record to indicate that the Agency ever attempted to establish an agreement with the Department of Navy for use of their Reserve Officer Training Corps program.

The Agency did not enter any new personnel into the military training programs in 1970, due primarily to a major reduction in the strength of the CT program. There were other factors involved, however. The change to a lottery system for draft calls by Selective Service in 1970* and the lowered draft calls in 1969 and 1970 eased the recruiting problems somewhat, but there was also some disenchantment with the programs themselves. A 1970 Office of Training survey of the records of those CT's who had entered through the military programs showed an extremely high attrition rate:

* Starting with calendar year 1970 a system of random selection for military service was established by Selective Service. Under that system, registrants eligible for draft were assigned draft priority numbers by national lottery.

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	<u>Number Trained</u>	<u>Number Resigned or Declined Aptmt.</u>
Air Force		
Army		
Navy	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
Marine Corps		

I. Length of Tours

The problem of "homesteading" military personnel plagued the Agency from the beginning but positive guidelines on the subject were not established in an Agency publication until 30 April 1968, when a Headquarters Notice was issued. 33/* That notice stipulated that the Agency would not, as a matter of general policy, request extension of tours of military personnel except in very unusual and highly important cases. It authorized the Chief, MMPD, to request a one-year extension to the normal tour, but requests for extensions of more than one year or repeated extensions had to have the concurrence of the Director of Personnel. The Office of Special Activities was exempted from normal policy since the military personnel assigned to that office were engaged in joint Agency/Service operations in activities _____ (b)(1) _____ (b)(3) NatSecAct units which were not dissimilar to normal Air Force assignments. 34/

* The guidelines were incorporated in HR 20-51b when HN-20-235 expired in 1969.

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In spite of the best efforts of the Directors of Personnel and the Chief of MMPD during the first several years, the "homesteading" problem kept rearing its ugly head. A survey conducted by the Chief, MMPD, in December 1955 35/ uncovered ten officers who had been with the Agency five or more years. In a memorandum to the Director of Logistics in December 1958, 36/ the Director of Personnel expressed his concern about the practice of extending military personnel for periods upwards of five, six, and seven years:

When we do this, we create the following situation: The person concerned is very often brought close to the conclusion of his 20-year period of active service. The military component from which he came has lost interest in having him back. The quality of his contribution to the Agency in terms of his possession of military skills has declined with every year of service with us, and not infrequently, it is found that he is no more or less than an Agency employee with military status. He, himself, has been led to believe or hope that at the conclusion of his 20 years he will be civilianized into one of the middle or upper GS grades. We, on the other hand, have not faced up to this decision. The result is that by continuing him from year to year we increase our moral obligation to hire him without having given careful consideration of the desirability of taking such action.

Again, in a Memorandum for the Record dated 27 April 1961, 37/ the Chief, MMPD said:

It was observed that large numbers of military men were literally homesteading within the Agency, notwithstanding the policy of three year tours. Many men had been here 5, 6 and 7 years. In some of those cases the men had drifted into jobs not related to their military specialty and for all practical purposes they had ceased to be a military man. We added emphasis to enforcing the 3 year tour length and weeded out a considerable amount of dead wood. Reports from operating officials have confirmed this.

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The problem again surfaced in the fall of 1967 when an Area Division requested the DDCI's assistance in securing further and, indeed, indefinite extension for a Navy yeoman who had already been with the Agency more than six years.* The DDCI disapproved the request and called for a report of military personnel who were then on extended tours with the Agency. The study, which was transmitted to the DDCI on 20 November 1967 by the Deputy Director for Support, 38/ revealed th(b)(3) CIAAct persons were on extension ranging from one to four years beyond the normal three-year tour. The majority of the personnel involved (b)(3) CIAAct

were Air Force personnel who were assigned to US and Foreign Field Activities of the Special Operations Division in self-sustaining [redacted]

[redacted] units.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

After reviewing the report, the DDCI stated 39/:

As a general rule I think it unwise for us to request extensions. If the individual wishes to request extension and we are willing to have him, that's a somewhat different matter. It's more one between the man and his service. Our requests should be confined to unusual cases of patently high importance.

The Executive Director added:

I agree fully with Admiral Taylor and please take necessary steps to make this policy. It is clear that if we keep the military detail too long his military career suffers and in the course of all this we assume a moral obligation for giving him a job when he gets out of the Service. Neither is desirable.

* The requested extension had earlier been disapproved by MMPD.

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The Headquarters Notice, published on 30 April 1968, implemented the policies handed down by the DDCI and the Executive Director.

J. Use of Employee Reservists in Military Status

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

Prior to 1962, Agency employees required in military status were ordered to extended active duty by their parent service and received full 365 days a year military credit toward reserve retirement at age 60. Full credit toward civilian retirement also accrued during this period. It became apparent that the procedures had to be changed after three Army officers became physically disqualified while in actual recall status and became entitled to physical disability retirement pay. Thus,

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in 1962, a procedure of "ostensible" recall was established. Under that procedure the employee concerned was authorized to wear the uniform and in return, assuming that he was active in the Ready Reserve, was awarded Satisfactory Reserve Retirement years (an annual minimum of 50 promotion/retirement points) while in that status. Actual recall to active duty could still be used when it was determined that the sensitivity of the position so required, but these cases were very rare. The proposal to substitute the ostensible recall system for actual recall was proposed by the Navy in a memorandum to the Agency dated 19 March 1962. 40/* On the surface, it appears strange that the initiative to change the system came from the Navy when the physical disability cases were Army. It is the opinion of this writer, however, that the Navy Focal Point Officer (b)(1) picked up the ball at the request of the Chief of the (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct who was being pressed by the Chief, MMPD, for a change in the system. It is believed that it was reasoned that the proposal stood a better chance of being accepted if it came from one of the services rather than from within the Agency.

To the embarrassment of all concerned, the first Navy officer placed in uniform after the revised procedures were proposed by the Navy

* It is interesting to note that Vice Admiral Halloway, Chief of Naval Personnel, had stated in a letter to Colonel White, DDS, on 13 June 1955 41/ that the Navy could find no legal basis for allowing naval reservists to wear the uniform (b)(1) as had been requested by the Agency.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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found himself on actual duty with his military pay account opened when the ostensible orders were erroneously given normal distribution. It was decided to let the case ride and at the end of the tour the records were purged to delete the full military credit and substitute 50 reserve retirement points per year. The first Air Force case was handled in the same manner but only because the Air Force insisted that it be handled that way. The Air Force gave in on the next case, the Navy tightened its distribution controls, and the procedures for all services became more or less uniform.

The majority of those employees selected to fill positions requiring military status were active reservists assigned to one of the Agency-sponsored military reserve units whose military grades were commensurate with the level of the positions they would occupy. In the interests of operational effectiveness, however, a few employees who did not hold active reserve status were documented in an assumed military status and a few were ostensibly recalled in grades higher than their reserve grades. In all such cases, it was imperative that the individuals be capable of carrying out the military role and that their military grades be in line with the grades of other active-duty officers with respect to age and stature. As a rule, an individual in ostensible recall status could not be advanced in grade while on the job since military selection lists and promotions were widely publicized in service publications and military newspapers and journals. These lists were watched very closely by all

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

officers who were in zones of consideration, and the promotion of an individual whose name had not appeared on the list could have endangered [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Requests for the ostensible recall of Agency employees to active military duty were submitted to the Support Activities Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Military Cover Branch, [redacted] 42/ Upon receipt of concurrence, the [redacted] issued a letter of (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] 43/ which, among other things, informed the individual concerned that the authorization granted to wear the uniform was for (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] purposes only and did not entitle the employee or his family to draw supplementary fringe benefits such as retirement, medical care, casualty benefits, or commissary and post exchange privileges except (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct as required in the maintenance [redacted] and in the performance of operational duties. Military pay and leave accounts were not opened for (b)(1)
ostensible recall nor were Social Security payments withheld (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] however, the names of the individuals concerned were placed in the Service Registers as though they were actually on active duty. Their military records were also blocked against unauthorized access.

Although MMPD was not directly involved in negotiating requests for ostensible recall, it had a primary interest in each case. It advised [redacted] regarding the reserve status of nominees, established and maintained "soft" military 201 files for those ostensibly recalled,

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and made certain that those individuals who were in the active reserve received satisfactory retirement years.

There were advantages and disadvantages under both systems. After 1 January 1957, when military personnel came under the Social Security system, employee reservists who were recalled to active duty had Social Security taxes withheld from their military pay. Although the individual drew his Agency pay and turned in the military pay, there was no way that the Social Security taxes withheld could be recouped.* On the other hand, the individual received full credit toward military reserve retirement and full credit toward civilian retirement for the period plus credits toward Social Security. Under the ostensible recall system, the active reservist lost the opportunity to perform annual active duty for training tours with pay because such tours were not compatible with their [redacted]

(b)(1),
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] but they were assured of being awarded satisfactory reserve retirement years without having to attend drills or complete military correspondence courses.

* The question, which was raised in 1964 by an employee who was on active duty as a Navy Captain, was answered in the negative by the Agency's Office of General Counsel in a finding issued on 2 October 1964. 44/

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K. Fluctuation of Military Manpower Requirements

As discussed in Chapter I, the Agency's requirements for military manpower fluctuated over the years according to its involvement in covert paramilitary activities. In the past two years, however, other factors entered the picture. In FY 1970 and FY 1971, CIA, along with all other Federal Agencies, was required to reduce the number of personnel overseas under the President's BALPA (Balance of Payments) and OPRED (Overseas Personnel Reduction) programs. At the same time, the Agency's total personnel ceiling was reduced during each of the fiscal years. Logically, the positions filled by military personnel were prime targets in these reduction in strength programs since the military man would simply be reassigned to his parent service and not replaced. At the same time, the stringent personnel ceilings made the "non-assigned" military personnel support programs very attractive since, under the 1960 agreement discussed earlier, they did not count against ceiling. Some of the requests for "non-assigned" support programs received from the field during this period had to be turned down because they did not fit the criteria of the agreement. The transition from an "assigned" to a "non-assigned" program

(b)(1),
(b)(3) NatSecAct _____ started out to be exceptionally simple and smooth but became complicated because the Stations involved, with the concurrence of the military authorities, insisted on retaining full control over the personnel involved, including Agency security clearance. For many years the Agency had used Army Military Policemen _____

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] as guards and couriers and to [redacted] at (b)(1)
these installations. The number of guards was reduced from [redacted] t(b)(3) CIAAct
during FY 1970 but the Chief, European Division, decided to eliminate (b)(1)
the remaining [redacted] spaces by 30 June 1970. After discussions betwe(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] and the Army Focal Point Officer, US Army (b)(1)
Europe (USAREUR) the Army agreed to furnish [redacted] "non-assigned" g(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] to take over the functions of the (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct "assigned" guards effective 1 July 1970. On 30 June 1970, [redacted] of the
"assigned" guards were transferred on paper from the Agency to the Office
of the Provost Marshal, USAREUR, but remained in place, resulting in an
exceptionally smooth transition. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

The problems started when the time came to procure replacements
for some of the old hands who were scheduled for rotation in December 1970
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct and early 1971. The Chief of Base, [redacted] wanted only volunteers who
could be Agency cleared (including polygraph). With proper lead time,
these could be selected from personnel as they arrived at the theater
reception center but this involved problems of interim assignment pending
clearance by Office of Security. The Chief of Base wanted to seek volun-
teers from personnel already in country but the Military Police Brigade
Commander, who was already operating 400 men understrength, objected to
moving personnel who were already on the job. As a compromise solution,

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

MMPD obtained and passed [redacted] the names of eight Military Police School graduates who were programmed for assignment to Europe in November 1970. These individuals were interviewed by [redacted] personnel on their arrival and those who volunteered for the special assignment were put in process for Agency security clearance. Similar action was planned for early 1971 for replacements required during the first calendar quarter.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct MMPD maintained that the agreed upon [redacted] guard positions should have been manned by personnel assigned to the local military police detachments; that they should not have had access to such Agency operations as to require Agency security clearances, especially polygraph; and that the personnel should have been under the command and control of the local military commander to include housing, messing, and administration. This position was supported by the Chief, European Division but was not accepted by COB [redacted] who had obtained concurrence from the USAREUR Provost Marshal (Brigadier General Moore) for special handling, including use of the housing formerly used by the assigned military guards. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

L. Military Liaison Channels

Special channels and contact points were established within the DOD for the processing of Agency operational and personnel support matters. For the DOD the channel was to the Support Activities Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Similar contact offices were designated

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within each military service as follows:

Army	Special Operations, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters Department of Army
Air Force	Directorate of Personnel Resources and Distribution, Headquarters Department of Air Force
Navy	Interagency Coordination Division, Navy Intelligence Command Headquarters Department of Navy
Marine Corps	Chief, Counterintelligence Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters USMC

MMPD dealt with the offices shown above on non-routine personnel support requirements and in the establishment of new programs or procedures. It dealt directly with personnel assignment officials in each of the military services, however, on routine replacement requirements.

The military services also designated Focal Point Officers in major US and Overseas Commands as points of contact for Agency operational and logistical support requirements. Requirements for "non-assigned" personnel support were also channeled through these officers.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActM. Field Visits by MMPD Officials

The MMPD Division Chiefs made it a practice to visit all overseas stations where military personnel were assigned on an annual basis, funds permitting. Periodic visits were also made by the division chiefs, branch chiefs, and senior NCO's to [redacted] stations which had military personnel assigned. These visits were considered by all concerned to be absolutely essential to the fulfillment of the Agency's responsibilities to the military assignees. There were isolated instances in which it was found that military personnel were required to perform tasks which should have been performed by indigenous labor but these situations were usually corrected with little fanfare. More important, through personal interviews each individual was able to make known his problems, either real or imagined, and know that someone back at Headquarters was concerned about his welfare.

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III. Personnel Mobilization Planning

A. Background

As stated in Chapter I, the Agency's Personnel Mobilization Planning functions were assigned to MMPD in 1959. Prior to that time these functions had been assigned to the Plans Staff, Office of Personnel.

B. Basis for Personnel Mobilization Planning

The Agency's charter for Personnel Mobilization Planning stemmed from NSCID's 10/2 and 10/5 and an agreement established between the Agency and the JCS in 1953 known as the Command Relationships Agreement. The National Security Council assigned to the Agency responsibility for the Development of covert assets for unconventional warfare, including, wherever practicable, provision of a base upon which the military might expand in time of war. The Command Relationships Agreement set forth basic principles governing the activities and military command relationships of the Armed Forces and CIA in the conduct of unconventional warfare in active theaters of war where American forces were engaged.

Following finalization of the Command Relationships Agreement in 1953 and concurrent with the Agency's initiation of a concerted mobilization planning effort, a Personnel Mobilization Planning Staff was formed within the Office of Personnel.

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C. Functions of the Personnel Planning Program

As outlined in Headquarters Regulation 20-14, 45/ the functions of the Personnel Mobilization Planning Program included the determination of the numbers and types of manpower which the Agency would require to carry out its wartime role and the development and establishment of an Agency manpower reserve system which would provide readily accessible sources of qualified manpower when needed.

D. Problems Which Faced the Personnel Planners

Planning for conversion of the Agency to a wartime organization was complicated by the fact it would have to be organized for a dual role--that is, to operate in support of the military in combat theaters of operation while continuing to carry out most of its current civilian agency functions at Headquarters and in areas of the world which did not become combat theaters.

In certain parts of the world, organizations and objectives would remain unchanged. In other areas, such as combat theaters, organizations would be reorganized and certain projects reoriented for wartime application with emphasis placed on CIA support of US military requirements. It was expected that military personnel requirements would increase appreciably in the latter areas. The source of qualified military personnel most readily available would be the Agency's employees with active military reserve status, but their removal from activities which could

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not be contracted or discontinued would create immediate replacement problems.

A situation of "the chicken or the egg" developed between the Headquarters planners and the Overseas planners. The Overseas planners expected Headquarters to establish the theater personnel ceilings first but the Headquarters planners believed that the requirements should be built from the bottom up--that is, that the Overseas planners should determine what personnel would be needed to carry out the anticipated wartime tasks. Once these were received at Headquarters and combined into a total package, the Support offices could then determine the additional personnel they would require to handle the buildup.

The Headquarters planners did make a valiant try. They worked at considerable length endeavoring to develop standard tables of organization which could be used by the Overseas planners to determine their personnel requirements. The problem was that Agency organizations and activities did not fall into standard patterns and there were no experience factors. Aside from this problem, the planners encountered more unknowns when they tried to bring people into the picture. After making a detailed analysis of the personnel on duty in potential combat theaters, it was estimated that approximately 80 percent would be redeployable to the Agency's wartime theater organization. It was also realized, however, that most of the employees would be in civilian status

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and that the Agency could not legally retain them in a combat theater against their will. Another factor which would bear on the number of persons available for redeployment would be the military commander's policy on the presence of civilians in a combat theater, especially female civilians.

E. Personnel Planning Guidelines

In spite of the above, general personnel planning guidelines were developed and published in the Personnel Appendix 46/ to the Agency's Global War Plan:

1. Mobilization Force Basis. It was pointed out that, although the ultimate decision as to the Agency's wartime personnel strength would be determined by the Agency's wartime tasks as reflected in operational plans, consideration would also have to be given to such limiting factors as manpower resources, recruiting capabilities, required lead time for security and medical clearances, and training capacity.

2. Procurement of Personnel for Overseas Commands. Although it was determined that the pipeline for personnel required in the Agency's overseas commands generally should be through Headquarters, it was agreed that limited numbers of support-type personnel not requiring full CIA security clearance could be procured from theater sources provided prior agreements to this effect could be established with the theater military planners.

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3. Personnel Utilization. The maximum possible number of Agency employees on duty in the area on M-Day were to be retained in Theaters of Operation to staff CIA's wartime organization which would be activated. Female employees would be used in mobilization positions for which they were qualified and for which they volunteered, subject to the concurrence of the theater commander. Civilian personnel who were not to remain in the theaters could be used by competent US authority for evacuation and similar emergency assignments as required, but they would not be subject to redeployment.

4. Preparatory Tasks and Responsibilities

a. Chiefs of Staffs, Offices, and Divisions at Headquarters and Senior War Planners and Area Divisions responsible for mobilization planning for overseas areas were tasked with the responsibility of determining and reporting their total mobilization personnel requirements under the following guidelines:

(1) Estimates of manpower requirements would be based on the personnel strength required to fulfill the Agency mission through M plus six months. It was anticipated that CIA, as a civilian agency of the Government, would continue to be manned at Headquarters primarily by civilians but that in the proposed field commands, where operations were to be conducted in support of the military, an appreciable increase could be expected in military manpower requirements.

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(2) Because trained military manpower would be in critical demand for primarily military duties on mobilization, the requirements for military manpower to be placed on the military departments should be held to a minimum. In certain overseas areas, theater policy would dictate that the majority of the Agency's personnel be in military status. Otherwise, designation of positions as requiring military personnel should be limited to those which would:

- (a) Require an individual with specific military skill qualifications,
- (b) Involve the command and administration of military personnel,
- (c) Involve liaison between components of the military services, or
- (d) Require that the incumbent be in military status [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(3) The division of military personnel requirements among the Armed Services would be derived by:

- (a) Assumption as to which service would have the unified command,
- (b) Nature of the qualifications required, or (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (c) [redacted]
- (d) In the absence of practical applicability of the above guides, the division would be 50 percent Army, 25 percent Navy and Marine Corps, and 25 percent Air Force.

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b. The Director of Personnel was charged with responsibility for (1) reviewing the mobilization personnel requirements developed by the planners, (2) establishing and administering the Agency's military and civilian reserve programs, (3) reporting additional military personnel augmentation requirements to the military departments, and (4) planning for the mobilization assignment of personnel in the Agency's military and civilian reserve programs, as well as those to be procured from the military services and those who would be evacuated from theaters of operation.

5. Mobilization Tasks and Responsibilities. The following tasks were to be carried out in event of mobilization:

a. Major CIA Force Commanders* in theaters of operation would furnish Headquarters, by the most expeditious means, (1) the names of employees to be evacuated to the US (those who could not remain in the theater and those surplus to need) and (2) their personnel augmentation requirements for M plus six months, to include numbers by job title and grade, phased buildup desired, and recommended debarkation points.

* Major CIA Force Commanders would be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the theater commander. If a commander-designate had not been identified prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Senior War Planner in the area would act as the CIA Force Commander pending such appointment.

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b. Chiefs of Staffs, Offices, and Divisions at Headquarters would furnish the Director of Personnel (1) the names of employees available for reassignment and (2) personnel augmentation requirements for M plus six months at Headquarters and in field areas not covered by a Senior War Planner, to include numbers by job title and grade, and the phased buildup desired.

c. The Director of Personnel would (1) issue reassignment instructions for Agency employees as appropriate, (2) institute necessary action to call up the Agency's reservists as required, (3) requisition necessary military personnel from the military services, (4) submit requirements for transportation for the movement overseas of priority personnel, (5) establish necessary liaison with the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Civil Service Commission, Selective Service, and the military services, (6) receive, process, and assign augmentation personnel, and (7) prepare and disseminate necessary changes to personnel regulations and procedures.

F. Wartime Administrative Concepts

Since there were no experience factors to draw upon, answers to many of the questions regarding the administration of CIA personnel in combat theaters had to be based on judgment only and were necessarily general in nature.

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1. Following are the guidelines which were set forth in the Personnel Appendix to the Global War Plan:

a. Although Agency rules and regulations would apply, personnel in a combat theater would be subject to the general personnel policies and procedures prescribed by the Theater Commander.

b. Employees who remained in the theater as civilians would be documented in the status which would best enable the performance of their mission. This might include documentation in an assumed military status when such status was determined to be essential, but such action would be accomplished under procedures acceptable to the local military commander concerned and the action would be backstopped at appropriate levels.*

c. True military status would be obtained (a) by order to active duty in the case of reservists or (b) by appointment, enlistment, or induction of eligible non-reservists. Control over the recall of reservists would rest with Headquarters where they would be assigned to the appropriate CIA Theater Command. Under an Army Regulation which would become effective on mobilization or when announced, 47 major

* It was hoped to avoid situations like those which developed during the Korean Emergency when some Agency employee reservists were allowed to wear their military uniforms without proper backstopping and, as a result, were discharged from the reserve for apparent lack of participation.

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commanders would be authorized to announce temporary appointments in commissioned status.*

d. Upon assumption of command, CIA theater commanders would assume jurisdiction over all CIA personnel in the theater.**

e. CIA commanders would, insofar as practical, use military facilities and services for postal exchange, finance, spiritual, and welfare needs. Military facilities would be used for the handling of deceased CIA personnel if available and secure, and special security precautions would be taken in the establishment of procedures for the handling of awards and recommendations.

2. Policy decisions in the following areas were made by the Director of Personnel in response to questions raised by the Senior War Planners:

a. The Pacific Planners asked what could be done about those Agency employees serving overseas at the time of an emergency who were subject to order to active military duty but whose military grades might be considerably lower than their civilian grades. In a memorandum for

* The need for standby authority for temporary appointments was not seen by the other military services. They estimated that their reserve forces would meet their buildup requirements.

**The question as to the role of Headquarters Area Divisions in such situations was left unanswered. It is assumed that in the case of theater organizations where more than one Area Division would be involved, a corresponding Theater Staff would be developed at Headquarters.

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the Special Planning Assistant to the DDS, 48/ the Director of Personnel stated, "As a matter of policy, it should be understood that an employee who accrues the benefits of active military reserve status in peacetime subjects himself to order to active military duty in time of emergency in the military grade held at the time."

b. The Senior War Planner Pacific requested Headquarters to secure DOD authority and advance instructions for the documentation of CIA civilian employees in military status in theaters of operation. In a memorandum for the Chief, War Plans Staff, 49/ the Director of Personnel reported that the idea had been declined by DOD and the individual military services on the grounds that it was a problem which would have to be worked out with local military commanders at the time, on the basis of the needs and merits of each case. He further stated:

In view of the complications which could arise from indiscriminate documentation in an assumed military status or higher military grade, such action should be resorted to only when it is determined that the mission cannot be accomplished through the use of personnel in any other status and when qualified personnel with actual military status are not available.

3. The one unanswerable question which plagued the planners was whether the majority of those employees in the overseas area on mobilization would be willing to remain in the area for redeployment to the Agency's wartime organization since there was no legal authority which

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would prevent an individual from quitting.* At one time, consideration was given to the development of a policy statement to be signed by the Director of Central Intelligence which would be read and acknowledged by employees being assigned overseas. It would have outlined the Agency's wartime role in a theater of operations and the employee's obligation to remain with the Agency's overseas command unless specifically informed to the contrary. The proposed statement was drafted for submission to the Director from the Deputy Director (Plans), 50/ but was never submitted.

4. More detailed guidelines on the procedures visualized for conversion to the wartime organization in a combat theater were contained in a draft handbook entitled Personnel Emergency and Mobilization Planning Guide 51/ but it was never published.** Copies of Appendix A of the draft, however, entitled "Wartime Personnel Procedures in Theaters of Operation," were made available to the Senior War Planners Pacific

* Leaving the theater, however, might prove to be difficult since all transportation would be controlled by the theater commander.

** The draft was reviewed by the Director of Personnel (Mr. Emmett D. Echols) but returned with the comment that although it was an excellent piece of work he felt it was too ambitious. He was probably right in that it was designed so that, when completed, it would govern not only the conversion in a combat theater but also the relocation and reorganization of the Headquarters Force in event of atomic attack against the United States.

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and Europe who later incorporated much of the material in their theater emergency plans. The Appendix contained broad guidelines on:

- (1) Status of personnel in combat theaters.
- (2) Promotion policies.
- (3) Tours of duty.
- (4) Records and reports.
- (5) Personnel losses and loss reporting.
- (6) Personnel loss estimates.
- (7) Periodic reports.
- (8) Personnel procurement.
- (9) Discipline, law, and order.
- (10) Prisoners of war.
- (11) Morale and personnel services such as rest and recreation, decorations and awards, chaplain's service, postal service, recreational equipment, legal assistance, exchange and welfare service.
- (12) Burials, graves registration, and effects.
- (13) Civil affairs and military government.
- (14) Insurance and claims.
- (15) Fiscal procedures.
- (16) Personnel security procedures.
- (17) Evacuation and hospitalization.

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G. Development of the Personnel Requirements1. Military Personnel Requirements

As stated, the personnel planners had hoped to have the personnel requirements developed in an orderly process but time was against them. The DOD had agreed in 1955 to establish a military reserve policy which would assure that those Agency employees who were military reservists would be available to meet the priority portion of the Agency's military personnel requirements on mobilization.* Implementation of the program, however, was contingent upon the Agency determining its estimated military personnel requirements through M plus six months and on DOD acceptance of those requirements. Some of the overseas plans had been developed but they were far from complete. The Headquarters planners had no choice but to develop tables of organization for the missing pieces and then make the decision as to which positions would require personnel with military skills and/or status. While that was being done, the Headquarters Offices, with only a vague concept of what their wartime tasks might be, put together estimates of their military personnel requirements. The task was particularly difficult for the Support Offices because no one could tell them what the total personnel buildup would be.

* For further information on the DOD-CIA Reserve Agreement, see Chapter IV.

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The wartime organization visualized by the Agency's Overseas planners at that time included large and completely self-supporting training and support bases in both the Pacific and European Theaters. When the T/O's were completed and the smoke cleared, the personnel planners came up with a military personnel requirements package of (b)(3) CIAAct. These requirements were discussed with the DOD and later scaled down to [] by reducing the requirements at Headquarters and by reappraisal of the capabilities and limitations of the Agency to support the military in overseas theaters. The reduced requirements--which were divided as follows: [] Army ([] officers and [] enlisted), [] (b)(1) orce [] officers and [] enlisted), [] Navy ([] officers and [] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct [] enlisted), and [] Marine Corps ([] officers and [] enlisted) -- (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct submitted to the DOD by Memo from the DDCI dated 24 May 1956. 51/ (b)(1) The revised requirements were accepted by the DOD and (b)(3) CIAAct subsequently by the military services and included in their total wartime personnel requirements.

2. Estimated Net Increase in Agency Personnel Requirements

Although the Agency's estimated military personnel requirements totaled more than [] the personnel planners estimated that the net increase in personnel requirements would not exceed approximately []. An analysis of the projected wartime organization and tasks had indicated that the Agency's peacetime requirements of approximately 5 percent

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military to 95 percent civilian would change to approximately 40 percent military to 60 percent civilian by M plus six months. There were approximately [] military personnel assigned to the Agency in 1956 and it was estimated that roughly [] employees would be convertible to military status, either as reservists or through temporary appointments and enlistments. That left roughly [] military personnel who would have to be requisitioned from the military services.

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H. Revision of the Personnel Requirements Estimates

The Headquarters personnel planners intended to refine the military personnel requirements estimates as the Overseas planners completed their mobilization tables of organization but, for the reasons explained below, the estimates submitted to the Department of Defense in 1956 were never changed.

Although "pieces" of the theater T/O's were submitted by the Overseas planners from time to time, a complete theater package was not received until August 1960 when the T/O's for the CIA Pacific Headquarters and the Country Commands were transmitted to Headquarters by the Senior War Planner Pacific by Dispatch FHHT-1775 (TS No. 174121). 52/ Much to the surprise of the Headquarters personnel planners, the total additional personnel requirements reflected in the Pacific Theater plans amounted to only [] * as opposed to the 1956 estimate of approximately [] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct

* The additional requirements were reduced from [] to approximately [] in 1962 due to the decision to phase out [] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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The military personnel requirements estimates were not revised at that time for two reasons: (1) it was expected that since complete T/O packages for the European Theater would soon be forthcoming, it would then be possible to arrive at a better estimate as to the additional personnel which the Support Offices would need to accommodate the buildup; and (2) it was realized that a major reduction in the Agency's total wartime military personnel requirements would have made it difficult to justify retention of all the mobilization designee spaces which had been authorized by the military services in the Agency-sponsored reserve units. Fortunately, the military services were apparently not particularly concerned about the numbers, which to them were minute, because the requirements were included in their mobilization plans each year without any requirement for further justification.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

The European Theater T/O's were finally completed and submitted to Headquarters in 1967. Again, much to the surprise of the Headquarters personnel planners, the additional personnel requirements had been pared to the bone. Instead of the almost [] additional personnel requirements which had been estimated in 1956, the plans finally submitted in 1967 showed additional requirements of approximately []. As had been done in the Pacific, the training and support bases had been dropped from the plans. Also, three area headquarters (North, Central, and South), which were to have been established between Headquarters CIA Europe and the country commands, had been eliminated, leaving only the Headquarters

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CIA Europe to be staffed. None of the Station (Country Command) plans called for additional personnel.

I. An Analysis of the Decrease in Estimated Wartime Personnel Requirements

A large portion of the reduction in personnel requirements in the Pacific and European Theaters was caused by the decision to eliminate the support bases from the plans. It is believed that the decision was reached because the theater military planners had agreed that the Agency would be able to draw most of their maintenance and housekeeping support from the military commands with which they would operate. There were other changes, however, which were more difficult to pinpoint.

There is no question but that the emphasis on long-range general emergency planning declined steadily during the 1960's. Obviously, the need for contingency planning and the actual involvement in contingency operations in Southeast Asia took precedence over general emergency planning in the Pacific Theater. The reasons for the decline were not so obvious elsewhere. It is assumed that there were several possible contributing factors: (a) a national planning assumption that future emergencies would be limited rather than general, (b) the withdrawal of France from NATO and the loss of French territory for use as a Theater Support Zone, (c) a general apathetic attitude among the NATO Allies toward the threat from Russia and the Bloc Countries, and (d) an increase in unconventional warfare capabilities within the military services with a concomitant decrease in emphasis and expertise within the Agency.

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IV. Military ReserveA. Need for Control Over Agency Employee Military Reservists

The statutory responsibilities assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act of 1947 were such that the Agency found it expedient to staff a great number of its positions with individuals who had counterpart military experience. The majority of these individuals had retained their military reserve commissions and were actively affiliated with the reserve program of the several Armed Forces. It soon became apparent that steps would have to be taken to develop procedures which would ensure the uninterrupted services of its employee reservists in the event of a general mobilization.

1. Early Negotiations with Individual Military Services--1948-55

On 3 March 1948 a memorandum was sent to each of the military services by the then Director, Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, 54/ requesting that the Agency's employee military reservists be given mobilization assignments to CIA. The services concurred in the Director's request in general terms and established various procedures to carry it out. These were important first steps but not completely satisfactory. Although a total of [redacted] overt employee reservists were given mobilization assignments to the Agency, they were assigned or attached for training

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to 19 different reserve units in the Washington area. None of the covert employee military reservists had been identified to the military services for fear of jeopardizing their cover. The DCI wrote to the military services on 13 July 1948 55/ pointing out that certain of those employees were in danger of being dropped from their reserve status because they could not participate in reserve activities or even provide an address to which official mail could be forwarded. In order to avoid injustice in such cases, he recommended that their reserve status be restored upon presentation of a certificate signed by the Director of Central Intelligence indicating the inclusive dates of employment for covert purposes and that their service during such employment had been such as to warrant restoration. The services agreed to that proposal, but the Department of Navy suggested that the problem could better be solved by flagging their reserve records so that the individuals would not be discharged in the first place without prior clearance with the Agency.* Later that year, in a memorandum dated 17 November 1949, 56/ the DCI requested the Secretary of Defense to prescribe a policy which would enable those reservists who lost their reserve status because they were employed in covert capacities to obtain full restoration of

* The control system suggested by the Navy was established and is still functioning. It was not possible to establish similar procedures with the other services until many years later due to their decentralized control over reserve records.

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active reserve status without loss of prior rights including continuous service and minimum point credits required for reserve retirement purposes. The matter was reviewed by the DOD Civilian Components Policy Board, but the Board ruled that the award of retirement points without active participation in reserve training was unwarranted and of questionable legality. 57/

In order to gain better control over the assignment and training of the Agency's employee reservists, negotiations were undertaken with the military services toward the establishment of CIA-sponsored reserve training units. The road ahead was not a smooth one. The proposal was emphatically turned down by the Chief of Naval Personnel who pointed out in a memorandum dated 22 August 1949 58/ that the existing Naval Reserve program offered an opportunity for all Naval Reserve civilian employees of the Agency to participate in unit training if they so desired and urged that they be advised to avail themselves of the existing opportunities. The first Agency-sponsored unit to be authorized was an Army unit which was activated on 11 March 1949. That was followed by an Air Force unit on 10 May 1949, a Navy unit on 27 February 1950, and a Marine Corps unit in February 1952.* In spite of the firm turndown by the Navy in 1949 cited above, the Agency's employee Naval Reservists managed to accomplish the task by getting the Potomac River Naval Command to authorize the formation of a Volunteer Composite Company. 59/ Although membership in the unit could not be

* The designations of the various reserve units which were provided by the military services for Agency employee reservists during the period, as well as the names of the unit commanders, are shown in Appendix I.

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officially limited to Agency employees, the unit commander was authorized to review and approve or disapprove all applications for membership, thus accomplishing the purpose.

Due to changes in the reserve organization concepts within the military services and the DOD during those early years following World War II, most of the units were subject to continuous reorganization and redesignation. The fact that they managed to survive was attributable in large part to the hard work and dogged determination of a few individual reservists.*

2. Negotiations with the Department of Defense--1955-56

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Command Relationships Agreement established between the Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953 obligated the Agency to plan for the conduct of unconventional warfare operations in support of the military in combat theaters in event of emergency. It became apparent in the early stages of the Agency's planning that, under such circumstances, its military personnel requirements would increase greatly and that all of its employee military reservists should be trained and available to meet the priority portions of such requirements. Although some employee

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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reservists had been designated for mobilization assignment to the Agency, many other employee reservists were not so controlled. By letter to the Secretary of Defense dated 14 May 1955, 60/ the Director of Central Intelligence outlined those facts and requested that an ad hoc Committee be appointed, composed of representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and CIA to study the problem and recommend policies and procedures governing Agency employee military reservists which would:

Provide opportunities for Agency reservists to assume their responsibilities for maintaining military proficiency, and to enable them to secure advancement in military grade commensurate with their age and experience.

Enable Agency reservists, in a manner consistent with security, to remain eligible for at least the same privileges and benefits which accrue to other reservists, including a proportionate share of active and inactive duty training, promotion and retirement credit.

Establish a pool of highly qualified and trained personnel, to be a part of the military services mobilization assignment to CIA.

The Director stated that he believed such a program would be of mutual benefit in the following respects:

Our personnel requirements against the military departments during a war or national emergency would be reduced by the number of Agency reservists utilized in a military status.

A pool of intelligence and unconventional warfare specialists would be available in peacetime to the armed forces to serve for short active duty periods to instruct or to perform other specialized duty.

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With the intensified association between the armed forces and CIA in the event of a national emergency, it would be of considerable value to the armed forces to have among our employees individuals who are kept current on military policies and procedures.

The Committee, which was appointed by the Secretary of Defense as suggested, completed its study in September 1955 61/ and recommended, among other things:

That the CIA submit to each of the military departments through the Secretary of Defense a roster of all the employees of the Agency who have military reserve status in that department, under three headings; the first heading to include those whom the Agency desires and will make available to fill its approved military personnel mobilization requirements, the second heading to include those whom the Agency will make available for other mobilization assignments, and the third heading to include those whom the Agency wishes deferred from military service to continue their civilian employment with the Agency.

That, upon receipt of these lists, the military departments assign the reservists desired by the Agency against the Agency's authorized mobilization requirements for military personnel (subject to other overriding requirements) and otherwise assign or screen the remainder of the reservists as appropriate.

That the reservists having mobilization assignments within the authorized military requirements of the Agency be assigned to training categories and pay training groups as appropriate by the departments concerned, and that a training organization be established by the departments which will permit joint instruction where indicated. That this training be administered and conducted by the military departments, and that ample opportunity be afforded all Agency reservists to participate in such training in a paid or unpaid status as appropriate and to perform active duty for training, in order that they may maintain active reserve status and qualify for the promotion and retirement benefits associated therewith.

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The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) and announced to the service Secretaries by memorandum dated 30 December 1955. 62/

The Agency proceeded immediately to screen and categorize all of its employee military reservists as recommended by the ad hoc Committee:

Category 1. Those designated to be ordered to active duty on mobilization and assigned to the Agency to fill a military manpower requirement. That category included all reservists assigned to Agency-sponsored military reserve units and other reservists in an active status who were not obligated to mobilize elsewhere.

Category 2. Those designated to be released by CIA to the military services if ordered to active duty. That category was comprised generally of those individuals assigned to organized military reserve units not under Agency control.

Category 3. Those designated to be deferred from active duty to continue in their civilian assignments. That category was comprised generally of those individuals in the standby and retired reserve whose availability (b)(1) would be determined by Selective Service. Although (b)(3) CIAAct subject to involuntary recall through Selective Service, they could volunteer for active duty if their services were needed in a military status by the Agency. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

As of 31 May 1956, [] employees having military reserve

status had been identified, screened, and machine coded by service, military grade, and military occupational specialty. As a result (b)(1) that screening, [] were placed in Category 1, [] in Category (b)(3) CIAAct

[] in Category 3.*

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

* As of 31 October 1970 there were [] employee reservists in Category 1, (b)(1)
[] in Category 2, and [] in Category 3 for a total of 1,764. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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B. Coordination Between Reserve Training and Personnel
Mobilization Planning

The following actions were taken to ensure coordination between the military reserve training programs and the Agency's planned utilization of the reservists concerned in event of emergency:

1. Agency policy governing wartime utilization and peacetime training of Agency military reservists was announced in Agency Regulation 20-291 on 16 June 1960. 63/ That regulation made it clear that Agency employee reservists in CIA Category 1 would be available for order to active duty on mobilization and, when so ordered, would be used to meet valid military personnel requirements. It also pointed out that the location and appropriateness of peacetime training would be determined by the Agency insofar as the rules and regulations of the military services permitted. That authority was unrestricted as far as Army and Air Force reservists were concerned because those services had delegated such authority to the Heads of proponent Agencies, but only advisory with respect to the Navy and Marine Corps. The latter services retained complete control over the training of their reservists. Responsibility for planning for the wartime use of the employee reservists and for monitoring their peacetime training was delegated to the Director of Personnel. The Deputy Directors were required to designate representatives of their war planning elements to assist the Director of Personnel in those responsibilities.

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2. A Reserve Advisory Committee composed of representatives from the three Directorates (Intelligence, Plans, and Support), the Office of Training, and the Office of Personnel was formed to assist the Director of Personnel as directed in Regulation 20-291. At the request of the Deputy Director (Support), the Committee studied and arrived at recommended positions on a series of questions regarding the degree of support, direction, and supervision which should be given to the reserve training program by various components of the Agency. The Committee report was approved by the Director of Personnel and forwarded to the Deputy Director (Support) by covering memorandum on 10 January 1961. 64/ The report was approved by the Acting Deputy Director (Support) on 16 January 1961. The Committee concluded, among other things:

a. That the Agency's reserve training program should be primarily military in nature so that the reservists would be capable of performing, in military status, a variety of duties which might be required in the Agency's wartime operations in support of or in coordination with the military. It pointed out that the advantages which would accrue from devoting part of the training program to the study of certain Agency skills as they related to Agency operations in support of the military should not be overlooked, but that it should be expected that proficiency in Agency skills would, as a rule, be maintained through the normal performance of Agency duties.

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b. That responsibility for the coordination of the reserve training program should rest with the Office of Personnel, but that the Director of Training and the Military Reserve Advisory Committee should assist the Director of Personnel in carrying out those responsibilities. Responsibility for the preparation and presentation of lesson materials should remain with the reserve units.

c. That different training for DDI, DDP, and DDS reservists was not required if the premise was accepted that the reserve training program should be primarily military in nature, but that it might be desirable to divide the reservists into functional groups such as (1) Intelligence Collection, (2) Intelligence Production (3) unconventional Warfare, and (4) Support during those phases of the training program concerned with joint operations and CPX-type training exercises.

d. That reservists should not, as a matter of policy, take Agency courses as part of their active duty training, except where certain existing or potential courses were determined to have a direct relationship to the duties to be performed by military personnel who would serve with the Agency in wartime and could be approved by the appropriate military service as proper training for selected employee reservists. Such training should not, however, duplicate that training which had been or otherwise would be undertaken as a requirement of Agency employment.

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e. That the military reserve training program should be organized and administered as follows:

- (1) The Military Reserve Advisory Committee should study and recommend military reserve policies, program training objectives and content, and inactive and active duty training policies and standards.
- (2) The Mobilization and Reserve Branch, MMPD, should act as the executive agent for administration and coordination of the program, conduct liaison with the military departments and secure military speakers and training materials, and arrange for individual active duty training determined to be best suited for the mobilization training of the individual reservist.
- (3) The actual training should be developed and conducted by the reservists themselves, as had been done, augmented by appropriate guest speakers.

3. The Agency's reserve unit commanders were advised regarding the approved recommendations of the Military Reserve Advisory Committee by memorandum from the Director of Personnel dated 15 February 1961. 65/ A suggested training outline which had been prepared by the Advisory Committee for use by the units in the preparation of their training programs was also furnished the unit commanders.

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4. Until 1962 the inactive-duty training programs undertaken by the Agency-sponsored reserve units were devoted for the most part to the study of the organization and functioning of the US, allied, and enemy military forces and to those paramilitary subjects such as guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, evasion and escape, and espionage. When it became apparent in 1962, however, that the most pressing requirement confronting the United States Government at that time and for the foreseeable future was that of combating the spread of military and political Communist subversion in remote and under developed areas,* it was decided that the training objectives should be directed more toward preparing the reservists to carry out tasks appropriate to the Agency role in either covert denied or overt limited warfare. Thus, in a memorandum from the Deputy Director (Support) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), dated 23 April 1962, 66/ the Agency proposed that it be authorized to organize a provisional joint military reserve training command (JMRTC) to permit centralized direction and supervision of active and inactive duty training. Although the joint command would include only personnel of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps units initially, the Agency was hopeful that the Department

* Following Premier Khrushchev's statement that Russia would support "wars of national liberation."

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of Navy would consider the new training approach to constitute appropriate training for the Agency's Navy reservists and that they would permit personnel of the Navy unit to be integrated into the JMRTC. The proposed organization, which was approved by the DOD, consisted of a joint headquarters, including joint general and special staffs, and five regional training commands which were geographically comparable to the Unified Commands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

A formal request was made to the Navy on 8 June 1962 for permission to integrate the Agency's Navy reservists into the JMRTC but, as had been the case on the Agency's request for an Agency-sponsored reserve unit in 1949, the proposal was emphatically turned down by the Chief of Naval Personnel** in a memorandum dated July 1962. 67/ Although the subject was discussed informally with Navy contacts from time to time, it was not until late 1970 that the climate appeared to be favorable for reopening the subject. At the suggestion of Captain W. J. Hepfinger, Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Reserve), the proposal was again made on 19 November 1970 in a memorandum from the Director of Personnel. 68/ The request was still being staffed within the Navy as of 31 December 1970.

* The JMRTC Organization and key personnel are shown in Appendix J.

** Apparently Admiral Smedberg, the Chief of Naval Personnel who signed the memo, was a little embarrassed at having been so firm in the turndown because he added a handwritten note. "I regret that we cannot recognize that your proposal is in the best interests of the Navy."

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C. Military Reserve Training1. General

The development and conduct of sound training programs for the approximately 600 employee reservists assigned to the four Agency-sponsored reserve training units always posed problems. The membership consisted of personnel from every career service in the Agency whose military grades ranged from 2d lieutenant to full colonel and whose civilian grades ranged up through GS-18. From time to time serious consideration was given to organizing and training the reservists by major component (operations, intelligence, and support), but the prevailing view was that training should be general and primarily military in nature so that the reservists would be capable of performing, in military status, a variety of duties which might be required in the Agency's wartime operations in support of or in coordination with the military. Although it was agreed that such training should include subjects peculiar to the Agency's wartime mission in support of the military, it was felt that the programs should not attempt to qualify reservists in new Agency skills, since it was expected that most reservists would continue in wartime in their normal Agency field of specialization and that their full-time Agency employment would provide continuing proficiency in those skills.

A major problem encountered in the conduct of one training program for all Agency reservists was the understandable reluctance on the part

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of the Plans Directorate to having unconventional warfare tradecraft exposed to personnel of the other Agency components. However, with some give and take on both sides, that problem was generally overcome. In that connection, the Director of Personnel took the position that reservists of the Support, Intelligence, and Scientific and Technology Directorates would be able to provide better support to the Agency's UW operations if they had some knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of such programs.

2. Inactive-Duty Training

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Agency's military reserve inactive-duty training was based on a three-year cyclical program related to (a) world-wide US military alliances and commitments, (b) strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of US military forces, (c) missions and capabilities of NATO allies, (d) organization, strengths, and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite military organization and intelligence and counterintelligence services, and (e) CIA's wartime role, with emphasis on the tasks Agency reservists would be expected to carry out in providing direct support to the military in the field of unconventional warfare. A memorandum for the Inspector General, dated 4 April 1960, 69/ from Mr. Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence and, incidentally, Commanding Officer of the Agency's Army reserve unit, provided an excellent overview of the training programs which were conducted during that period. The memorandum also spelled out

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Colonel Amory's view as to the problems which would be involved in any attempt to train the employees for assumed specific mobilization assignments. He stated:

... I think we have got to take a realistic approach to this problem of mobilization planning and specific assignments of personnel to mobilization billets. TO and E units, National Guard outfits and similar reserve components are trained as self-contained units and often enter active service as such. At least the assumption in training them as units is that they will remain intact. In such an organization each man can be and is earmarked and trained to perform a specific job and can realistically be given a specific mobilization designation. The problem confronting the Agency is a much more complicated one and, without going into a discussion of our war planning problems, it seems to me that the emergency will be imminent before we reach the point where we can place any sizeable number of reserves in specific assignments with any reasonable hope that they will actually perform in same when the emergency strikes. There is no tangible benefit achieved by a paper slotting of individuals against proposed mobilization positions if we are not relatively sure of the validity of such assignments. This mistake could be seriously compounded if such a paper exercise were used as a basis for determining the reserve training requirements of each individual and we then set about tailoring a narrow, specialized program for him only to find later that he will be used in some completely different activity.*

In essence, I feel that we must maintain a fairly broad gauge program providing each reservist with diversified training in as many aspects of UW as our capabilities permit so that we will create a pool of at least semi-trained people who can be called upon for a variety of assignments should the need arise.

* The Headquarters personnel planners had reached exactly the same conclusions early in the game. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the employee reservists were too mobile and, in the absence of firm wartime tables of organization, it was impossible to predict where and in what positions they would be needed.

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Commencing in 1962, concurrent with the formation of the Joint Military Reserve Training Command, the training effort was directed toward preparing reservists to carry out tasks believed to be appropriate to the Agency in "limited" as well as "general" war. Priority emphasis was placed on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations for limited war situations including espionage, counterintelligence, operational intelligence, and related support operations. Approximately half of the weekly assemblies were conducted as joint meetings in the Agency's auditorium, with expert guest speakers exploring the basic doctrine of the subject concerned. After each address, each regional training command explored the situation in its geographic area of responsibility in light of the basic doctrine.

In 1967 the counterinsurgency and UW cycle of instruction gave way to the consideration of the broader problem of the national security posture of the United States and its allies, with emphasis on US foreign policy and on the scope and nature of US military commitments under that policy.

3. Active-Duty Training

Maximum effort was made to provide active-duty training which related to and augmented the subjects undertaken in the year's inactive-duty training programs. However, success in that effort was limited. The conduct of annual "summer" training of the units as a whole--

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similar to the practice followed by organized table of organization and equipment reserve and national guard units--was impracticable due to (1) the lack of suitable training facilities for such groups and (2) the impossibility of securing simultaneous release from Agency duties for large groups of reservists. The primary approaches to the problem taken over the years were as follows:

Many individual reservists from the Agency had on-the-job tours in such DOD activities as the Intelligence Staffs of the Army, Air Force, and Navy; the Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Office of International Security Affairs. Maximum use was also made of available quotas for refresher courses at service schools and seminars at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. During recent years a number of the reservists were placed on duty within the Agency for the purpose of developing the unit training programs, specialized active-duty training courses, and reserve training lesson plans. However, the Agency always adhered to the policy that reservists would not under any circumstances be permitted to perform "on-the-job" training within the Agency.

Although it was not possible to develop a sufficient number of meaningful two-week training courses to accommodate all of the annual training requirements of Agency reservists, a number of special courses were arranged with the military outside the Agency and several two-week courses were developed and conducted internally:

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External. Prior to 1962 the Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, presented a number of two-week orientation courses for several groups of 30 to 40 Agency reservists. However, the Center's workload became so heavy in 1962 that the Agency was reluctant to continue requesting such specialized training support. The Agency did, at the Center's suggestion, send a group of 37 reservists to the Center in July 1967 for a two-week course in Psychological Operations, which the Center was presenting for other reservists.

A special two-week orientation course was presented by the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination Center, Little Creek, Virginia, for three groups of approximately 40 Agency reservists each during 1960 and 1961.

Thirty Agency reservists were placed on active duty with Joint Exercise SWIFTSTRIKE, which was conducted in 1962. That was excellent training and the Agency planned to continue maximum participation, but due to the Vietnamese conflict, the military suspended such large joint exercises.

Internal. Although the development and conduct of internal two-week military reserve courses was sporadic, some valuable training was provided over the years.

In 1959 a group of reservists, assisted by the staff and faculty [redacted] developed and presented a special two-week UW course for (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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Agency reservists. The same course was presented to a second group in 1960, but the training workload [redacted] during the ensuing years made it necessary to discontinue the presentation of special courses for military reservists. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Commencing in 1961, in line with the increased emphasis on countering insurgency, two-week courses on Basic Counterinsurgency, Advanced Counterinsurgency, and Intelligence Counterinsurgency were developed and conducted [redacted] Those courses were developed by members of the reserve units and conducted by a combination of guest lecturers and student presentations made on the basis of prepared lesson outlines. The courses were conducted and attended by reservists as follows:

<u>Course</u>	<u>Number of Runnings</u>	<u>Students</u>
Basic Counterinsurgency	16	[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
Advanced Counterinsurgency	13	[redacted]
Intelligence in Counterinsurgency	6	[redacted]

Plans were made to develop a course in Psychological Operations in 1967, but it was decided instead to send a group of officers through the course conducted by the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. However, since that course was available only during the summer months, an Agency course was later developed and presented commencing in 1968. Another course--US Military Involvement in Southeast Asia--was developed and presented in 1970.

4. US Army Reserve School Training Attachments

A considerable number of Agency Army reservists met their training requirements through attachment to appropriate US Army Reserve Schools. That was encouraged as the best means of meeting the Army's prescribed education standards for promotion. Agency reservists found that approach helpful overseas--particularly in Europe, where several USAR School Detachments were available.

D. Administrative and Budgetary Support of Training Units

1. Administrative Support

Prior to 1954, one Air Force enlisted man assigned to the Military Personnel Division was responsible for the internal administrative support of Agency employee military reservists. On 18 June 1954 a Reserve Affairs Branch was formed under a field grade officer, and a second enlisted space was authorized (one Air Force and one Army). A Marine Corps enlisted position was added in 1957 to support Navy and Marine Reservists. A second Army enlisted space was added in 1958 to assist in the support of the large Army unit which had grown to a strength of over officer mobilization designees. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

At the end of 1970 the organization consisted of one officer (civilian), two Army enlisted men, one Air Force enlisted man, and one Marine enlisted man. One of the Army EM spaces had been deleted, however, and the man scheduled for reassignment in May 1971 was not to be replaced.

The names of key personnel who were assigned to the Reserve Branch during the period are shown on Appendix K.

In the early stages the limited personnel available could do little more than maintain locator files and point records. However, the functions were continually broadened over the period to include:

Scheduling of all active-duty training tours for assigned reservists.

Processing all requests for orders for active-duty training.

Support of the inactive-duty training program, to include publication of weekly drill schedules, assistance in arranging for guest speakers, and recording attendance.

Processing of all correspondence between or on behalf of all assigned reservists and parent service pertaining to training attachments, correspondence courses, retirement credits, and promotion consideration.

Maintenance of controls with the Military Departments over all non-unit employee military reservists.

2. Budgetary Support

a. Inactive-Duty Training

Personnel assigned to the Army reserve unit were authorized 12 paid drills per year until 1958 when it was reclassified to a non-pay status. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units were never in drill pay status, although the Navy unit was generally authorized three or four paid slots for command, training, and administrative personnel. In 1970 the unit had two paid slots, the training officer and the admin officer.

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b. Active-Duty Training

The active-duty training tour costs of the Agency's military reservists approximated \$250,000 a year. Budgetary support for that training was handled as follows:

Army

CIA, as the proponent agency for the Army Mobilization Designation unit, received an annual budget allocation from the Department of the Army for active-duty training tours for assigned personnel. Experience showed that approximately 80 percent of CIA's officers performed annual tours, and the allocation was based on that experience factor. Supplementary allocations were readily available if needed so that all personnel were paid for their tours. The FY 1971 allocation was \$125,000.

Air Force

Funds for active-duty training tours for CIA Air Force Reservists now provided through Headquarters Command, Bolling Air Force Base. The Agency never experienced any difficulty in obtaining active-duty training with pay for those reservists available to perform training.

Navy

Training tours for Navy Reservists were administered and funded through Headquarters Fifth Naval District, Norfolk, Virginia. In years past, active-duty training with pay was extremely limited for

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CIA Naval Reservists. That problem was temporarily solved in 1960, when all assigned reservists from the Agency were slotted into specific mobilization billets authorized for the Agency by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Commencing with FY 1971, however, Navy funds for T/O and E units were limited to such an extent that only junior officers (lieutenants and below) were paid.

Marine Corps

Training tours were administered and funded by Headquarters US Marine Corps. As with the Air Force, there was never any difficulty in obtaining active-duty training with pay for those reservists who requested training.

3. Location of Official Military Reserve Records

Army. Initially, the official Army reserve records were maintained at South Post, Fort Myer, Virginia, by the Military District of Washington. When it was discovered in 1956 that many of the records contained material which identified the reservist, and the unit, with CIA, the Army consented to having the records transferred to and maintained by the Reserve Branch, MMPD. That system was continued until the mid-1960's when they were sanitized and transferred to the US Army Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri, for permanent retention. That was done at MMPD request because it had become too cumbersome to ship the files to St. Louis each time they were needed for review by reserve selection boards.

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Navy. Headquarters, Fifth Naval District, Norfolk, Virginia.

Air Force. Headquarters and Headquarters Command, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland.

Marine Corps. Marine Corps Reserve Data Service Center, Kansas City, Missouri.

E. Control Programs

1. Reservists Assigned to Agency-Sponsored Units

Following implementation of the military reserve policy for the Agency which was approved by the Secretary of Defense in 1955, the Agency was assured that those employee reservists assigned to its reserve units (CIA Category 1) would be available for duty with the Agency in military status in event of an emergency. For many years, though, the individuals had to be released from their unit assignments when they were assigned overseas by the Agency. The Navy and Marine Corps centralized control systems were adequate in such cases but, under the decentralized systems of the Army and Air Force, the records of their reservists were usually transferred to the major overseas command. The problem was resolved for Air Force unit personnel in 1959 when the Department of Air Force authorized their retention in the unit while overseas. Similar arrangements were made with the army in 1960 when their regulations were amended to exempt the members of the Agency unit, referred

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to as the Joint Intelligence Coordination Staff, from having their unit assignments terminated while overseas.* The exemption was contained in paragraph 2-7 e (4) (c), AR 140-10, last issued on 25 January 1966.

Authority to retain employee Marine Corps reservists in the Agency unit while overseas was obtained from the Deputy Director, Division of Reserve, Headquarters US Marine Corps on 8 March 1968 70 and for employee Naval reservists from the Chief of Naval Personnel on 16 September 1969. 71/ These arrangements were not necessarily required for control purposes but they did enable the Reserve Branch, MMPD, to provide better support to the individual reservist with respect to his enrollment in military correspondence courses, arranging active-duty training tours, and obtaining waivers for failure to earn minimum reserve retirement points for retention in the active reserve when such was precluded by his overseas duties and/or location.

2. Non-Unit Employee Military Reservists (CIA Category 3)

The Agency had an average of 1,000 Category 3 employee reservists who, under the 1955 DOD Agreement, were not to be ordered to duty in an emergency without prior clearance with the Agency. Control procedures for this category were established with the individual military services

* Mobilization designees to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of Army, already had the exemption.

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as follows:

a. Navy

Initially, the commissioned reservists were controlled by the Mobilization and Reserve Plans Branch, Bureau of Naval Personnel and the enlisted men were controlled at the Naval Reserve Manpower Center, Bainbridge, Maryland. Effective 2 June 1969, pursuant to a memorandum issued by the Office, Chief of Naval Personnel, dated 7 May 1969, 72/ control over the commissioned reservists was transferred to the Naval Reserve Manpower Center. Additions and deletions were provided by MMPD each month.

b. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps control procedures were similar to those established by the Navy. MMPD furnished the Chief, Division of Reserve, Headquarters US Marine Corps, additions and deletions. The individual's record was flagged by the Division of Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve Data Services Center, Kansas City, Missouri, was instructed to contact Headquarters Marine Corps before taking any action in the case.

c. Air Force

Positive control procedures were not established with the Air Force until the Berlin Crisis in 1962. Prior to that time, it had been assumed that there would be adequate time at the beginning of an emergency to identify the Agency Air Force reservists to prevent

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their order to active duty until needed by the Agency. The suddenness of the call-up of individual reservists as fillers in 1962, however, proved that advance controls were necessary. Accordingly, lists of names were furnished the Air Records Center, Denver, Colorado, through the Reserve Division, Headquarters US Air Force. After all Air Force personnel activities were moved to Randolph Air Force Base in Texas, arrangements were made to transmit additions and deletions directly to a cleared contact at the Air Records Center.

d. Army

The Army's system of decentralization always posed problems when the Agency attempted to establish a meaningful control system. Under Army policy the records of reservists located outside the United States were transferred to the administrative control of the major overseas Army commander concerned where they were subject to call to active duty by the Army commander in event of emergency. When it appeared that the Department of Army might delegate authority to the Commander, US Army, Europe, to mobilize the reservists in his command during the Berlin Crisis, it was decided to try to establish a centralized control for the Agency's Army employee reservists overseas who were not assigned to the Agency-sponsored unit. All Chiefs of Station and Base and the Senior War Planners, Pacific and Europe were alerted to the problem by Book Dispatch No. 3539, dated 11 January 1963, 73/ and advised that Headquarters was exploring with the Department

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of Army the possibility of having the records of the Agency's overseas military reservists transferred back to the US and placed under a control group to be established at XXI US Army Corps, Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.* The records of those reservists who were already overseas were not returned to the United States because the situation in Europe eased, but procedures were established under which the records of the Agency reservists who went overseas in the future would remain in the United States. That was accomplished by having the reservists use a post office box which was controlled by MMPD as their mailing address while overseas. A special Holding Unit was established by XXI Corps to which all such personnel were assigned.

Later, when the Army Reserve Corps was deactivated and all non-unit reserve records were transferred to the US Army Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri, the records of the Agency reservists overseas were controlled by removing them from the normal files and placing them in a vaulted area under the control of one person.

3. Reservists Enlisted Under the "Six-Month" Reserve Training Program

The Agency had a number of employees who had elected to fulfill their military service obligation by enlisting in a reserve or National

* The Agency-sponsored reserve unit was under the administration control of XXI Corps at that time.

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Guard unit and, after serving on active duty for training for about four to six months, drilling with that unit for the balance of their six-year obligations. Many of the reservists, however, were not drilling with a unit as required by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 under which the program was authorized because they had moved from the area of original enlistment and either could not or did not try to find a vacancy in a unit in the new area. In the summer of 1967, however, the DOD issued a new directive which required all such individuals to participate satisfactorily in reserve training with a reserve or National Guard unit, regardless of the location of the individual. Those who failed to do so were subject to order to active duty for a period of 24 months less the time already served. Since there were no qualifying reserve or National Guard units outside the United States, the Agency could no longer send employees in that status overseas. The policy, as announced in OPM 20-224, 13 September 1967, ^{74/} also restricted employment of such personnel who would have to terminate their reserve unit assignments to accept such employment, because vacancies in the reserve and National Guard units in the Washington area were extremely scarce.

The DOD authorized the services, as an exception to policy, to discharge persons for dependency; hardship; employment necessary to maintain national health, safety, or interest; or other reasons authorized by military regulations. The Agency's policy in that respect

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(also contained in the cited OPM) was to support a request for discharge in the national interest in certain cases involving assignment overseas in a critical skill or to isolated areas such as Laos or Vietnam. One such case was processed under that policy--the discharge of a Coast Guard reservist was secured in 1968 to permit his assignment to Laos.

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At the time the new DOD regulations were issued, the Agency had a total of [] employees who had remaining military reserve training obligations who were not assigned to drilling units. These were individuals who were in the Career Trainee Program, in critical shift jobs such as watch officer, or were assigned overseas. They were assigned to a Control Group whose records were controlled by the US Army Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, at Army request. Although retention in that status was contrary to the DOD directive, the Records Center agreed to continue its control over that particular group until such time as they could be made available to affiliate with a reserve or National Guard unit or they had completed their reserve obligation.

F. Employee Reservists Assigned to Non-CIA-Sponsored Reserve Units

There were on the average about [] employee reservists placed in Category 2 under the 1955 CIA-DOD Agreement who would be released by the Agency if called to active duty with their units in an emergency.

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A few of them were reservists who had been permitted to join outside units to receive special training not available within the Agency (or to draw drill pay), but the majority were reservists who had served only four to six months and were obligated to drill with organized units. All of the employee reservists in that category had been certified as "Available" by their offices.

G. Screening of Key Federal Employees in the Ready Reserve

The DOD initiated a vigorous program of screening "key" federal employees out of the ready reserve in December 1964. The Office of Emergency Planning,* by memorandum dated 8 December 1964, requested all Federal Agencies to furnish the DOD the names of all employees in the ready reserve, identifying those considered to be "key" employees who could not be released for military service in event of emergency.

CIA submitted a Summary Report (numbers by military grade) by DDCI memorandum dated 11 January 1965, 75/ but withheld the names of the reservists concerned for security reasons. The memorandum also explained that the Agency had not classified any of its ready reservists as "key" within the DOD definition because it was felt that, under the

* The Office of Emergency Planning was responsible for obtaining the information from all non-Department of Defense Federal Agencies.

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Agency's wartime mission of conducting operations in support of the military in combat theaters, it would be more advantageous to have those individuals who were trained in Agency as well as military skills available to fill some of the Agency's priority military personnel requirements on mobilization. The memorandum gave a brief history of the Agency's agreements with the DOD and the military departments and concluded with the recommendation that the Agency continue to screen and categorize its employee reservists under those agreements with the full understanding that all of the Category 1 reservists would be available to their parent service for order to active duty on mobilization and assignment to the Agency to fill approved military positions.

The Office of Emergency Planning, by memorandum dated 2 February 1965, transmitted additional DOD instructions on the screening program for key federal employees. This was in response to a 25 January 1965 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to all military departments, staffs, and agencies requesting that they:

- (1) Take steps to insure that no individual is permitted to hold a mobilization assignment within the same directorate or agency in which he is presently employed as a civilian, and
- (2) Review and reevaluate all ready reservists now occupying a position of GS-15 or higher, on the assumption that personnel holding such civilian positions are to be classified as key employees and hence not available to fill reserve mobilization assignments.

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On 1 March 1965 the Chief, Mobilization and Reserve Branch, MMPD, contacted Captain S. W. Gavitt, USN, Directorate for Reserve Policy, Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) to determine DOD reaction to the DDCI's 11 January 1965 memorandum. Captain Gavitt returned the call on 3 March 1965 and stated that the memorandum had been reviewed and that the Agency's position appeared to be acceptable. He also stated that the Agency would eventually receive a formal reply, but that in the meantime the Agency should proceed on the basis of DOD concurrence. A formal reply was never received from the DOD nor was the subject pursued. The DOD directive requested continuous screening and annual reports. CIA again submitted a Summary Report when the 1966 report was requested by the Office of Emergency Planning, but no further reports were requested.

H. Redesignations of Agency-Sponsored Units

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Some of the unit redesignations which are reflected in Appendix I were required to bring them in line with the overall reserve reorganization programs of the military services while others were accomplished at the request of the Agency [redacted] Most of the redesignations were routine, but retention of a Navy unit beyond 1966 required fast action on the part of the Agency and a helping hand from a junior Naval officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. A letter

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issued by Headquarters Fifth Naval District, Norfolk, Virginia, dated 28 June 1966, 76/ advised that the Agency's Composite Company 5-52 would be deactivated on 31 August 1966. Those instructions were based on Bureau of Naval Personnel Notice 5400, 6 June 1966, 77/ which directed that all Composite Companies within a radius of 50 miles of a Naval Reserve Officers School be disestablished as of 1 September 1966. On 15 July 1966 a memorandum was sent from the Director of Personnel to the Chief, Special Activities Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 78/ requesting that the Agency unit be exempted from the deactivation order or that a suitable substitute unit be authorized. The memorandum reviewed the Agency's requirements for all of its employee military reservists to meet its priority military personnel requirements on mobilization and the 1955 DOD-CIA military reserve agreement under which Agency employee military reservists were to be provided suitable training by the military services and be available for order to active duty and assignment to the Agency to meet its priority military personnel requirements on mobilization. It pointed out that if the company were deactivated as planned and a substitute training unit were not provided, the Navy reservists would have to seek assignments in outside units which would make them unavailable to the Agency in event of mobilization. The request was passed to Lieutenant Tom Barr, the Navy Focal Point

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Officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), who immediately set out to find a home for the Agency unit. After a series of discussions by Lt. Barr and MMPD officials with personnel in the Politico-Military Affairs Division, Office Chief of Naval Operations, that office agreed to sponsor the unit. Accordingly, the unit was redesignated to Politico-Military Affairs Company 5-2 on 1 January 1967.

I. Future Status of Agency-Sponsored Units

Since the justification for the Agency-sponsored units was based on the Agency's anticipated requirements for military personnel on mobilization, and since those requirements, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, had greatly diminished, continuation of the units indefinitely appeared doubtful at the end of 1970. At the request of the Director of Personnel, a preliminary study on the question was completed on 23 December 1970. 79/ It was concluded that:

The mobilization designee positions represented within the four Agency-sponsored reserve units could not be supported under the Agency's current mobilization concept. On the other hand, the program does provide many tangible benefits to the Agency and its employee reservists which should be weighed before reaching a decision to phase it out.

It was recommended that the matter be brought to the attention of the Executive Director-Comptroller for a decision as to:

Whether the program should be continued until such time as the Agency might be requested by one or more of the

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military services to revalidate the wartime military personnel requirements which were submitted in 1956, or whether serious consideration should be given at this time to its discontinuance.

After discussing the matter with the Executive Director-Comptroller, the Director of Personnel instructed MMPD to proceed with a comprehensive study with a view toward a two to three year phaseout of the units.

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V. Civilian Reserve

A. Background

Numerous civilian reserve and alumni programs were discussed and considered within CIA during the period. Three such programs--the National Defense Executive Reserve, the CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve, and the CIA Civilian Standby Reserve--were approved and implemented. Only the Civilian Standby Reserve remains in effect. These programs are discussed separately below.

B. National Defense Executive Reserve

Presidential Executive Order 10660, dated 15 February 1956, 80/ provided for the establishment of a National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) to be administered by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The NDER was to be composed of persons selected from various segments of the civilian economy and from government to be trained for employment in executive positions in the Federal Government during periods of emergency. The Director of ODM invited the DCI to establish a unit of the Executive Reserve in the Agency.

A study which was submitted to the Deputy Director (Support) by the Director of Personnel on 17 April 1956 81/ concluded that, although specific requirements had not been revealed in personnel requirements

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estimates received to that date, there was reasonable basis for designating a reserve of executive personnel, perhaps on the order of two or three hundred, who would be useful in an emergency for replacement purposes and for unforeseeable contingencies. The study, which was approved on 24 April 1956, recommended that the Director of Personnel explore current resources and projected requirements for establishing an Agency executive reserve with the Deputy Directors and senior officials of the Agency while conducting further exploratory discussions with ODM officials regarding training and security problems which might be encountered through Agency participation. ODM plans provided for the establishment of formal training programs for reservists and for possible audits of such programs by ODM. Security factors were also involved since central rosters of executive reservists were to be maintained by the Civil Service Commission.*

As expected, the Plans and Support Directorates were more concerned with potential military personnel requirements and requirements for "specialists" than requirements at the "executive" level. The Intelligence Directorate was interested, however, and, when the decision was made to proceed with the program, entered a total of reservists
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* The Civil Service Commission agreed to omit the names of the Agency's reservists from their centralized register. Those who attended NDER national conferences were documented as ODM reservists.

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into it (Office of National Estimates, Office of Research and Reports, and Office of Scientific Intelligence). The majority of the reservists were either current or former consultants with those offices. The names of those who participated in the program are shown in Appendix L.

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The Agency's program began in 1958. A review of the program in late 1962 showed that it was static and that the Agency's participation in the national program had been extremely limited. Only two reservists attended ODM's National Conference in 1960 and they found it to be too long and of little interest to them. The problem was that, although the sponsoring offices believed they would have valid requirements for their reservists under their anticipated wartime roles, they had not found it practical to assign them to specific mobilization positions. For that reason, and because they had periodic contact with most of their reservists through their consultant status, the sponsoring offices had not considered it necessary to hold special orientation and training sessions with their reservists, as did some of the other Agencies--ODM and the Department of Commerce--which had large Executive Reserve programs. Although the Agency's emergency planning still had not revealed requirements for additional personnel at the executive level, the program did provide a means of filling some of the gaps which might be left in the personnel structure in case of a sudden nuclear attack on the Washington area.

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On 4 October 1962 a study on the program was submitted to the DDCI by the Director of Personnel, 82/ setting forth the above information. The study concluded that "if the program is to be continued on the current or expanded scale, a positive program should be developed under which the reservists would be advised regarding their probable emergency roles and kept up to date on emergency operational plans on a 'need to know' basis as determined by their sponsoring offices." The study recommended that the Agency continue its participation in the NDER program but on the basis that:

Membership in the program be limited to those for whom there is a demonstrable need in essential mobilization functions, either to meet the needs of expanded or new operations or to backstop certain key officials.

The offices which participate in the Executive Reserve program develop positive plans under which their reservists will be advised regarding their probable emergency roles and kept abreast of emergency operational and relocation plans on a 'need to know' basis.

The study did not reach the DDCI because the Assistant Deputy Director (Intelligence) objected to it on the grounds that it did not reflect the fact that the Agency's participation in the program had really been window dressing for intra-government public relations purposes and that the Agency had intentionally made no real attempt to establish an executive mobilization reserve which would be competent and available to assume post-hostilities direction of the Agency (D/Pers

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Memo for the Record, 11 October 1962 83/. [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct
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Deputy Assistant for Administration, DDI and the Director of Personnel agreed that the position of the Agency with respect to the Executive Reserve should be clearly and succinctly brought to the DDCI's attention and that the study should be withheld pending his decision with respect to the Agency's participation in the program. The Executive Director (Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick) agreed with their position and advised them that he would orally explain their position to General Carter (the DDCI). In the course of their discussion with the Executive Director, it was brought out that the Agency did not know what its wartime mission was, if any, and that the maintenance of a large-scale Executive Reserve covering all present missions of the Agency would be expensive and time consuming. The Executive Director indicated that he would recommend to General Carter that the Agency withdraw from the program on the understanding that it would operate its own mobilization plan.

On 19 October 1962 the Executive Director sent the Director of Personnel a routing slip which read as follows:

Let us phase out our participation in this program, and in its stead let us use the Agency Reserve which we last discussed in General Carter's Office with Mr. Dulles last spring.* I think that your office should prepare some type of a reserve plan which

* Mr. Kirkpatrick was referring to the Agency's Civilian Standby Reserve (later called the Civilian Reserve) which is discussed in D, below.

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should be circulated to all components for their comment and agreement. As I see it, our Reserve would consist of consultants and alumni, but we would not go through any expensive procedure of security upkeep or training, but would be satisfied with maintaining contact.

As directed by the Executive Director, a proposed Agency Regulation covering the Civilian Reserve was drafted and placed in formal Agency coordination through the Personnel Advisory Board. By memorandum dated 1 November 1963, 84/ the Director of Personnel proposed to the DCI that the Agency discontinue its participation in the Executive Reserve and rely on the Agency's Civilian ("Alumni") Reserve as its source of additional civilian manpower in event of emergency. The Director of Personnel's proposal was approved and the Director, Office of Emergency Planning (formerly Office of Defense Mobilization) was informed by letter from the DDCI, dated 18 November 1963, 85/ of the Agency's decision. The Director, Office of Emergency Planning acknowledged the DDCI's letter on 21 November 1963 86/ and concurred in the decision.

C. Civilian Specialist Reserve

The activation of a CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve program was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence on 26 January 1958. The program was designed to provide the Agency with a readily available pool of trained civilian specialists whose skills would be required immediately in the event of war or general emergency. The reserve was

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to be comparable in many respects to the Organized Reserve Corps of the Armed Forces. Selected reservists were to report during the first year for a three-day period for medical, security, and personnel processing and for a two-week training assignment. The initial period and the training tours were to be with pay.

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The formation of such a reserve had been under active consideration within the Mobilization Planning Staff, Office of Personnel since 1954. Impetus for the formation of an Agency-wide program was provided by a study which Matthew Baird, Director of Training submitted to the Deputy Director (Support) on 27 June 1956, 87/ in which he outlined Office of Training requirements for professional psychologists in event of emergency and proposed that the Office of Training be authorized to select and initiate recruitment of that number either as civilian reservists or as military mobilization designees. On 26 July 1956 the Deputy Director (Support) sent the OTR study to the Director of Personnel with the following note:

In accordance with our recent discussions I am hesitant to approve the attached recommendation for a -man reserve in the Assessment and Evaluation Staff. I am anxious, however, to get an Agency policy set on this whole matter, after which these things can be approved if they are consistent with the established policy. I would appreciate if the study which I know is in progress concerning Agency policy could be expedited.

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The Civilian Specialist Reserve concept was approved in principle by the CIA Career Council on 13 September 1956, with the recommendation that it be referred to the Project Review Committee (PRC). A Project Outline for the program was prepared and submitted to the PRC in April 1957. 88/ The PRC reviewed the proposal on 1 August 1957 and in paragraph 4, PRC Action No. DD/S-27-58, 89/ recommended that the Agency initiate a limited Civilian Specialist Reserve Program as a pilot activity. The Director of Central Intelligence approved the PRC recommendation on 26 January 1958.

The Deputy Directors (Coordination, Intelligence, Plans, and Support) were advised of the program by Gordon M. Stewart, Director of Personnel, by memorandum dated 12 February 1958, 90/ in which he asked them to identify the components of the Agency which were interested in establishing, at that time, units of the CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve, as well as the number of spaces which would be contemplated for each unit. A pilot program of spaces was then undertaken- Office of Communications, Office of Training, Office of Security, and Foreign Broadcast Information Division.
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The program provided for the tender of appointments in the CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve with the Certificate of Appointment to be signed by the Director of Central Intelligence. 91/ The Terms of Agreement, which were to be provided the individual reservist by the Director of Personnel, 92/ advised the individual that he would become

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a member of the CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve in a compensation
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bracket equivalent to a specific GS grade. (b)(3) CIAAct

A review of the program conducted in late 1959 showed that recruitment for the program had been difficult and uneven. Out of a total of approximately [] persons who had been nominated for the program by the interested offices, only [] had been entered on duty. A total of [] had been cleared for entrance on duty but, because of budgetary cuts required for 1960, funds for their processing and training were not available. In view of the problems which were being encountered, the Office of Personnel surveyed the interested offices to determine whether they would favor discontinuing the program. All of the offices except the Office of Communications concurred in its discontinuance. Commo wanted to test the program for one or two years because of the acute need for additional communications personnel which would exist at the beginning of an emergency. Accordingly, by memorandum dated 11 December 1959, 93/ Gordon M. Stewart, Director of Personnel proposed to the Deputy Director (Support) that the program be discontinued except for the Office of Communications. He stated that the Office of Personnel would continue to process prospective Office of Communications candidates for the program up to and including entrance on duty, but he recommended that the costs connected with entrance on duty and subsequent active-duty training be budgeted for by the Office of Communications and that the administration of the reservists after

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entrance on duty be handled by the Office of Communications. The Deputy Director (Support) concurred in the proposal on 11 December 1959.

The Office of Communications decided to discontinue the program the following year because it was found that the individual reservists were finding it extremely difficult if not impossible to leave their jobs for a two-week training tour in a program which could not be divulged to their employers.

D. Civilian Standby Reserve

The concept of a Civilian Standby Reserve was approved in principle by the Career Council on 20 February 1958. The purpose of the program was to establish and maintain a current roster of selected former employees who would be willing to make themselves available to return to the Agency if needed during an emergency. It was not contemplated that there would be any training given the individuals selected nor would any travel, per diem, or salary payments be involved.

By memorandum dated 28 May 1958, 94/ Gordon Stewart transmitted the names of former employees (GS-07 and above) to the Deputy Directors (Intelligence, Plans, and Support) and requested that they identify those who they believed should be included in the program.

Of the nominated, only were cleared by the Offices of Security,

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Medical, and [redacted] to be invited to participate in the program by the Director of Personnel. Subsequently, monthly separation rosters were screened by the Office of Personnel and selected candidates were processed for contact.

In January 1962 the Director, Mr. John A. McCone, requested that the Director of Personnel consider the establishment of an organized CIA league, reserve, or alumni association. It was the Director's view that such an organization would make a real contribution to the Agency in terms of a pool of qualified consultants, a ready reserve, and enthusiastic supporters of the Agency. He anticipated that the members would be invited to Washington for periodic briefings. In complying with the Director's request, the Director of Personnel established a committee composed of representatives from each of the three Directorates, the Office of Training, and the Office of Security to assess the feasibility of such a project. The committee concluded that:

To encourage or promote an overt alumni association that would be open to all former employees would not be in the Agency's best interests due to the cost of such an undertaking, the many security problems that would likely arise and the possible adverse publicity that could accrue to the Agency.

The Agency could cooperate with the Veterans of Strategic Services (whose New York Chapter was quite active) and possibly arrange to have selected former employees join that organization and assist the Agency through it. The Agency, however, would be unable to control the organization, the security problems that could arise with an overt organization would still be present, and the interests of many former employees would not be identical to the members of the Veterans of Strategic Services. Thus, the disadvantages of such an arrangement would outweigh any advantages.

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The Agency, on the other hand, could make use of selected former employees to assist in limited fields of activities if properly controlled. These could include assistance in recruitment of personnel, finding outside employment for personnel leaving the Agency, the reporting of [redacted] opportunities for investigative leads, and certain operational activities and special (b)(1) tasks that could be performed by persons outside the (b)(3) NatSecAct Agency. Such a reserve would also have additional value as a potential source of manpower in event of emergency or wartime expansion.

To implement such a program, the Agency should initially utilize the existing Civilian Standby Reserve which, although a passive activity, could be changed to an active unit at comparatively small cost.

The findings of the committee were transmitted to the DDCI by Emmett D. Echols, the Director of Personnel, in a memorandum dated 23 April 1962, 95/ in which he recommended that the Director of Personnel be directed to develop a detailed program to utilize selected former employees to assist the Agency. The recommendation was approved by the DDCI on 1 May 1962.

The Standby Reserve Program, which was designed solely to provide a reserve of experienced Agency employees who would be willing to return to the Agency under conditions of an emergency or wartime expansion, was revised so that it would provide a list of professional and technical personnel qualified and willing to assist the Agency on an occasional basis as the need might arise with a secondary objective of providing a source of manpower for emergencies. The revised program, which was called the Civilian Reserve Program, was outlined in

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Headquarters Regulation 20-15 which was published on 9 June 1964. 96/
About half of the approximately [redacted] persons who were members of the Civilian Standby Reserve were invited to affiliate with the revised program. Those not invited to continue were lower-graded, non-technical personnel who would have had limited potential for rendering assistance in current operations.

Although the revised Civilian Reserve program was intended to be an active program, it turned out to be almost as passive as the original Standby Reserve. There was no lack of willingness on the part of the reservists to assist the Agency but very few requests for assistance were levied on the Office of Personnel by potential users. Much of the problem was undoubtedly due to the lack of awareness throughout the Agency that such a program existed. The Office of Domestic Operations reviewed the files periodically and [redacted] requested the names of reservists who were in colleges and universities on the East and West Coasts, but for many years that was about the extent of interest. The Soviet Bloc Division became interested in 1970 and began to work with the program to identify and maintain contact with individuals leaving the Agency who planned to reside in certain areas overseas. The names and addresses of all reservists were furnished the Office of Personnel Field Recruiters from time to time but there was no indication that any of the reservists were ever contacted. The Office of Personnel Retirement Division began to look at the program

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in 1970 with a view to securing assistance in finding employment for retiring Agency employees. The program was administered and maintained manually within MMPD. With a view toward developing a capability of producing and disseminating periodic rosters of the reservists which could include enough basic information to alert possible users to the potential of the program, MMPD recommended that the program be approved for early inclusion in the Agency's electronic data processing system. A Support Information Processing Staff (SIPS) Team conducted a study of the Civilian Reserve program to determine whether computer support was justified. In its report, which was completed in November 1969, 97 the Team concluded that:

If the Civilian Reserve Program will be used as a central control point for former employees, then it is the conclusion of this group that computer support, which would greatly increase the effectiveness and response of the Civilian Reserve Program, is definitely feasible and quite necessary.

The Team recommended that:

The above proposed Civilian Reserve Program be accepted for implementation if Agency components now utilizing their own supplemental directories use the Civilian Reserve Program as the central data bank for storing and retrieving information on former employees.

If this centralization does not occur and sufficient use will not be made of the Civilian Reserve Program without it, then computer support for the Program is not recommended.

The problem was that, although the Agency Regulation published in 1964 provided for a centralized reserve directory to be established and

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maintained by the Director of Personnel, the last subparagraph of the regulation stated that "Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as preventing Agency components from maintaining, or as restricting the maintenance of, supplementary directories of former employees and associates of the Agency for use in specific operational capacities."* In the course of discussing the Civilian Reserve Program with various offices throughout the Agency, the SIPS Team discovered that information on former Clandestine Service personnel was being maintained in the office of the Chief, Clandestine Service Personnel Staff, much of which duplicated the central system being maintained by the Office of Personnel. Aside from being duplicatory, however, it was found that the files being maintained within the Clandestine Service soon became dated because there was no contact with the individuals after they left the Agency.

With a view toward overcoming the objections raised by the SIPS Team regarding the maintenance of lists of former employees by offices other than Personnel, proposed guidelines governing operation of the Civilian Reserve program were developed and transmitted to the Deputy Directors (Plans, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Support) by memorandum from Robert S. Wattles, Director of Personnel, 28 May

* That particular paragraph had been added to the regulation at the insistence of the Clandestine Service.

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1970, 98/ requesting their consideration and approval in principle.

The key paragraph of the guidelines paper read:

The establishment and maintenance of a current Civilian Reserve Directory of selected former employees shall be the responsibility of the Director of Personnel. In order to guard against the possible compromise of individuals in this Directory, duplicate lists will not be maintained within individual offices nor will contact be made with a member of the program without clearance with the Office of Personnel.

The guidelines were concurred in by the Deputy Directors* and HR 20-15 was redrafted to conform to the guidelines and placed in Agency coordination on 18 September 1970. 100/ The language in the draft HR was not as strong as that contained in the guidelines but it was at least an improvement over the 1964 issuance. It read, "In the interest of economy and security, duplicate directorates should not be maintained in Agency components."**

The Director of Personnel was advised by memorandum from [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
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[redacted] DDP/OP, dated 25 September 1970, 101/ that Mr. Karamessines, DDP, had designated [redacted] to establish a system through (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) which it would be possible to identify rapidly a former Clandestine (b)(6)

* The approval which was of primary interest to the Office of Personnel was that of the Deputy Director for Plans, which was signed by Mr. Karamessines on 12 June 1970. 99/

** As of the end of 1970 the revised HR 20-15 was still in coordination.

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Service employee in terms of his capability for a specific task and to be able to get in touch with him quickly. The program would include detailed discussion with those approaching retirement as to their interest in availability for post-retirement service, their qualifications, and their plans after departure from the Agency. He stated the program might be extended to have the retirees visit Headquarters on occasion or be contacted, particularly if operational tasks were contemplated, by [redacted] at the retiree's location.

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[redacted] would keep in close touch with the Clandestine Service components in connection with their requirements. He stated that in developing the program, [redacted] would work closely with elements of the Office of Personnel, especially the Retirement Affairs Division and MMPD, to assure that any duplication or overlap of responsibilities was minimized and that no confusion or flaps occurred as a result of dual contacts with the persons involved. There was some concern within the Office of Personnel that the Clandestine Service program would be divorced from the central system but, happily, [redacted] coordinated his efforts closely with MMPD and individuals in whom they were interested who were not already in the central system were added to it. A memorandum for all Clandestine Service Staff and Division Chiefs signed by Mr. Karamessines on 21 December 1970 102/ confirmed the fact that the Clandestine Service effort would function within the

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central system. It stated in part: "An officer has been designated within OPSER/ CSPS to work with the Agency's Civilian Reserve Program in maintaining a register of ex-employees." (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

At the end of 1970, approximately [redacted] former employees were members of the Agency's Civilian Reserve program. Barring any unforeseen problems, it appeared that the program would be incorporated into the Agency's computerized Manpower Control System by 1972.

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VI. Military Deferment

A. General

The Central Intelligence Agency, like other employers, periodically faced manpower losses when US military commitments required increases in the Armed Forces through the draft. The Agency consistently adhered to normal Selective Service rules and procedures with respect to requesting occupational deferments for its employees at Headquarters, but it was necessary to establish special programs and procedures for certain employees assigned to or selected for assignment overseas. Even so, the Agency never sought exemption from service for its personnel, only control of the timing of the military service so that coverage of its assigned missions would not be adversely affected.

B. Special Draft Deferment and Army Enlistment Programs

1. Korean Emergency Period

a. Development of Special Deferment Program for Overseas Personnel

The Korean Emergency (July 1950-July 1953) posed particular manpower problems for the Agency, specifically in terms of potential loss of personnel involved in or selected for overseas operations. Selective Service Regulations provided routine procedures for employers to request occupational deferments in the national

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interest through an individual's local selective service board. It was not possible, however, for the Agency to follow the routine procedures for deferment requests for cover and security reasons. On 25 June 1950 the CIA Director of Personnel, Mr. William J. Kelly, met with Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service, to discuss the possibilities of arranging secure procedures for handling occupational deferments for personnel assigned or selected for assignment to Agency overseas operations. As recorded by Mr. Kelly in a Memorandum for the Record on 28 July 1950, 103/ agreements were reached and the following policies and procedures were concurred in by General Hershey:

- (1) There would be no formal inter-office correspondence on the subject of special deferment agreements for CIA personnel. General Hershey was concerned over the resultant criticism if these agreements were to become public knowledge.
- (2) The Agency would designate one officer who would be responsible for CIA approval of each deferment and who would personally hand carry each request directly to General Hershey. The Agency initially designated the Director of Personnel as the responsible officer. General Hershey subsequently designated Colonel Daniel O. Omer, General Counsel, Selective Service System, as his authorized contact in these matters; and CIA appointed the Executive Officer/Office of the Director of Personnel as the Agency's responsible officer.
- (3) "Special" deferments would be arranged for employees overseas on secret missions of such a nature that their duties could not, in the

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national interest, be divulged to the Selective Service System. Requests for deferments on this type of employee were approved only when the individual was scheduled to depart for overseas assignments within six months after such deferment was requested. General Hershey agreed to accept all requests for deferments without question as to where the employee was assigned or what duties he was performing. He held CIA honor-bound to submit deferment requests only on individuals who were eligible under criteria agreed upon.

(4) General Hershey stated that he would arrange individual deferments in a manner of his own choosing. He indicated that he would either direct the State Directors of Selective Service to classify the individual as a "Directed 4-F," or General Hershey, himself, would ask that files be sent to National Selective Headquarters where he would "sit on them." He would then issue a Directed 4-F classification for the individual.*

(5) The Agency agreed that deferments arranged under the special agreement with General Hershey would be canceled by CIA within 30 days after a deferred employee returned from overseas. The Directed 4-F classification card signed by General Hershey would be returned to his office.

(6) Upon initiation of a request for deferment to General Hershey, the individual was prohibited

* A Directed 4-F classification is a category whereby the Director of Selective Service could direct deferments on individuals involved in national security work for the US Government.

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from corresponding with his local board. All contacts with his local board had to be made through CIA and General Hershey's office. National Selective Service Headquarters would then handle local board contacts.

Paragraph 12 C (4) (a) (1) of CIA Regulation Number 20-12, issued on 1 May 1959, 104/ made reference to the deferment program for personnel assigned to, or being trained for definite later assignment to, positions abroad, but in accordance with General Hershey's wishes gave no details and made no reference to Headquarters Selective Service.

b. Development of Special Army Enlistment Program

The agreements with General Hershey for deferment of personnel selected for overseas assignments assured protection from induction only for the duration of the overseas duty. As a result of those deferments, draft eligibility was extended to age 35, and the returnee again became liable for induction. The probability that CIA service would be followed by military service, through the draft, developed a major obstacle to retention of personnel and the recruitment of qualified personnel. That, in turn, created a serious problem for the Agency in meeting operational program commitments. On 6 February 1952, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence, submitted a proposal to the Honorable Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, 105/ outlining the Agency's circumstances and recommending that a special enlistment program be established for selected draft-eligible

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

employees. He proposed that not more than [] paramilitary, scientific, and technical personnel per year be recruited and enlisted in the Army who, upon completion of basic military training, would be released from active service in the national interest, transferred to the reserve, and returned to CIA for resumption of duty.

Mr. Pace informed General Smith by letter dated 25 March 1952 106/ that he concurred in the proposal in principle, provided there were no objections by the Director of Selective Service. Details of the proposal, together with Mr. Pace's admonition, were transmitted to General Hershey by Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Acting DCI, on 3 April 1952. 107/ General Hershey informed Mr. Dulles by letter dated 4 April 1952 108/ that he had no objection to the proposal. Accordingly, a program known as the "Equivalent Military Credit Program" was established by CIA Regulation 20-21 on 29 October 1952. 109/ The rules of the program were fairly restrictive. Individuals who participated in the program were required to continue in it for a period of time sufficient to serve a two-year overseas tour in a civilian status for the Agency, in addition to Army and Agency training time. That tour could occur either before or after active military service. Personnel enrolled in the program who were not required to serve overseas were required to serve a minimum of two years in a civilian status for the Agency, exclusive of Army and Agency training time. Separation prior to satisfactory completion of the required Agency tour, except

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for reasons of physical disability, made the individual liable for recall to active duty from the reserve upon release from the Agency.

2. Post-Korean Emergency

a. Background

The termination of hostilities in Korea in July 1953 resulted in a marked reduction in Selective Service call-ups. The continuing requirements for military manpower, however, sustained national draft quotas at a level higher than the years prior to the Korean War period. The Agency, therefore, continued to utilize the special deferment program arranged with National Selective Service Headquarters and the special Enlistment Program established with the Department of the Army.

During the last months of the Korean Emergency and subsequent years, certain modifications of deferment policies were arranged with Selective Service and the Department of the Army to accommodate changes in Agency essential activities and legislative changes in Selective Service and military service policies.

b. Modification of Deferment Program for Overseas Personnel

The original agreements developed between the Agency and the Director of Selective Service in July 1950 remained in effect, with only minor changes. Two of these changes, both of which were announced in OPM 20-22-5 on 2 November 1967, 110/ are worthy of mention.

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(1) When draft quotas were increased to meet military manpower requirements in Vietnam, the Agency agreed to a request from Colonel Daniel Omer, Deputy Director of Selective Service,* that Agency employees not be allowed to volunteer for overseas service with the Agency to avoid military service. Agency policy to that effect was announced in paragraph 2a of the cited OPM which read:

In the absence of overriding essential operational requirements which cannot be met with other personnel, "special" draft classifications will not be requested for individuals with I-A classification who cannot complete the scheduled overseas tour and return to the United States and local board jurisdiction prior to attaining age 26.

Personnel being assigned to remote areas, such as Vietnam or Laos, could be excepted from the policy.

(2) Prior to 1967, employees holding Selective Service Classification IV-A (completed two years active duty but with remaining reserve obligation) were processed through Headquarters Selective Service for "Directed IV-A" classification and permission to leave the United States. That was done to prevent contact by local boards while overseas and to guard against order to active duty in event the military services called up the reserve forces. Since it appeared unlikely, however, the reserves would be called, a new

* Colonel Omer was the Agency's sole contact in Headquarters Selective Service from 1950 until he retired in 1970.

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procedure was instituted for that category of personnel and announced in paragraph 2c of the cited OPM. That paragraph read:

Employees holding Selective Service Classification IV-A (completed two or more years active duty) do not require special handling through Headquarters Selective Service nor do they need permission to leave the United States. However, to ensure that routine correspondence and questionnaires from their local boards do not go astray, employees in this category will use a designated post office box as their mailing address while overseas. This box will be serviced by Mobilization and Military Personnel Division and the material forwarded to the individual concerned, if appropriate.

The procedures for IV-A personnel being assigned overseas were further modified and announced in Headquarters Notice 20-421 on 2 July 1970. 111/ Paragraph 1b (4) of that Notice read:

Previously, a directed classification and permission to leave the United States was obtained from Headquarters Selective Service for employees classified IV-A (completed two or more years of active duty). This permission and directed classification are no longer required, but to ensure receipt of Selective Service System correspondence and questionnaires, a valid address, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] must be furnished the local board.

Agency Forms 575 (Selective Service Action Request) which were prepared (b)(1) by the office concerned were forwarded to MMPD through the [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] to ensure that use of the overseas mailing address would not [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

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c. Termination of Special Enlistment Program

The special enlistment program which was established with the Army in 1950 was used until about January 1957, when it gave way to new special enlistment programs which were established by the military services under authority of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. These programs permitted draft-eligible men with I-A classification to volunteer for six months' active duty and five and one-half years' Ready Reserve. [redacted] Acting Chief, (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Personnel Operations Division, OP, in a memorandum for the Director of Personnel dated 9 January 1959, 112/ concluded that the program no longer served a useful purpose and recommended that Agency Regulation 20-685 which governed the program be rescinded. He pointed out that the program had not actually been used by the Agency for approximately two years and that the availability of other programs such as occupational deferments for scientific and engineering skills and the six months' reserve enlistment programs indicated that the program would not be needed in the foreseeable future.

C. Occupational Deferments1. Korean Emergency Period

The original negotiations and agreements between CIA and the Director of Selective Service in July 1950 were specifically directed at deferment of employees selected for overseas assignments.

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Under these agreements, deferments were not considered for personnel assigned to domestic activities. By the end of calendar year 1951, it was apparent that special arrangements would have to be made for deferment of certain scientific and technical personnel engaged in stateside support of operations (for example, Technical Services Division personnel) where security considerations precluded identification of CIA as their employer. In any instance where the critical skill employee was an overt CIA employee, requests for occupational deferments were openly directed by the Agency to the employee's Local Selective Service Board. In certain instances, occupational deferments were requested through [redacted] units to the employee's Local Board. However, personnel involved in sensitive operations were sponsored into the Army "Equivalent Military Credit Program" discussed previously.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Post-Korean Emergency

a. Department of Labor List of Currently Critical Operations

Selective Service local boards were guided by the Department of Labor List of Currently Critical Occupations and the Department of Commerce List of Currently Essential Activities in their consideration of requests for occupational deferment. The Department of Commerce list included companies which were supporting the national defense effort but no Federal agencies. Apparently none of the latter were considered "essential." Even so, the Agency experienced little

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difficulty in obtaining occupational deferments for many years following the Korean Emergency when draft calls were minimal. As draft quotas increased to meet the military personnel requirements in Vietnam, however, occupational deferments became increasingly difficult to obtain, making it necessary to appeal some of the cases to the State Appeal Boards.

b. Positions for Which Advanced Pay Rates were Authorized

Section 504 of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 and Executive Order 11073 authorized the Civil Service Commission to revise the minimum salary rate for certain positions under the Classification Act. That authority was directed at certain critical skill or "hard to get" categories of jobs whereby advances in pay rates were authorized in order to attract and retain qualified personnel. Since the Agency had some skills which were critical to its operations which were not included in the list of critical skills published by the Department of Labor, the Agency decided to use the Advanced Pay Rate skills as a guide to requesting occupational deferments. The door was not thrown open, however, Office of Personnel Memorandum No. 20-22-3 on the subject on 7 March 1966 113/ stated in part:

It is evident that the increased draft calls necessary to meet military manpower requirements will have a major impact on the manpower pool in which critical shortages have already developed

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in certain skills. While we are determined that the Agency shall NOT abuse the military deferment program, it is imperative that valid and justifiable requests for military deferment be processed on a timely basis, and

Assignment to one of the critical skill categories does not, in itself, however, justify requesting an occupational deferment. Consideration must be given to all relevant factors such as the actual effectiveness of the employee, his unique fitness for the work, his unique familiarity with a specific project in the course of completion, and the difficulty of replacing him.

c. Suspension of Department of Labor List of Critical Occupations

The Universal Military Service and Training Act was amended in 1967 with passage of Public Law 90-40, 90th Congress, S. 1432, dated 30 June 1967, and by Executive Order 1136.0, 30 June 1967. Among other changes, the new law, which amended the title of the UMS&T Act to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, empowered the Director of Selective Service to identify needed critical skills and essential occupations after advice from the National Security Council. It provided for the use of the Department of Labor List of Current Critical Occupations for informational purposes until such time as advice was received from the National Security Council.

The National Security Council advised the Director of Selective Service by memorandum dated 15 February 1968 114/ that it

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had concluded that deferments based on the lists of essential activities and critical occupations should be suspended. The Council stated that its recommendation was based on these considerations:

The needs of the Armed Forces do not now require such occupational deferments.

The needs of the civilian economy do not now require such occupational deferments.

The inherent inequity, at a time when men are called upon to risk their lives for the Nation, in any such occupational deferments from military service which may in practice turn into permanent exemptions.

The lack of justification for such deferments lists as evidenced by the fact that more than half the occupational deferments actually granted are to men in occupations not on the "List of Currently Essential Activities" and "List of Currently Critical Occupations."

The Director of Selective Service announced the suspension of the lists of essential activities and critical occupations by Operations Bulletin No. 322, 19 February 1968, 115/ leaving each local board with discretion to grant, in individual cases, occupational deferments based on a showing of essential community need.

The Honorable John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman of the US Civil Service Commission, wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence on 9 April 1968 116/ stating that, in view of the recent action of the Director of the Selective Service System suspending the lists of essential activities and critical occupations as a basis for occupational deferments, he believed it essential that Government agencies follow a

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uniform policy with respect to requests for the occupational deferment of their employees. He enclosed a draft policy statement which he proposed to issue as a guide to all Federal Agencies and the District of Columbia Government and requested Mr. Helms' views on it by 15 April. The draft cited the considerations of the National Security Council and stated that:

In view of these findings, it shall be the policy of the Federal Government and the Government of the District of Columbia not to request Selective Service deferments of Federal employees on occupational grounds, nor to initiate appeals from Selective Service Board actions on occupational grounds.

Mr. Helms responded to Mr. Macy on 17 April 1968, 117/ stating:

CIA has always been very conservative on draft matters. Deferments have been requested or appeals entered only when they were believed to be in the national interest. With the announcement of the National Security Council policy and subsequent action by the Director of the Selective Service System, we re-examined our procedures and criteria to ensure that we would request a deferment or enter an appeal only in cases involving most highly skilled individuals vital to particular Agency activities.

I agree in principle with the proposed policy but suggest that it be modified to permit an agency head to request deferments on an individual case basis when he believes that the need is so critical that deferment is in the national interest.

Although Mr. Helms non-concurred in Mr. Macy's proposal to have all agencies discontinue requesting occupational deferments, he laid the groundwork for a drastic tightening up within the Agency

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at the Executive Committee meeting on 17 April 1968, 119/ when he very emphatically identified his position as being opposed to deferments except where individually justified to and approved by him. Accordingly, Headquarters Notice 20-357, which was published on 17 July 1968, 120/ reflected the Director's thinking. It stated in part that:

In the future, requests for deferments will be limited to cases involving highly skilled individuals vital to particular Agency programs where the need is so critical that deferment is clearly in the national interest. Requests will be considered on an individual case basis and must be justified, first, by the essentiality of the program to the national defense effort and, second, by the extent to which the loss of the services of the individual concerned would jeopardize that program.

By memorandum dated 2 July 1968, 121/ Colonel White, Executive Director-Comptroller, advised the Deputy Directors that:

You may be assured that the Director will approve of requesting deferments for only a very small number of the total and that each Deputy Director must be prepared to support personally any case which is requested by one of his components. It is essential that each directorate make a careful study of the losses which would really be critical and decide now in which cases it feels a deferment is justified. Please report to the Director of Personnel by memorandum not later than 15 July 1968 that this has been done. Your report should indicate the total number of deferments you now have in effect, separated by those who are under 26 and those who are over 26. Please also indicate how many of this total you feel meet the Director's very stringent criteria and for whom you expect to request further deferment.

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The Director of Personnel forwarded a consolidation of the Deputy (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct Director's reports to Colonel White by memorandum dated 18 July 1968. 122/ This report showed a total of [] existing deferments (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct which had been obtained at Agency request, [] of which were for individuals over age 26. Only [] of the cases were considered (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct strong enough to meet the Director's criteria for renewal [] in Computer Services and [] in the Technical Division, Office of (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct Security). All [] cases were later approved by the Director for (b)(1) renewal request and all but one were approved by the local boards (b)(3) CIAAct

Surprisingly, the suspension of the critical skills list in February 1968 appeared to have had very little impact at the local board level. It had been expected that many of the boards would construe the term "community need" to mean the local community (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct since the percentage of approvals for Agency employees remained about the same as it had been before the suspension, it must be assumed that most of the boards considered community need to mean the national community. Also surprisingly, the change in Agency policy on requesting occupational deferments in July 1968 did not materially affect the deferment situation within the Agency. Individual registrants were entitled by law to request their own occupational deferments. Although the Agency specifically requested deferments in only those [] cases which were approved by the Director, it did support individual requests to the extent of confirming their employment status when requested to

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

do so by a local board. A survey made in July 1969 showed that during the year [redacted] individual requests for deferment had been submitted [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct approximately [redacted] percent of which had been approved. That compared favorably with the approximately [redacted] percent approval rate which had prevailed before suspension of the critical skills list and before the change in Agency policy. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

d. Random Selection for Military Service

By Executive Order No. 11497, dated 26 November 1969, the President amended the Selective Service Regulations to prescribe a random selection system for induction commencing in January 1970. In essence, the system established a method of selecting draftees from each year's pool of I-A's, relying on chance from a lottery for the order of call rather than on selection by the local boards. Local boards still had the authority and responsibility to register individuals upon reaching age 18, to call them for examinations, and to rule whether a registrant was to be deferred, exempted, or classified I-A at any given time. Although the random selection system did not affect the Agency's military deferment policy, an Office of Personnel Memorandum was published on the subject on 17 December 1969. 123/

e. Revocation of Authority to Grant New Occupational Deferments after 22 April 1970

Authority to grant new occupational deferments was revoked by Presidential Executive Order 11527 on 23 April 1970. Those

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registrants who held occupational deferments on 22 April 1970 and those whose applications for occupational deferment were pending on that date continued to be eligible for such deferment so long as they were qualified under regulations in force prior to 23 April 1970. That change was announced by Headquarters Notice 20-421, 2 July 1970. 124/

D. Military Deferment Arrangements for Personnel Engaged in Special Agency Programs

1. Background

The deferment agreements entered into by CIA and the Director of Selective Service were designed to accommodate the normal staffing requirements of essential activities in the Agency.

In addition to the regular staff-type problems, the Agency was subsequently faced with complications peculiar to the staffing of certain covert action programs in the Clandestine Service. Some of these activities of essential operational interest to CIA involved international organizations not under Agency control. Selected key officials in these organizations were in fact employees of CIA, but others were unwitting of Agency interest. Many of these unwitting individuals (non-employees) represented Agency viewpoints in carrying out their organization's activities, and CIA had good reason to see that these individuals continued in their tenure.

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In the case of covert action programs where resident alien employees were utilized, the Agency deemed it essential for the success of these activities that these employees not be subject to unplanned call-up through Selective Service. Non-citizens were obligated under Immigration and Selective Service Laws to register and were liable for induction in the same manner as US citizens. In order to avoid adverse security ramifications of these considerations, it was necessary for the Agency to negotiate agreements with the Director of Selective Service whereby these individuals could be properly accommodated through Selective Service processes. The Director of Selective Service was most responsive to Agency requests and established special mechanisms to meet the Agency's requirements. Details of these special covert action programs and deferment procedures are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. International Organization Operations

In October 1956, IO Division was engaged in highly sensitive and important operations relating to [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct organizations. Key officers (US citizens) of the [redacted] (b)(3) [redacted] were recruited by the Agency in staff agent or contract agent capacities. These individuals were former students who, as employees of the [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct were draft eligible and subject to early call-up as a result of their earlier student deferments. In addition to those [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct officers in Agency employ, there were others who, while not (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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employed or witting of CIA interest and influence in [] affairs, (b)(1)
reflected Agency interests in their attitudes. IO Division fore- (b)(3)
saw damaging effects on our vested operational interests if these NatSecAct
[] officers were to be routinely inducted into the Armed Forces. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
Chief, IO Division, therefore requested that the Director of Personnel NatSecAct
attempt to arrange deferments with the Director of Selective Service.
The Director of Personnel (Mr. Harrison G. Reynolds) met with Colonel
Omer on 29 October 1956 and successfully arranged local board "post-
ponements of induction" for non-employee [] officers of vital
interest to CIA. This arrangement did not result in deferments per se (b)(1)
but had the same effect (a one-year postponement). Agreement was also (b)(3)
made that no further requests for postponement would be entertained NatSecAct
for this type of individual.

In the case of [] officers employed by the Agency, the (b)(1)
Director of Selective Service agreed to arrange postponement of induction (b)(3)
for up to one year for stateside assignees and subsequently approved NatSecAct
Directed 4-F deferments for those individuals who were assigned to the
foreign field. While the Director of Selective Service approved post-
ponements of induction and/or Directed deferments of all IO Division (b)(1)
cases presented by the Agency (a total of [] cases), there were instances (b)(3) CIAAct
where relations were strained primarily because of unilateral actions
by individual [] employees to obtain additional deferments. In a
Memorandum for the Record dated 8 February 1960, 125/ [] (b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct (b)(3)
NatSecAct

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Executive Officer, Office of Personnel, reported that he received a phone call on 2 February 1960 from Colonel Omer, Headquarters Selective Service, concerning a letter which had been addressed to Vice President Nixon by [redacted] urging Mr. Nixon to exercise his influence to establish draft deferment for a number of (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct officials of the Association. Colonel Omer thought that before advising the Vice President's office it might be advantageous to know whether CIA had an interest in any of the five persons named and, if so, whether such interest could be disclosed to the Vice President. All of the persons named in [redacted] letter were well known to the IO Division (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct and they expected that it might be necessary to seek Headquarters Selective Service assistance in obtaining draft deferments to [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] in the not too distant future since they were scheduled for (b)(1) overseas assignment.* The Division requested that the information be (b)(3) CIAAct conveyed to Colonel Omer with the request that it not be communicated by him to anyone else. Colonel Omer agreed to honor IO Division's request and stated that he would inform the Vice President's office that the case of each man would be reviewed by Selective Service Headquarters in order to ascertain that the present classification of each individual was consistent with general Selective Service regulations. That apparently closed the case.

* Apparently action was not required in the [redacted] cases since there was nothing in the files to show that they were processed. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

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The program operated smoothly from 1960 to 23 December 1965 when Colonel Omer telephoned Mr. Robert Wattles, Deputy Director of Personnel, to inform him that the White House office had passed along a letter which had been written to Vice President Hubert Humphrey by the President of [redacted] requesting occupa- (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct tional deferments for [redacted] officials. Colonel Omer said that General Hershey wondered how many of the [redacted] the Agency had an interest (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct in. The Agency had an interest in [redacted] persons named but Headquarters Selective Service assistance had not yet been requested in any of the cases. Fortunately, all of the cases were still working overtly through local boards in accordance with procedures which had been recommended by Colonel Omer earlier and outlined in a memorandum from [redacted] Chief, Mobilization and Reserve Branch, MMPD, to the Covert Action Staff (formerly IO Division) on 6 October 1965. 126/ Under those procedures, the [redacted] officials who were to remain in the United States were instructed to request occupational deferments from their local boards on the basis of the duties which they would be performing with the [redacted] programs. In the event the local boards denied their requests, they were to appeal within 10 days. If the State Appeal Board denied the deferment, Colonel Omer was to be notified at which time he would either take the case up with the appropriate State Director or call the file in for Presidential Appeal Board action.

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After Colonel Omer's call on 23 December 1965, the _____ (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (DDP) contacted the President of [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct to persuade him to at least exclude persons in whom the Agency had an (b)(3) CIAAct interest from his occupational deferment efforts. As evidenced in a (b)(6) memorandum on the subject from [redacted] [redacted] to (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct the Director of Personnel on 6 January 1966, 127/ the effort was not successful. [redacted] maintained that, because of extensive pressure (b)(1) (b)(3) from unwitting staff members [redacted] he believed it necessary to NatSecAct (b)(3) continue efforts to get deferments for unwitting as well as witting NatSecAct staff members for two reasons:

[redacted] dictate that the same ostensible efforts must be made to secure deferments for unwitting as well as witting staff members, and (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Because [] is an organization which also carries out a national program of no operational interest to CIA, its leadership feels that the integrity of the organization requires that personnel also be available to carry out its domestic activities. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)

_____ further stated that he was considering writing a letter (b)(3) NatSecAct
addressed to the President, directed to the attention of Mr. Douglas
Cater of the White House Staff, requesting that the Selective Service (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Presidential Appeal Board use its discretionary power to review the cases

_____ might be willing to favorably recommend that request (b)(1) to the Presidential Appeal Board. _____ also stated that, in (b)(3) NatSecAct following up the request already sent to the Selective Service Headquarters

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by the Vice President's office, he hoped to set up an appointment (b)(1)
with General Hershey to discuss in person the personnel problems (b)(3) NatSecAct
then faced by the [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] evidently followed through on his idea of writing (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

to the President. Colonel Omer phoned [redacted] on 12 January 1966
to tell him that Mr. Cater of the White House Staff and the President
of the [redacted] had an appointment with the Presidential Appeal Board on (b)(1)
13 January to discuss the overall problem of military deferment for (b)(3)
draft-eligible personnel affiliated with [redacted] Colonel Omer
NatSecAct
stated that it appeared that the Board would grant deferments, either (b)(1)
occupational or student, for all of the individuals concerned which (b)(3)
would, of course, include the three cases in which the Agency was
NatSecAct
interested.* (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The students' spokesman followed through on his plan to (b)(1)
discuss [redacted] personnel problems with Headquarters Selective Service. (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] wrote Colonel Omer on 7 October 1966. 128/ He outlined his
responsibilities toward the selective service problems of the staff
members and officers of [redacted] and he stated that, if Colonel Omer

_____ (b)(1)
* Three of the four cases which were working overtly through local (b)(3) NatSecAct
board channels at the time Colonel Omer called on 23 December 1965
had been turned down at the State Appeal Board level and would have
been called in by Colonel Omer for Presidential Appeal Board con-
sideration. The fourth case was resolved when the local board classified
the individual IV-F.

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would like to discuss with him the current activities and staff of the organization, he would be most happy to see him (Colonel Omer) at his convenience. Colonel Omer responded on 10 October 1966, 129/ stating that he believed a discussion of selective service procedure (b)(1) and problems relating to members of [redacted] would be most helpful; (b)(3) NatSecAct and he suggested that [redacted] call his office to arrange a mutually (b)(1) (b)(3) satisfactory time for the visit. (b)(1) NatSecAct

[redacted] Messrs. Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel, (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] DC/MMPD, and [redacted] met with (b)(6)

Colonel Omer in his office at his request to discuss a new problem (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct which had been raised by [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) held a press conference in Washington, D. C. to provide a briefing on (b)(1) [redacted] -coordinated proposals and programs planned by students around (b)(3) the country for changing the Selective Service System." [redacted] NatSecAct President, (b)(3) [redacted] NatSecAct (D)(3) had presided over the conference. According to subsequent press reports NatSecAct the thrust of [redacted] presentation was to indicate the organization's (b)(1) (b)(3) opposition to the draft and to announce that the Association would be NatSecAct organizing referendums on the draft and its alternatives in cooperation (b)(1) with student governments at some 1,000 colleges and universities during (b)(3) the current academic year. [redacted] press conference position had been (b)(1) derived from a resolution on the draft passed by the [redacted] (b)(3) [redacted] held at the [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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Colonel Omer began the meeting with the CIA representatives by reading from a memorandum hand-written by General Hershey expressing his strong disagreement with [redacted] resolution on the draft and the positions of [redacted] officers as expressed at the press conference. The General's memorandum suggested that, while reasonable dissent on a matter such as the draft was legitimate and acceptable, [redacted] position seemed to have reached the point of defying the law of the land. General Hershey wondered whether [redacted] could be regarded as "working in the national interest" and, if not, whether he could justify continuing to be of assistance in obtaining deferments for [redacted] employees. General Hershey concluded his memorandum by asking Colonel Omer to canvass CIA, Douglas Cater of the White House, and other government officials involved with the [redacted] regarding his observations.

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Colonel Omer added that he had the task of acting on General Hershey's wishes and that it was quite clear that General Hershey was not anxious to be involved in the deferment of individuals who in fact were actively engaged in undermining the system that made such deferments possible. Colonel Omer stated that he was contacting CIA first on the matter since he knew that CIA [redacted]. He wondered if CIA was [redacted] activities--and the individuals involved in them--in connection with the draft.

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[redacted] responded by indicating Agency agreement that the [redacted] resolution on the draft was indefensible and virtually

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incomprehensible.* He pointed out that the [] President had (b)(1)
indicated to the Agency his embarrassment about the resolution and, (b)(3)
also, that he had intended the press conference to concentrate on NatSecAct
constructive student actions to weigh and bring about changes in
the draft by legal means. [] pointed out that since CIA was (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
strictly prohibited by law from interfering or becoming involved in
any way with the domestic concerns, problems, and policies of organi- (b)(1)
zations such as [] the Agency could not and did not influence (b)(3) NatSecAct
[] policy or program on such issues as the draft. He also pointed (b)(1)
out that it was inaccurate to refer to CIA's relationship to [] as (b)(3)
one of []-he explained that CIA was interested in various NatSecAct
(b)(3)
aspects of [] overseas program and cooperated with a few of the NatSecAct
(b)(3)
individuals involved in it, but that the Agency [] NatSecAct
(b)(3)
[] In concluding his Memorandum for (b)(3)
the Record, [] stated: (b)(3)
[] (b)(3)
[] (b)(3) CIAAct
[] (b)(6)
[] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct
[] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

* As [] so aptly stated in the Memorandum for the Record which
he wrote [] after the meeting with Colonel Omer: 130/

That resolution, which can generously be described
as being seriously deficient in coherence, common
sense and political soundness, was distributed to
the press [] and thence to Captain Bascomb
who attended the Press Conference on which he took
very thorough notes. (Captain Bascomb, USN, was
Public Information Officer for Headquarters Selective
Service.)

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(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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Perhaps the most unnerving aspect of the above, meeting was Colonel Omer's and General Hershey's assumption that [] is basically a CIA proprietary. COL Omer was genuinely surprised when we indicated CIA's limited interest in [] and, correspondingly, CIA's limited ability to influence the actions of the organization or its officers. It will be important in future dealings with COL Omer and General Hershey to underscore CIA's limited relationship with [] not only because it is important for the Office of Selective Service to understand the limits of CIA's involvement with organizations such as [], but because it will discourage unguarded and indiscreet discussions on the part of COL Omer with [] officials. To embellish COL Omer's understanding of [] undersigned is arranging for materials on the organization to be passed to COL Omer.

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On 30 January 1967, the [] reported that a phone call had been received from Mr. Cater of the White House Staff who stated that Mr. Macy, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, had [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct reported that someone from Headquarters Selective Service had stated that CIA had no interest in the deferment of [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct personnel. [] DC/MMPD, contacted Colonel Omer who stated that he did not believe that anyone from Headquarters Selective Service, (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct except possibly General Hershey, would have had occasion to talk with Mr. Macy. Colonel Omer checked with the Chairman of the Presidential (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct Appeal Board who stated that he had discussed deferment of [] personnel with Mr. Cater but that he had not mentioned CIA in the course of the discussion. (The Presidential Appeal Board at that time had six [] (b)(1)
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cases before it, none of which were of any interest to CIA.) Mr. Howard stated in his Memorandum for the Record on 3 February 1967 that:

It would appear to me that a statement by Selective Service such as that alleged would help rather than hurt CIA. We currently have three [redacted] officials who were granted II-A deferments by the Presidential Board at our request. If the Board grants deferment in the six cases now before it, as I understand they are doing, [redacted] will be further enhanced. 131/

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

The Agency was forced to divorce itself from the [redacted]

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Agency. Fortunately, the three [redacted] officials who were still under deferments obtained through Headquarters Selective Service were serving outside the United States at the time and their affiliation with the Agency was not exposed. The last of these deferments terminated on 23 September 1968 following which the individual concerned was to return to school for graduate work.

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5. Cuban Covert Action Program

In 1960 the Agency was deeply involved in operational programs relating to Castro's Cuba. The flow of Cuban refugees to the United States provided a ready manpower pool for use in covert action against Castro. The Agency actively recruited among these Cuban nationals and integrated them into the several programs under development, both in the United States and outside the country. Under Immigration and Selective Service Laws, these foreign nationals were required to register at Local Selective Service Boards within six months after arrival in this country. Alien non-permanent residents (which included Cuban refugees) were classified in Selective Service category 4-C (alien) during the first twelve months after their arrival in the US. At expiration of this first year of residency, these registrants were eligible for I-A classification and induction (unless circumstances established a basis for other classifications). Aliens could retain a permanent IV-C classification only by permanently forswearing US citizenship, which relieved them from any US military obligation.

As a general rule, these Cuban nationals willingly registered as required with their local boards. Many who were recruited by the Agency were promptly moved to training bases outside of the continental United States. The lack of current locator information available to their local boards and lack of responses to correspondence resulted in

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citations of delinquency. In these circumstances, warrants were issued for FBI or Immigration and Naturalization Service action. Cuban national employees who had complied with Selective Service processes were eligible for early call-up once reclassified I-A. The Agency recognized the serious "flap" potential in failure of our Cuban employees to comply with the routines required by their local boards and the need to retain their services as essential to our operations. Arrangements were made with National Selective Service Headquarters to settle both of these problems.

Colonel Omer recommended that every effort be made to settle these problems at the local board level, since his open intervention would possibly indicate national security interest. This procedure was generally followed and local boards were mollified. It was necessary in several instances, however, for Colonel Omer to ask the State Selective Service Director in Florida to intervene by delaying local board action until the employee got in touch with the local board and satisfied its requirements.

While many Cuban refugee cases were permanently resolved at the local board level through draft classifications in "non-eligible for military service categories," those classified as I-A (draft-eligible) posed serious problems. This matter was brought to Colonel Omer's attention for resolution. Colonel Omer once again agreed to issue Directed 4-F deferments on a name-request basis. The initial

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cases submitted to him were handled in this manner. Colonel Omer quickly recognized that most of these cases were registered with the same local boards in Miami, and an undesirable pattern of US national security interest cases would soon be evident to members of these local boards. He resolved this problem in a most effective manner. As subsequent requests for deferment were provided him by the Agency, he simply ordered the Florida State Director to ask the local board to forward the files to National Selective Service Headquarters. He then retained the files in the safe in his office until such time as our operational interest was terminated. No deferment or other official action was taken on the case while the employee served the Agency. This procedure was followed from early 1962 to February 1966.

In February 1966, at Colonel Omer's suggestion, procedures (b)(3) CIAAct were established under which the records of all Cuban nationals of (b)(6) interest to the Agency who were registered with Florida local boards would be controlled by the Florida State Director. [redacted]

Chief, MRB/MMPD, and [redacted] Security Officer for the major (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) clandestine project directed against Cuba, visited Colonel Wall, the Florida State Director, on 24 February 1966 and found him to be most cooperative. After being briefed on the problem, Colonel Wall decided that he would withdraw individual files from the jurisdiction of the Miami local boards and hold them in a safe in his office until employment

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with the Agency terminated or until the individuals passed the age of liability for draft.* There were 17 such cases at the time. It was agreed that all future liaison with the State Director on those and any new cases which might arise would be conducted by the Clandestine Service Security Officer. Details of the arrangement were furnished the Chief, WH Division, in a memorandum from Mr. Robert S. Wattles, Deputy Director of Personnel, on 10 March 1966. 132/

E. Liaison Relationships

1. National Selective Service Headquarters

As evidenced by the complete support rendered CIA by the Director of Selective Service since the initial agreements in July 1950, relationships with Selective Service Headquarters were most harmonious and successful. From the inception of the mutual agreements, the arrangements were unwritten. General Hershey undertook the responsibility of serving Agency requests on an honor system, trusting the Agency's word that a case was justifiable and worthy. The Agency was scrupulous in applying stringent criteria for requests for deferment and never knowingly submitted questionable cases.

* Colonel Wall proudly stated that during World War II he held in his safe the Selective Service records of all personnel assigned to the MANHATTAN project.

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The Agency was extremely fortunate in having Colonel Daniel Omer as the point of contact for a period of 20 years. Colonel Omer always insisted on remaining within the rules set by General Hershey but, within those rules, he managed to solve some seemingly insurmountable problems. Mr. Allen W. Dulles, while Acting Director, wrote General Hershey on 17 June 1952 133/:

Recently I have had occasion to review the liaison activities being conducted between the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal Agencies. I am extremely gratified to find that liaison between our respective offices is one of the highest caliber.

I particularly would like to take this opportunity to recognize the contribution which Colonel Daniel O. Omer of your office has made and is continuing to make in the direction of promoting these activities. He has exhibited a keen insight into this Agency's man-power problems and has been most helpful in arriving at solutions which have been mutually agreeable and of great benefit to us.

On 12 June 1970, Robert S. Wattles, Director of Personnel, wrote to the new Director of Selective Service, the Honorable Curtis W. Tarr 134/:

I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the outstanding support which Mr. Daniel O. Omer and Miss Helen King have given the Agency over the past twenty years and also to thank you for allowing us to continue processing certain cases through your office.

I know that there were times when the volume of our cases must have created a burdensome additional workload for Mr. Omer and Miss King, yet they graciously took the time to listen to our problems and to work out solutions for some of our more troublesome cases. Many of our critical overseas personnel requirements could not have been met without their help.

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On the same date, Mr. Wattles wrote individual letters of appreciation to both Colonel Omer and Miss King. 135/

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr succeeded General Hershey as Director of Selective Service in April 1970.* General Hershey had been appointed Advisor to the President on Manpower Mobilization on 16 February 1970.

Dr. Tarr installed Colonel Byron V. Pepitone, USAF, as his Deputy.

Colonel Pepitone had worked with Dr. Tarr when the latter was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Colonel Omer was designated "Special Assistant" to the Director and worked on Selective Service legal history until his retirement on 30 September 1970.

Mr. Wattles, Director of Personnel, and [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) DC/MMPD, visited Colonel Pepitone in June 1970 and found him to be most cooperative and anxious to assist when necessary. Although non-routine cases were rare after the close-out of the [redacted] cases in 1967, Colonel Pepitone unhesitatingly took action on an Alien case in October 1970 when requested to do so. That case involved the son of a prominent defector whose name had been changed for safety reasons. The son was registered with Selective Service under the original family name and, although he could have had the local board record changed, there was no way the old name could have been purged from the file. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

* Dr. Tarr's background was outlined in an article published in the April 1970 edition of the Selective Service News. 136/

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Colonel Pepitone merely called the record in and put it in his safe where it will remain. There was no question of the individual avoiding military service because he had been found to be not physically qualified for service (IV-F).

2. Department of Defense

The Army Enlistment Program arranged in February 1952 between the DCI and the Secretary of the Army was the only special program negotiated with the DOD which applied to military deferment considerations. During the life of this special program (1952-57), liaison relationships were extremely difficult to maintain with the Department of the Army because of the continuous turnover of key Army officials. Re-briefings of new officials were required frequently to form a basis of continuous understanding of the working of the program. Changes in military enlistment programs and Selective Service minimum service obligations were experienced continuously and added further complications to the Agency and the employees involved in the program. The Secretary of the Army, unlike the Director of Selective Service, was limited in his unilateral authority and was bound by legal and regulatory controls imposed on the Army system by higher authority. In this environment, it was almost impossible to maintain privileged arrangements which eventually ran counter to normal procedures. Even

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in consideration of these factors, the "Equivalent Military Credit Program" worked successfully during the period when it was needed (1952-57). The establishment of the Department of the Army's six-month active-duty program in 1956, which was open to any draft-eligible young man under age twenty-six, provided an overt and routine mechanism for Agency employees to fulfill their obligation and resume their civilian careers.

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Appendix A

Source References

NOTE: All the following documents are on permanent file in MMPD.

1. DOD Directive No. 1315.3, 9 Dec 52, sub: Policies Governing Asgmt of Mil Pers to the CIA. R.
2. DOD Directive No. 1315.3, 5 Dec 57, sub: Policies Governing Asgmt of Mil Pers to the CIA. S.
3. Memo for Acting DDS from D/Pers, 30 Apr 59, sub: Reimbursement for DOD Pers. S.
4. Memo for Sec of Def from DCI, 16 May 59, sub: Pers Ceiling Distribution and Reimbursement for Detailed Mil Pers and Services Rendered in Support of CIA. S.
5. Memo of Understanding, sub: Mil Pers Support for Central Intelligence, signed in 1960 by DCI, Dir, BOB and Sec Def. S.
6. Title 10, U.S. Code - Sec 3230 (Army); Sec 8230 (USAF); 5416 (USN and USMC); sub: Pers Detailed Outside DOD.
7. HR 20-51b, sub: Management of Detailed Mil Pers. S.
8. Memo for D/Pers from C/MMPD, 15 Nov 67, sub: Cat "Z" Type Mil Pers Support (W/Staff Study attached). S.
9. OPM 20-51-4, 10 Feb 69, sub: Non-Detailed Mil Pers Support. S.
10. Ltr for the Dep Sec of Def from the DCI, 3 Dec 66, sub: Requesting loan of 50 Officers for duty in Vietnam. S.
11. Ltr for the DCI from the Dep Sec of Def, 17 Feb 67, sub: Approving loan of 50 Officers for duty in Vietnam. S.

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14. Memos of Understanding between CIA and Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, re: Officers detailed for duty in Vietnam. S.
15. Letter of Authorization for Mil Officers detailed to CIA for duty in Vietnam. S.
16. Casualty Annex for Mil Officers detailed to CIA for duty in Vietnam. S.
Amendment to Casualty Annex (Telepouch to COS Vietnam, 21 Oct 67). S.
17. Memo for Record, 8 Dec 66, sub: Defense Pers Assistance for CIA Programs in SE Asia; Mtg w/Dir of J-1 (Pers), JCS. S.
18. Ltr to Sec Def from DCI, 5 Mar 51 on Recruiting and Training Pers for CIA. C.
19. Ltr to Asst Sec Def for Manpower and Pers Policies from DCI, 30 Apr 51, same sub. C.
Memo for Sec Def from JCS, 16 May 51, same sub. C.
Memo for Sec Def from DCI, 23 May 51, same sub. S.
20. Ltr to DCI from Sec Def, 23 Jun 51, same sub. R.
21. USAF Implementation Plan for Trng Selected CIA Pers. S.
Basic Trng Agreement between CIA and Dept of Army. C.
Basic Trng Agreement between CIA and Dept of Navy. C.
Basic Trng Agreement between CIA and Marine Corps. C.
22. Basic Policy Agreement between DA and CIA on Recruiting ROTC Graduates. C.

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23. Basic Policy Agreement between Dept of AF and CIA on Recruiting ROTC Graduates. C.
24. Memo for JCS from D/Pers, CIA, 9 Jun 66, sub: Mil Trng for Selected CIA Employees, w/draft agreement. C.
Memo for D/Pers, CIA, from JCS, 25 Aug 66, sub: Mil Trng for Selected CIA Employees. C.
DA Memo for Record, 27 Mar 67, sub: Project GLADIATOR (DA-CIA Agreement on use of Army OCS Program for Career Employees). C.
25. Memo for DCS/Pers, DA from D/Pers, CIA, 20 Oct 67, sub: Proposed Change in Agreement on Recruitment of Certain ROTC Graduates. C.
Memo for D/Pers, CIA from DA, 13 Dec 67, sub: Revised Agreement on Recruitment of ROTC Graduates. C.
Memo for D/Pers, CIA, from DA, 23 Jan 68, sub: Revised Agreement on Recruitment of ROTC Graduates. C.
26. Ltr for the DCI from Asst DCS/Pers, Hq. USAF, 23 May 57, re: Reduction in AF OCS quota from 65 to 15 per year. C.
27. Memo for Asst DCS/Pers, Hq. USAF from DD/S, 31 May 57, proposing annual quota of 25 for AFOCS. C.
Memo for DDS from Asst DCS/Pers, Hq. USAF, 11 Jun 57, approving annual quota of 25 for AFOCS. C.
28. Memo for DDS from Actg D/Trng, 21 Feb 62, sub: Request for Adjustment in Agreement between CIA and USAF. S.
Memo for D/Pers from D/Trng, 18 Apr 62, sub: Adjustment of Agreement w/AF to substitute an OTS Program for the present OCS Program. C.
Memo for DCS/Pers, Hq. USAF, from C/MMPD, 9 May 62, sub: Adjustment in Agreement between CIA and USAF. S.
Memo for C/MMPD from Directorate of Pers Proc and Trng, Hq. USAF, 25 Sep 62, sub: same as above. S.

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29. Memo for C/MMPD from C/CT Program, 2 Sep 66, sub: AF/OTS Program--Request for Increased Quota for the CT Program. C.
Memo for Hq. USAF from C/MMPD, 13 Sep 66, sub: Request for Adjustment in the JOT Program. S.
30. Memo for C/MMPD from Dir of Plans, DCS/Plans and Ops, Hq. USAF, 8 Dec 66, sub: JOT Program. S.
31. Memo for DDCI from D/Pers, 12 Dec 58, sub: Proposed JOT Program w/USMC. S.
32. Memo for Commandant of Marine Corps from C/MMPD, 16 May 61, sub: Implementation of Agreement between USMC and CIA. S.
33. HN 20-235, 30 Apr 68, sub: Length of Tours of Mil Pers. C.
34. Memo for DDS&T from D/Pers, 29 Jan 68, sub: Length of Tours of Mil Pers. S.
Memo for C/MMPD from D/Pers, 29 Jan 68, sub: Length of Tours of Mil Pers. S.
35. Memo for DD/Pers for Planning and Development from C/MMPD, 8 Dec 55, sub: Civilian Career Status for Mil whose Tours of Duty are Extended Beyond 5 years. S.
36. Memo for D/Log from D/Pers, 9 Dec 58, sub: Extension of Tours of Mil Off Detailed to CIA. S.
37. Memo for Record, 27 Apr 61, sub: Activities of MMPD 1 Jul 58-April 61 (par E 1, p. 4). S.
38. Memo for DDCI from DDS, 20 Nov 67, forwarding report of Mil Pers on Extended Tours w/CIA. S.
39. Memo for D/Pers from EX/O to DD/S, 3 Jan 68, sub: Extended Tours of Detailed Mil Pers. S.
40. Memo to CIA from Asst Chief for Pers Control, BUPERS, Dept of Navy, 19 Mar 62, sub: Procedure for Documenting Inactive Naval Res Officers as Active-Duty Reservists [] w/out Actual Recall to Active Duty []). TS. Retained in MMPD TS File.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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41. Ltr to CIA from C/Naval Pers, 13 Jun 55, re: Ostensible Active-Duty Status for Empl Naval Reservist. S.

42. [Redacted] (b)(1)
[Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

43. [Redacted] (b)(1)
[Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

44. Legal Opinion on Social Security Tax w/held from pay of Agency Employee Reservist Recalled to Active Duty. S.

45. CIA Headquarters Regulation 20-14, 15 Sep 61, sub: Pers Mob Planning. C.

46. Appendix 4 (Pers) to Annex C, CIA Global War Plan for Clandestine Ops, May 65. S.

47. Army Regulation 601-50, 10 Nov 67, sub: Appointment of Temporary Officers in the Army of the US upon Mob. U.

48. Memo for Spec Planning Asst to the DDS to D/Pers, 15 Dec 59, sub: Pers Procedures in Theaters of Operation on Mob. S.

49. Memo for Chief, War Plans Staff fr D/Pers, 22 Mar 60, sub: Pers Procedures in Theaters of Operation on Mob. S.

50. Draft Memo for DCI fr DDP, 26 Dec 61, sub: Individual Wartime Responsibilities. S.

51. Draft Handbook - Pers Emergency and Mob Planning Guide, 5 Oct 59. S.

52. Memo to Dir of Spec Ops, OSD fr Lt Gen C.P. Cabell, DDCI, 24 May 56, sub: Mil Pers Mob Rgmts for the CIA. S.

53. Dispatch FHHT-1775 fr SWPPAC to DCI, 19 Aug 60, sub: CIA PAC Wartime T/O's. (TS No. 174121)

54. Memo for DCS, Pers and Admin, Dept of AF fr DCI, 3 Mar 48 sub: Asgmts of Res Pers. R.
Memo for DCI fr Office Dir of Pers, Hq USAF, undated, sub: Asgmt of Res Pers. R.
Memo for Dir of Pers and Admin, Dept of Army fr DCI, 3 Mar 48, sub: Asgmts of Res Pers. R.

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War Dept Disposition Form to Dir of Intel (Army) fr
Maj Gen F. A. Irving, Ch, Career Mgmt Gp, 9 Mar 48,
sub: Asgmt of Res Pers. R.

Comment from Office Dir of Intel (Army) to Ch, Career Mgmt
Gp, 1 Apr 48, sub: Asgmt of Res Pers. R.

Memo for DCI fr Ch, Career Mgmt Group, Dept of Army,
8 Apr 48, sub: Asgmts of Res Pers. R.

Memo for Chief of Naval Pers, Dept of Navy, fr DCI,
3 Mar 48, sub: Asgmts of Res Pers. R.

Memo for DCI fr Asst Chief of Naval Pers, 5 May 48, sub:
Asgmts of Res Pers. R.

55. Memo for Dir of Pers and Admin, Dept of Army, fr DCI,
13 Jul 48, sub: Asgmt of Res Pers. S.

Memo for DCI fr Dir of Pers and Admin, Dept of Army,
27 Oct 48, sub: Asgmt of Res Pers. S.

Memo for DCI fr Chief of Naval Pers, 8 Oct 48, sub: Asgmt
of Res Pers. S.

56. Memo for the Sec of Def fr DCI, 17 Nov 49, sub: Status of Res
Pers. S.

57. Memo for DCI fr Civ Components Policy Board, OSD (undated),
sub: Status of Res Pers. S.

58. Memo for DCI fr Chief of Naval Pers, 8 Aug 49, sub: Proposed
Unit for Nav Res Pers Empl by the CIA in Civ Capacities. S.

59. Memo to Cmdt, Potomac River Naval Cmd fr Capt James A.
Buchanan, USNR, 9 Feb 50, sub: Activation of Vol Composite
Unit W-14, Request for. U.

Memo for Capt James A. Buchanan, USNR, fr Cmdt, PRNC,
16 Feb 50, sub: Volunteer Composite Unit W-14, activation of. U.

60. Ltr to the Sec of Def fr Mr. Allen W. Dulles, DCI, 14 May 55,
Re: Agency wartime mil pers rqmts and need for mil res policy
for CIA. S.

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61. Report of DOD Ad Hoc Committee on a Mil Res Policy for the CIA, Sep 55. S.

62. Memo for Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force fr Carter L. Burgess, Asst Sec of Def (Manpower), 30 Dec 55, sub: Report of Def Ad Hoc Committee on a Mil Res Pol of the CIA. S.

63. CIA Reg No. 20-291, 16 Jun 60, sub: Pers Mob Planning - Utilization and Trng of Agency Mil Reservists. C.

64. Memo for DCI fr D/Pers, 10 Jan 61, sub: Study of Res Trng Prog. S.

65. Memo for CO's of Agency Res Units fr D/Pers, 15 Feb 61, sub: Trng for Agency Mil Reservists. S.

66. Memo for Asst Sec of Def, Manpower fr L. K. White, DDS, 23 Apr 62, sub: Reorganization for Trng Purposes of the Mil Res Prog of the CIA. S.

67. Memo for Chief of Naval Pers fr L. K. White, DDS, 8 Jun 62, sub: Reorganization for Trng Purposes of the Mil Res Prog of the CIA. S.

Memo for DDS fr Adm W. R. Smedberg, III, Ch of Naval Pers, 12 Jul 62, sub: Reorganization for Trng Purposes of the Mil Res Prog of the CIA. S.

68. Memo for Asst Dep Ch of Naval Operations (Nav Res) fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 19 Nov 70, sub: Reorganization for Trng Purposes of the Agency Sponsored Nav Res Unit. S.

69. Memo for the Inspector General (CIA) fr Robert Amory, Jr., DDI, 4 Apr 60, sub: IG Report on Active Duty for Trng of Reservists [redacted] S.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

70. Memo for Col E. H. Greason, Dep Dir, Div of Res, Hq MC, fr Tracy B. Harrington, Col USA, C/MMPD, 8 Mar 68, sub: Memo of Understanding between Div of Res, Hq MC and CIA concerning MC Reservists employed by the Agency. S.

71. Memo for Asst Ch of Nav Pers for Nav Res fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 1 Aug 69, sub: Nav Res Affiliation of Certain Employees Asgd Overseas. S.

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Memo for D/Pers, CIA fr R. J. Stankowski, Office, Ch of Nav Pers, 16 Sep 69, sub: Nav Res Affiliation of Certain Employees Asgd Overseas. S.

72. Memo to DCI fr R. S. Wentworth, Jr., Office Ch of Nav Pers, 7 May 69, sub: Mob Planning for Inactive Nav Pers Employed by CIA. C.
73. Book Dispatch No. 3539, 11 Jan 63 to all COS and Base and SWP's Pac and Eur, sub: Mil Reservists.
74. OPM No. 20-22-4 (Rev), 13 Sep 67, sub: Employment and/or O'Seas Asgmt of Certain Obligated Enl Reservists No Longer Possible. C.
75. Memo for Hon Norman S. Paul, Asst Sec of Def (Manpower) fr Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, 11 Jan 65, sub: Screening of Fed Empl in the Mil Ready Res. S.
76. Ltr fr Commandant, Fifth Naval Dist (Code N516), to Composite Companies, 28 Jun 66, sub: Deactivation of Nav Res Composite Cos within 50 mile radius of an NRROS. U.
77. BUPERS Notice 5400, 6 Jun 66, sub: Naval Reserve Composite Company Program; partial disestablishment of. U.
78. Memo for Support Activities Div, JCS, fr Emmett D. Echols, D/Pers, 15 Jul 66, sub: Res Trng Unit for Agency Empl Nav Reservists. C.
79. Study re: continuation of Agency-sponsored Mil Res Trng Program, 23 Dec 70. S.
80. Presidential Executive Order No. 10660, 15 Feb 56, sub: Providing for the Establishment of a National Defense Executive Reserve. U.
81. Study to DDS from Vernon R. Turner, Actg D/Pers, 17 Apr 56, sub: National Defense Executive Reserve. S.
82. Study to DCI from Emmett D. Echols, D/Pers, 4 Oct, sub: Review of CIA's National Defense Executive Reserve Program. C.
83. Memo for Record signed by Emmett D. Echols, 11 Oct 62, sub: CIA National Defense Executive Reserve Program. S.
84. Memo for DCI from Emmett D. Echols, D/Pers, 1 Nov 63, sub: National Defense Executive Reserve. C.

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85. Ltr to Hon Edward A. McDermott, Dir, OEP, fr Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, 18 Nov 63, re: Agency decision to discontinue participation in NDER program. U.
86. Ltr to Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, fr Edward A. McDermott, Dir, OEP, 21 Nov 63, concurring in Agency decision to discontinue participation in NDER program. U.
87. Study to DDS from Matthew Baird, Director of Training, 27 Jun 56, sub: Mobilization Requirements for Professional Psychologists. S.
88. Project Outline (Draft) 16 Apr 57, on CIA Specialist Reserve. S.
89. Extract of Project Review Committee Action No. DDS-27-58 stating Committee position on CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve proposal in meeting held 1 Aug 57. S.
90. Memo for DD's (Coordination, Intelligence, Plans and Support) fr Gordon M. Stewart, D/Pers, 12 Feb 58, sub: CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve. S.
91. Certificate of Appointment (Form) CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve. U.
92. Terms of Agreement (Form) CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve. (Secret When Filled In).
93. Memo for DDS fr Gordon M. Stewart, D/Pers, 11 Dec 59, sub: CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve. S.
94. Memo for Deputy Directors (Intelligence, Plans, and Support), fr Gordon M. Stewart, D/Pers, 28 May 58, sub: CIA Civilian Standby Reserve. C.
95. Study submitted to DDCI by Emmett D. Echols, D/Pers, 23 Apr 62, sub: Exploitation of CIA Alumni. Internal Use Only.
Memo for CIA Career Council prepared by Task Force, undated, sub: Utilization of Former Employees in an Organized Group. C.
96. Agency Headquarters Regulation 20-15, 9 Jun 64, sub: Civilian Reserve Program.
97. Action Paper, Civilian Reserve Program, prepared by [redacted] SIPS Team. S. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

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98. Memo for DDS fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 28 May 70, sub: Automation of Agency's Civilian Reserve Program. S.

99. Memo for D/Pers fr Thomas H. Karamessines, DDP, 12 Jun 70, sub: Automation of Agency's Civ Res Program. S.

Memo for D/Pers fr [redacted] C/Admin Staff, DDI, 16 Jun 70, sub: Automation of Agency's Civ Res Program. S. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

Memo for D/Pers fr [redacted] C/Admin Support Staff, DD/S&T, 5 Jun 70, sub: Automation of Agency's Civ Res Program. S. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

100. Memo for DD's and Separate Offices fr [redacted] C/Support Services Staff, 18 Sep 70, sub: Proposed Revision of HR 20-15, Civilian Reserve Program. C. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

101. Memo for D/Pers fr [redacted] DDP/OP, 25 Sep 70, sub: Project for Utilization of Clandestine Service Retirees and Resignees. S. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

102. Memo for All CS Staff and Div Chiefs fr Thomas H. Karamessines, DDP, 21 Dec 70, sub: Establishment of Register of Former CS Professional Pers. S.

103. Memo for Record by William J. Kelly, D/Pers, 28 Jul 50, sub: Discussion with Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey, Dir of Sel Svc. S.

104. CIA Reg No. 20-12, 1 May 51, sub: Agency Policies with regard to Mil Deferment of CIA Pers. S.

105. Memo for the Hon Frank Pace, Jr., Sec of Army fr Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, DCI, 6 Feb 52, sub: Enlistment and Release from Active Duty of CIA Pers. S.

106. Ltr to Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, DCI from Hon Frank Pace, Jr., Sec of Army, 25 Mar 52, re: Enlistment and Release from Active Duty of CIA Pers. S.

107. Ltr to Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey, Dir of Sel Svc fr Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Actg DCI, 3 Apr 52, re: Enlistment and Release from Active Duty of CIA Pers. S.

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108. Ltr to the Hon Allen W. Dulles, Actg DCI fr Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey, Dir of Sel Svc, 4 Apr 52, re: Enlistment and Release from Active Duty of CIA Pers. S.
109. CIA Reg No. 20-21, 29 Oct 52, sub: Equivalent Mil Credit Prog. S.
110. OPM No. 20-22-5, 2 Nov 67, sub: Military Deferment. C.
111. HN 20-421, 2 Jul 70, sub: Military Deferment. S.
112. Memo for D/Pers fr. [redacted] Actg C/Pers OPs Div, 9 Jan 59, sub: Army Enlisted Reserve Program. C. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
113. OPM No. 20-22-3, 7 May 66, sub: Military Deferment. C.
114. Memo for Dir of Sel Svc fr Bromley Smith, Exec Sec, NSC, 15 Feb 68, sub: Advice of NSC re: occupational and graduate student deferments. U.
115. Ops Bul No. 322, Hq Sel Svc, 19 Feb 68, sub: Advice of NSC with Respect to Occupational and Grad Student Deferments. U.
116. Ltr to Hon Richard Helms, DCI fr John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, CSC, 9 Apr 68, re: Suggested uniform policy on requesting occupational deferments. U.
117. Ltr to Hon John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, CSC, fr Richard Helms, DCI, 17 Apr 68, re: Occupational deferment policy. U.
118. Ltr to Hon Richard Helms, DCI fr John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, CSC, 20 May 68, re: Occupational deferment policy. U.
119. Memo for D/Pers fr John W. Coffey, Asst DDS, 17 Apr 68, re: DCI's Policy on Occupational Deferments. C.
120. HN 20-357, 17 Jul 68, sub: Mil Deferments. S.
121. Memo for DD's (Intel, Plans, S&T, and Support), fr L. K. White, Exec Dir-Compt, 2 Jul 68, sub: Draft Deferments. C.
122. Memo for Exec Dir-Compt fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 18 Jul 68, sub: Draft Deferments. S.

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123. OPM No. 20-22-6, 17 Dec 69, sub: Random Selection for Mil Svc. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
Admin-Internal Use Only.

124. HN 20-421, 2 Jul 70, sub: Military Deferment. C. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

125. Memo for Record by [redacted] ExO, OP, 8 Feb 60, sub:
Tel Conversation w/Col Daniel O. Omer, Sel Svc, re: [redacted]
ltr to Vice President Nixon. Internal Use Only. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

126. Memo for C/Support Gp, CA Staff, fr [redacted], C/Mob &
Res Br, MMPD, 6 Oct 65, sub: Draft Deferment for Persons
Affiliated w/Student and Youth Programs. S. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

127. Memo for D/Pers fr [redacted], C/CA/B5, 6 Jan 66, sub:
New Initiatives to Office of Sel Svc Contemplated by [redacted] S.
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

128. Ltr to Col Omer, DD Sel Svc, fr W. [redacted] (b)(1)
7 Oct 66, requesting aptmt to discuss deferment of [redacted] (b)(3)
officials. U. (b)(1) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

129. Ltr to [redacted] fr Daniel O. Omer, (b)(1)
Dep Dir Sel Svc, concurring in proposed discussion, re:
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
officials. U.

130. Memo for Record by [redacted] C/CA/B5, 2 Nov 66, sub:
Mtg w/Col Omer, DD Sel Svc, concerning [redacted] position (b)(1)
program against the draft. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct

131. Memo for Record by [redacted] DC/MMPD, 3 Feb 67, sub:
Threat to Expose CIA's [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
S. (b)(6)

132. Memo for C/WH Div fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 10 Mar 66, sub:
Military Deferment Procedures - JMWAVE. S.

133. Ltr to Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey, Dir of Sel Svc, fr Allen W. Dulles, Actg DCI, 17 Jun 52, sub: Appreciation for support rendered Agency, particularly by Col Omer, Dep Dir. U. (b)(1)
Ltr to Mr. Dulles, Actg Dir, CIA, fr Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey, (b)(3) NatSecAct
Dir Sel Svc, 24 Jun 52, acknowledging Mr. Dulles's 17 Jun 52 ltr. U.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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134. Ltr to Hon Curtis W. Tarr, Dir Sel Svc, fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 12 Jun 70, sub: Appreciation for support rendered CIA by Col Omer and Miss King, Hq Sel Svc. U.

Ltr to Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, fr Curtis W. Tarr, Dir Sel Svc, 19 Jun 70, acknowledging Mr. Wattles ltr of 12 Jun 70. U.

135. Ltr to Col Daniel O. Omer fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 12 Jun 70, sub: Appreciation for his support to CIA. U.

Ltr to Miss Helen King, Hq Sel Svc, fr Robert S. Wattles, D/Pers, 12 Jun 70, sub: Appreciation for her support to CIA. U.

136. Memo for Record by [redacted] DC/MMPD, 27 Apr 70, sub: Se(b)(3) CIAAct Svc Hq- Pers Changes w/attached article fr Apr 1970 Sel Svc (b)(6) News. U.

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Appendix B

CIA Military Personnel Strengths

<u>FISCAL YEAR</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL ASSIGNED</u>	<u>*NON-ASSIGNED</u>
1947						(b)(1)
1948						(b)(3) CIAAct
1949						
1950						
1951						
1952						
1953						
1954						
1955						
1956						
1957						
1958						
1959						
1960						
1961						
1962						
1963						
1964						
1965						
1966						
1967						
1968						
1969						
1970						
1971						
						(b)(1)
						(b)(3) CIAAct

* Agency reimburses for services but personnel do not count against strength. Requirements for this category were included in an annual estimates commencing with FY 1970 at request of DOD.

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Appendix C

Mobilization and Military Personnel Division

1947-70

KEY PERSONNELDivision Chiefs

1947-49
1949-52
1952-54
1954-58
1958-67
1967-

1954-58
1958-61
1961-64
1964-65
1965-67
1966-

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Appendix D

"Non-Assigned" Military Personnel Support Programs
in Effect in 1970

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Established Prior to 10 February 1969*

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] Airmen. This program involving air police guards had been in use since November 1963. Because of the sensitive mission of the activity, only personnel possessing an Air Force TOP SECRET clearance were assigned by the Air Force.

[redacted] Air Force Officer and [redacted] Airmen. These personnel provided physical security coverage at two of the Agency's of [redacted] at [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Airmen. Support for an SOD air operation. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Airmen. Discussed above. (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Airmen (later increased to [redacted]). These person (b)(3) CIAAct
were used to perform ground support functions similar to those (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] Airmen. Required to provide physical security (b)(3)
coverage and [redacted] for an activity of the [redacted] NatSecAct

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

* OPM 20-51-4, 10 February, placed responsibility for establishment and monitoring of all "non-assigned" military personnel sup (b)(1)
programs under the Director of Personnel. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [] Airmen. This program was established in 1960 as a basis of reimbursement for Air Force maintenance support for Agency aircraft based [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
Established After 10 February 1969

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [] Army NCO Movement Supervisor required to monitor and expedite Agency shipments through the port. (Note: This was the first use of Army personnel support under the "non-assigned" conce (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct [] - [] Air Policemen were required to provide physical security for the Agency's communications sites.

This support became necessary after [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct Vietnam- [] Air Policemen and [] Army Enlisted Men. These programs were formally established for reimbursement and personnel strength accounting purposes effective 1 July 1970. For several months prior to that time the Saigon Station had obtained military personnel support through local arrangements with Headquarters MACV and Headquarters 7th Air Force. The withdrawal of military personnel from Vietnam and the

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

imposition of personnel ceiling cuts by the Department of Defense, however, made formalization necessary. The [] air policemen were used to train, administer, and supervise [] and (b)(1) to expedite the movement of certain personnel and material through the (b)(3) NatSecAct Tan Son Nhut Airbase complex. The [] Army enlisted spaces inc (b)(3) CIAAct

[] Supply Specialists, [] Motor Maintenance NCO's, [] Procurement Specialist, [] Mess Steward, and [] Security Guards. (Note: The mess steward (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct security guard positions were not used since the station for which they (b)(1) were intended was closed before the program became effective. (b)(3) CIAAct authorization was retained, however.) (b)(1)

[] Army Security Guards ([]) (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

This program also became effective 1 July 1970 as replacement (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

"assigned" army security personnel which the Chief, European Division

had decided to eliminate to satisfy OPRED requirements. Thanks to

the cooperation of the Provost Marshal, US Army Europe (Brigadier

General H. L. Moore, Jr.), this transition worked very smoothly. On

(b)(1)
30 June 1970, 16 of the "assigned" guards were transferred (b)(3) NatSecAct

from the Agency to the Office of the Provost Marshal but remained in

place. Also, the Agency received an unexpected bonus in the changeover

in that USAREUR elected to charge the [] guards [] to occupation (b)(1)

(b)(3) costs. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [] Air Force Officer and [] Airmen. This program

was formalized in early 1970 when the Department of Air Force requested

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(1) the Agency to reimburse for the Focal Point (AF HEAVY SANDSO Officer
(b)(3) CIAAct. who was devoting full time to Station support activities. At the same
time the Station requested that airmen (an Admin Supervisor and a
(b)(1) Personnel Specialist) be assigned to assist the Focal Point Officer
(b)(3) CIAAct so that he would be able to make more upcountry visits.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Air Force Officer. The Department
of Air Force requested reimbursement for services being provided by
(b)(1) the field in support of the Office of Special Projects. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Army Enlisted Men. Department of
Army concurred in use of two Army enlisted men in the Pass-
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct port Office to replace "assigned" enlisted men (Army and (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct Force) who were supporting the Office of Central Processing, Office
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct of Personnel. The changeover was scheduled to become effective during
the latter part of calendar year 1970. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Pending (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1) Air Force Officers and Airmen). On 15 June 1970
the Department of Air Force requested the Agency to reimburse (b)(3) CIAAct
1 July 1970, for spaces (Officers and (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
for support and services which they were providing for the Agency's
Communications facilities
They stated that current and future personnel reductions affecting the
United States Air Force (Europe) had made it necessary to identify

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those Air Force personnel resources that were being applied to functions outside the primary Air Force mission and that their request for reimbursement was based on a study made by Air Staff Officials in May 1970. The request had not been resolved at this writing. Although the Office of Communications hoped to negotiate the number downward, they did expect to have to agree to reimbursement for some of the personnel involved.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActSummary

(b)(3) CIAAct

PERSONNEL

(Airmen)

(Airmen)

(Airmen)

(b)(1) Airmen
(b)(3) CIAAct(b)(1) Airmen
(b)(3) CIAAct

(Airmen)

(Airmen)

(b)(1) _____
(b)(3) CIAAct

(Airmen)

([] Airmen and [] Army Enlisted Men)

(Army Enlisted Men)

(Air Force Officer) (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(Army Enlisted Men)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Recap: [] Air Force Officers, [] Airmen, and [] Army Enlisted Men

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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Appendix E

Special Military Detail Program for Vietnam
For Duty With Revolutionary Development Cadre Program

Casualties

<u>Name</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Type and Date of Casualty</u>
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	Capt	USA	Wounded in Action (28 December 1968)
	Maj	USA	Wounded in Action (12 March 1968)
	Capt	USA	Killed in Action (26 February 1968)
	Maj	USA	Wounded in Action (7 June 1968)
	Maj	USA	Wounded in Action (31 January 1968)
	Capt	USA	Killed in Action (3 October 1967)
	Maj	USA	Wounded in Action (24 November 1967)
	Capt	USMC	Killed in Action (29 February 1968)
	Capt	USA	Wounded in Action (25 September 1967)
	Capt	USA	Wounded in Action (30 March 1968)
	Capt	USA	Wounded in Action (24 November 1967)

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Appendix F

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Eyewitness Account of Valorous Action

The following is an account of the actions of [redacted]
 United States Army, which took place during the Viet Cong assault on [redacted]
 Republic of South Vietnam, on 31 January 1968.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3)NatSecAct
/b/v3
CIAAct
NatSecAct

The Viet Cong assault on [redacted] 1968 (the Tet offensive) began at about 0315 hours. I was in my quarters at the time, and [redacted] was in his own quarters. We stayed as we were, in telephone co(b)(3) with one another, until it became clear that this was a full-scale attack(b)(6) the city. At about 0530 [redacted] came to my house, and we drove back to his quarters, where we stayed until about 0700 hours, when there was sufficient daylight for us to make our way in the streets. We took a Jeep and went out to pick up the wounded who were lying in the streets, and took them to the house of Captain (MD) Robert Leonard, USAF, who had set up and staffed his quarters as an aid station. We made two trips, and brought in a total of seven wounded persons, and then, with Doctor Leonard, we made two trips to the hospital to pick up needed medical supplies. (b)(6)

We then met TMI Howard N. Paulsen and SSgt James Thacker in another Jeep. They had just received a radio message from the Province Senior Advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Girdner, US Army, that his house was surrounded by Viet Cong, and that the Deputy Province Senior Advisor, Mr. Thomas Hayden, had been wounded. The four of us in the two Jeeps drove to the PSA's house in order to provide suppressive fire so that Lt Col Girdner and Hayden could move from the house. We took Hayden to Captain Leonard's house, and then drove Lt Col Girdner to the Tactical Operations Center, where he took over virtual command of the defense of the city. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Upon arrival at the TOC at about 0745, we found that the Provincial Compound (the seat of the Provincial Government, situated across the street to the north of the TOC) was in the hands of the Viet Cong. [redacted] took a sniper rifle into the TOC Briefing Room and began to fire at the VC who were firing from the windows of various buildings in the compound. After about ten minutes of exchanging fire in this manner, [redacted] took an M-79 grenade launcher and moved from the TOC across the street and through the main gate, under heavy enemy fire from within the compound, and entered the Village Office, which is located to the east of the main gate, just inside the compound fence. From this point he fired twelve rounds of M-79 at the enemy concentrated in an adjacent building. Having expended all the ammunition he had carried with him, he again moved under fire from the Village Office to the main gate and back to the TOC. There he picked up a Swedish K submachine gun with a satchel of magazines, and once again went into the compound. He took cover momentarily behind a truck which was parked inside the main gate, about half the distance to, and in line with, the Province Officer's house. Then he moved from the truck to the kitchen, adjacent to the Province Chief's house. From this vantage point, he took the Province Administration Building under fire, as well as the small building beside it, to which it is connected by a breezeway.

When he had fired almost all of his ammunition, he received a re-supply by Paulsen and Thacker, who had moved through the gate with a case of M-79 ammunition and a satchel full of 9 mm ammunition for the Swedish K submachine guns. They also brought an M-50 machine gun which, unfortunately malfunctioned shortly thereafter. It was during this re-supply mission that Paulsen received a wound, which, although not critical, was serious enough to immobilize him for the rest of the action.

After Paulsen had been treated and removed from the Compound, Mr. Woodrow Rickert, US Advisor to the Police Field Forces, came in through the gate with another supply of M-79 ammunition, after which he left the compound. The use of this supply of M-79 ammunition resulted in setting fire to the Province Administration Building and the Province Security Office immediately behind it. An unknown number of Viet Cong died in these fires.

After having set the buildings on fire, [redacted] left the kitchen a(b)(3) CIAAct moved under heavy fire to the ammunition warehouse, which is to the west(b)(6) the kitchen, inside the compound fence. It was here that the malfunction of the M-60 occurred, and this weapon was left in the warehouse. At this point, however, [redacted] was able to acquire more M-79 ammunition. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

He then went from the warehouse toward the Province Chief's house, but in so doing received such intense enemy fire from the schoolhouse across the street to the north of the compound that he was forced to take cover in a gazebo-like structure to the north of the warehouse. After waiting at this point for a time, he broke out in a sudden rush and managed to reach the Province Chief's house.

From this point I could no longer see [redacted] although I could see(b)(3) CIAAct his M-79 firing regularly at the enemy force in and around the Province (b)(6) Administration Building and the Security Office. At about 9:40 I could no longer hear him firing, and I was told by some Vietnamese soldiers that he had moved back in the direction of the warehouse. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Digison, USA, then happened by, and he told me that he had heard that [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct had been wounded. I went with Digison in a Jeep through the west gate o(b)(6): compound, and found [redacted] lying beside the Province Chief's house, to(b)(3) CIAAct point he had managed to drag himself, with the help of some ARVN soldier(b)(6) from behind some trees to the north of the house. He had originally taken cover behind these trees in order to lay more effective fire upon the Security Office. While lying in this position he had received a bullet wound, apparently from an AK-47, from the western end of the school building, across the street from the compound. The bullet had penetrated his buttock, coursed upward through his belly and had exited just below the navel. It was obviously a very serious wound.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) [redacted] had given himself an injection of morphine, and was still conscious. We managed to get him into the Jeep and took him to the hospital; but since the [redacted] hospital lacked the means to treat the wound adequately he was shortly thereafter medevaced to the Third Field Hospital at Dong Tam. He was very near the point of death before he finally came under the care of surgeons with adequate facilities to save him.

Because of the nature of this action, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of enemy killed by [redacted]. The battle lasted for two hours, and during that time he expended about 280 rounds of M-79 ammunition. Of the thirty-nine VC dead left in the compound after the battle, I estimate that [redacted] killed ten to fifteen.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

During the entire action, [redacted] took initiatives that were clearly far above and beyond the call of duty; and he persistently and aggressively carried the fight to the enemy, under constant and heavy fire from automatic weapons at close range. He fought with absolute disregard for his own personal safety, displaying not only outstanding courage, but truly professional skill in his handling of a combat situation against overwhelming odds.

Except as noted in the foregoing, I was an eyewitness to all the actions described, and I have recounted them here with complete accuracy to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/S/

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Roger W. Hightower, 643027
Lieutenant, USN

RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD

For use of this form, see AR 672-5-1; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

 HEROISM MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE

TO: (Include ZIP Code)

COMUSMACV
ATTN: MACAG-PD
APO 96222

FROM: (Include ZIP Code)

Chief, RDC Division
IV Corps

PART I - PERSONAL DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE (b)(3) CIAAct 12. SSAN _____ 3. GRADE Major 4. BRANCH Infantry

(b)(6)

5. ORGANIZATION

MACV (CORDS)

6. RECOMMENDED AWARD

Distinguished Service Cross

7. POSTHUMOUS AWARD: YES NO

8. DESIRED DATE OF PRESENTATION

8. DATE AND PLACE OF DEATH

9. WAS INTERIM AWARD MADE? YES NO

9. NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND ADDRESS OF NOK

AWARD:

PART II - RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROISM

10. INFORMATION ABOUT EYEWITNESS

a. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MI	b. SSAN	c. GRADE	d. UNIT
HIGHTOWER, Roger W.	_____	LT USN	MACV (CORDS)
			(b)(6)

IF STATEMENT OF WITNESS IS NOT ATTACHED, GIVE REASON

A statement by LT Hightower is attached.

11. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED

a. LOCATION (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActb. TIME 0135 to 0945
c. DATE 31 Jan 68

d. UNIT MORALE, CASUALTIES, AND MISSION DURING TIME AND DATE(S) OF ACT

_____ is not assigned to a combat unit. He is, and was at the time of (b)(3) CIAAct detailed to CORDS as an advisor to Revolutionary Development Teams. He and (b)(6) fellow advisors were in their respective quarters when the attack began.

PART III - RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE

12. INCLUSIVE DATE FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED

13. INCLUSIVE DATES OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNIT SHOWN IN ITEM 5,
STATE REASON FOR END DATE (Retire, REFRAD, etc.)

14. OTHER AWARDS TO INDIVIDUAL DURING TIME FRAME SHOWN IN ITEM 12 (Does not include Interim award)

PART IV - OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND AUTHENTICATION

15. INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING APPENDICES:

See Appendix VII, AR 672-5-1 for instructions on completing and attaching necessary narrative data, such as description of the act, sketches, maps and statements of witnesses.

16. RELATED POSITION OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION
TO PERSON BEING RECOMMENDED
Regional Supervisor

18. IF APPROVED, FORWARD AWARD TO:

USA Special Warfare Sch (WLEOAA)
Fort Bragg, NC 2830717. TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH AND TITLE OF PERSON
INITIATING RECOMMENDATION
J. ANDY ROGERS, GS-14

Acting Chief, RDC Division

19. SIGNATURE

/S/

20. DATE

9 Dec 1970

NARRATIVE

(b)(3) CIAAct

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

(b)(6)

is assigned as U. S. Advisor to the Revolutionary Development

Cadre. In that capacity, he has no assignment, order or formal obligation to enter into combat. Nevertheless, when the assault on [redacted] had reached its full force, he drove with three other Americans to the home of the Province Senior Advisor, under heavy fire, to provide suppressive fire and enable the Senior Advisor to move from his quarters to the Tactical Operations Center.

At the same time, they took the Deputy Province Senior Advisor, who had been wounded, to the home of Captain (MD) Robert Leonard, USAF, for treatment. [redacted] then assisted Leonard in gathering seven wounded persons from various locations in the streets of the city and taking them to [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct's quarters for treatment, moving under enemy fire for extended periods of time as they did so.

Upon returning to the TOC, [redacted] learned of the occupation of the Provincial Compound, across the street from the TOC, by about fifty or sixty (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Cong, who were armed with automatic weapons and B-40 rocket launchers. He first fired at the compound from the TOC, using a sniper rifle; and in so doing was able to get a general idea of the strong points within the fence. It was then about 0745 hours, and [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct accompanied by Lieutenant Roger H. [redacted] (b)(6) took an M-79 grenade launcher and rushed through the compound gate. Seeing this example, four soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) followed him into the compound. These six men were the only friendly forces inside the compound throughout the entire action. In a firefight which lasted until approximately 1100 hours, [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) displayed a pugnacity and courage which made him a deadly antagonist. He carried the battle to the enemy, against almost overwhelming odds, and had killed about ten to fifteen of them.

before he was wounded and thus put out of action. It is a mark of his skill as a professional soldier that this wound was received as a result of his moving into a closer position, with a better field of fire; but that the wound was not inflicted by fire from the position he was assaulting, but rather by a sniper from a building outside the compound. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

During the entire action, [redacted] was under heavy fire from automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. At no time did he waver or lessen the pressure of his attack. It is of course pure speculation to say what the outcome (b)(3) NatSecAct battle for [redacted] would have been if [redacted] had not acted, but there is no doubt that his action was the factor which reduced this key strong point within a few hours after the enemy had occupied it. After other military action had destroyed the pagodas which were being used by the enemy as command posts and staging points, the result was that the enemy was driven completely out of the city by nightfall....almost a unique situation among all the provincial capitals of the Delta region which were attacked at the same time. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

[redacted] could have done considerably less during the day's battle, and (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) still have been properly considered to have displayed great courage. The actions he did perform were a signal service to his comrades, his allies and his country, and they were prompted only by [redacted] own dedication (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) his duty and his nation, rather than by specific assignment or orders. By any definition, these actions were heroic, and deserve to be honored by his fellow countrymen.

PROPOSED CITATION

FOR

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving
conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam: [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on
31 January 1968 during the Viet Cong "Tet" assault on [redacted] the capital (b)(1)
of Vinh Binh Province, where he was serving as advisor to the Provincial Re- (b)(3)
connaissance Unit and Revolutionary Development Cadres. As soon as daylight (b) NatSecAct
broke after the initial enemy assault, [redacted] moved through the [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
streets under hostile fire with another American officer to pick up wounded (b)(6)
and brought seven wounded persons to the hospital. On returning to his
compound he was informed that fifty to sixty Viet Cong had captured and
occupied the Province Chief's compound. For about ten minutes [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
and three other Americans personally engaged a large group of Viet Cong in (b)(6)
the Provincial compound Administration building in a fire fight. [redacted]

[redacted] then armed himself with an M-79 grenade launcher and moved quick (b)(3) CIAAct
to the Provincial compound with the other Americans and four Vietnamese (b)(6)
soldiers, who were inspired by the American example, providing protective
covering fire and resupplying ammunition. For almost two hours while under (b)(3) CIAAct
intense hostile machine gun and rocket fire, [redacted] personally (b)(6)
maneuvered from one position to another and fired his grenade launcher into
windows of the various buildings of the Provincial compound occupied by Viet
Cong until he was seriously wounded. His grenades set fire to the Administration
Building and the Province Security Office and an unknown number of Viet Cong
died in these fires. His aggressiveness and tenacity, as well as the skill

with which he directed the fire and ammunition resupply movements of the seven men who supported him, ultimately drove the enemy from the compound in which they left behind thirty-nine dead Viet Cong. Without [redacted] heroic example and actions, the Viet Cong would have been able to consolidate their hold on the Provincial compound, and the outcome of the battle for [redacted] would have been different if the Viet Cong could have controlled this strong-point for a longer period. Although [redacted] was the key figure in blunting and turning the enemy offensive in [redacted] he was under no military command to participate in the battle, but did so voluntarily. [redacted] extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Army.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Appendix H

Decorations and Awards for Officers

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SECRET

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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SECRET

SECRET

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

- 194 -

SECRET

SECRET

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

- 195 -

SECRET

SECRET

Appendix I

Agency-Sponsored Reserve Unit Designations
and
Unit Commanders

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

SECRET

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

- 197 -

SECRET

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

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SECRET

SECRET

Appendix J

Joint Military Reserve Training Command (Provisional)
Organized 1 July 1962

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C02489890

SECRET

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

- 201 -

SECRET

Area Training Group Commanders

Africa

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)


Europe

Near East

Pacific

SECRET

Western Hemisphere



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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SECRET

SECRET

Appendix K

Reserve Affairs Branch, MMPD/OP

1954-70

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

27 November 1962

Appendix L

National Defense Executive Reserve(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

- 206 -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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